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ABSTRACT 
Anger In Action:  
The Role of Emotions, Competition, and Threat on Mobilization.  
by 
Ngoc Phan 
Research Question: Anger is believed to be a powerful motivator of group mobilization.  
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the role of anger in assisting individuals to 
overcome the collective action problem.  Theory: I utilize Intergroup Emotional Theory 
in order to build and test hypotheses on when and how anger will lead to mobilization.  
Methods: I test my hypotheses through four experiments.  Experiment 1 examines how 
individual level anger impacts mobilization.  In Experiment 2, I implement a test to 
induce anger towards an out-group.  In Experiment 3, I then examine how anger towards 
an out-group impacts mobilization under the contexts of threat and competition.  In 
Experiment 4, I look at different threatening contexts and how anger towards an out-
group, limited information, and discrimination all work together to impact mobilization.  
Results: In Experiment 1, I found that when an angry subject is asked to take action in a 
task unrelated to that anger, the subject fails to mobilize.  In Experiment 2, I built and 
tested two experimental manipulations of out-group anger and was successful in inducing 
anger directed towards an out-group.  Having successfully induced out-group anger, 
Experiment 3 then demonstrated that out-group anger increases mobilization under 
competition, but not under threat. The mobilizing effect of out-group anger was limited 
under threat because subjects also felt angry towards their own in-group.  Lastly, I 
iii  
reexamine different variations of threat on mobilization.  I attempt to reduce increases in 
in-group anger by limiting information and discriminating against the angry group, but as 
I stack the deck against the angry group, they responded by mobilizing less.  
Conclusions: The potential for anger to mobilize may be contingent upon the level of out-
group and in-group anger within a group.  These findings collectively shed light on how 
out-group anger can either facilitate action or lead to inaction.  
iv 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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In July 2009, China suffered the worst ethnic unrest in years.  In Xinjiang China, 
ethnic violence broke out between the Uighurs (Turkish Muslims) and Han (ethnic 
majority) resulting in over 200 deaths and 1700 injured (Gladney 2009).  Media reports 
indicate that Uighur protests against discrimination turned into racial riots, leading to 
many Han deaths.  Hans, in turn, retaliated and attacked Uighur citizens (Wong 2009).  
For decades, Uighurs and Hans had lived in relative peace with one another, but this time 
things escalated into full-blown violence.  This case and others like it highlight how 
ethnic or religious competition can explode into violent outbursts.  Ethnic competition is 
prevalent throughout most societies, often lingering and persisting without violence.  
Competition over land and resources often increases ethnic tension between groups.  
While it is assumed that anger causes ethnic groups to riot, current explanations for 
ethnic violence fail to fully account for the role of emotions in violent mobilization.  How 
emotions serve as the catalyst to mobilization and violence is still not well understood.  
  2 
There are many explanations for why individuals mobilize and get involved in 
costly collective action.  The literature on collective action is well established and 
expands into many fields (Olson 1965; Dawes 1980; Hardin 1982; Messick et. al 1983; 
Sally 1995).  Studies on emotions shed light on when an individual is angry, but fails to 
elucidate how anger directed at the out-group impacts political behavior.  In this 
dissertation, I use interdisciplinary literature to help answer the question.  I build upon the 
collective action work in political science, the behavioral economic experiments in 
economics, and emotional research in social psychology. 
Current studies examine aspects of group threat and emotions separately, but do 
not consider their joint effects.  These studies often miss how emotions may provide a 
mechanism (a commitment device) that incites an individual to become willing to 
disregard their own well being for the benefit of the collective.  In order to address these 
limitations, I focus on how anger at the out-group influences group mobilization.  
In this dissertation, I empirically test three explanations for group mobilization.  
The three explanations are emotions, competition, and group threat.  My objective is to 
understand how these three explanations alone, and in combination with one another, 
influence individuals to decide whether or not to take part in collective action.  I 
hypothesize that emotions serve to enhance and heighten the effects of group competition 
and group threat, both of which are necessary ingredients for mobilization.   
Scholars and political pundits alike often assert the notion that ethnic mobilization 
is motivated by out-group anger.  Ethnic groups interact and become angry at one another 
and each respective group then mobilizes their angry co-ethnics against the other.  Case 
studies and on going ethnic conflicts often offer anger as the key catalyst for ethnic 
  3 
mobilization.  Racial riots and social movements alike also evoke this underlying theory 
that anger pushed citizens to take to the streets.  Yet, the theoretical reasoning and logic 
for how group anger manifest itself into mobilization is unclear.  There are places where 
citizens are angry but fail to mobilize, but then there are other situations where anger sets 
off the catalyst to social and political revolutions.   
This dissertation sets out to experimentally test whether anger can lead to 
mobilization.  The research on emotions indicates that anger has implications for political 
behavior and decision making (See review: Groenendyk 2011).  The nature of collective 
action is foundational to political science.  When and why individuals choose to take on a 
cause for their fellow group members is not well understood within the framework of 
emotional research.  I argue that emotional mechanisms may underpin why and how a 
citizen rallies around a collective cause.  For example, when someone is angry with the 
out-group, their cost and benefit calculations may differ from when they are not angry.   
The problem in current research and political rhetoric is that there is an assumed 
relationship between anger and collective action.  I am putting this conventional 
knowledge through empirical analysis.  Exactly how and why anger pushes people to take 
part in costly collectively action is not as straightforward as conventional wisdom 
suggests.  Explaining post-hoc reasons for protests or large-scale mobilization is 
problematic.  I argue we need to understand why and how people become angry and then 
what they do with this anger.  I further argue that what they are angry about and whom 
they are angry at may highlight when they may do something about this anger.  However, 
the current explanations for mobilization fail to fully discuss these aspects of the target of 
anger and the different realms of responses to anger within a group context.   
  4 
Current theories of collective action do not fully account for the role of emotions 
and individuals interacting.  This study attempts to fill in this knowledge gap by 
clarifying how emotions, specifically anger, motivate individuals to take part in costly 
group action.  In summary, anger needs a target to mobilize and is most useful when the 
target is the out-group.  Out-group anger leads to mobilization under competition but not 
threat.  Under threatening conditions, groups angry toward the out-group responded to 
feedback and simultaneously increased in anger towards their in-group.  The increase in 
in-group anger then curbed any impact that out-group anger would have had on 
mobilizing.   
The results of this dissertation provide clues to why ethnic violence broke out 
between the Uighurs and Hans.  Everyday the Uighur and Han feel anger and compete 
with one another relatively peacefully.  However, this balance is provoked by some 
catalyst (threat) and results in violence.  Anger, group competition, and group threat 
alone often fail to lead to violence.  It is the dangerous combination of all three that 
produces violent mobilization.  If true, then these results will further clarify how exactly 
anger mobilized the Uighurs and Hans to attack one another.  In studying the causes of 
violent mobilization, I hope to shed light on how best to avoid and identify group 
interactions that are most likely to lead to violence.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review,  
Theory, and Hypotheses 
2.1. Mobilization 
Mobilization is the process in which actors induce others to participate 
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 2003).  In this dissertation, mobilization refers to when 
individuals take costly action on behalf of their group.  Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) 
further define mobilization to have two important components (1) it subsidizes the cost of 
participation (provides information and resources) for an individual to take action, and 
(2) it works because it occasions social contracts that provide additional benefits (exploits 
friendship and social obligations).  Working within this definition of mobilization, I will 
demonstrate that existing theories of mobilization fail to include how emotions can serve 
to reduce the cost of participation and provide additional social benefits.  While the 
notion that emotions and politics go hand in hand is not novel, I argue that the existing 
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research on emotions in politics fails to consider how the specific emotion of anger 
directed at the out-group yields unique insight into how groups mobilize.  
The organization of the literature review will first summarize the general existing 
mobilization research.  I will then introduce the emotional explanations for mobilization 
and their current limitations.  I argue that though the literature on how emotions impact 
mobilization has thoroughly considered the emotion anger and its impact on politics, 
there lacks any significant treatment of out-group anger.  The last section of the literature 
review will build the case for understanding out-group anger as an important ingredient 
for group mobilization. 
2.2. General Mobilization: Costs and Benefits 
The underlining assumption in most mobilization models is that individuals will 
mobilize when the benefits outweigh the costs (Downs 1957).  This model helps explain 
how mobilization is a collective action problem.  Olson’s seminal work on collective 
action and groups indicate that often self-interested individuals fail to work towards a 
common or group goal (1965). Equally important theories of mobilization rest on social 
characteristics, elites, parties, and contact.  The socioeconomic model argues that those 
most likely to mobilize have the time, money, and skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 
1995).  Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) argue those most likely to mobilize are educated, 
efficacious, and socially engaged in their communities.  The thrust of these arguments is 
that those with the most resources and who are the most socially involved will mobilize, 
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but these arguments largely fail to acknowledge how emotions may provide subsidies for 
action and exploit social connections.   
Elites, whether community leaders or political, will also mobilize citizens 
(Leighley 2001).  However, the willingness of elites to mobilize a group of citizens 
depends on the size of the group (strength in numbers), which ignores the primary driver 
of the group’s likelihood to mobilize – the group’s socioeconomic status.  Interest groups 
also provide their group members with selective incentives to mobilize.  Selective 
incentives punish those who do not work for the group’s interest and “can be treated 
differently than those who do” (Olson, 1965, p51).  These top down theories posit that 
elites and interest groups reduce the costs and increase the benefits of participation.  
Individuals are seen as incapable agents of mobilization absent formal organizations and 
elites.  
Race is also an important mobilization tool.  In a pivotal article on ethnic and 
racial mobilization, Leighley and Velditz (1999) identify (1) socioeconomic status, (2) 
psychological resources, (3) social connectedness, (4) group identity and group 
consciousness, and (5) group conflict as the primary mobilization frameworks.  These 
racial and ethnic frameworks build upon social identity and group models of mobilization 
underpinned by relational goods (Uhlaner et al. 1989), which are incentives enjoyed by 
group membership and take the form of group identification, social interactions, and 
social norms.  Identifying with a group and caring about its wellbeing can increase the 
likelihood of mobilization (Verba and Nie 1995; Pantoja et al. 2001; Stokes 2003; 
Sanchez 2006; Masuoka 2006; McClain et al. 2009).  Empirical evidence supports this 
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relationship among African Americans, where group consciousness and linked fate maps 
to political behaviors and attitudes (Tate 1993; Allen et al. 1989; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; 
Dawson 1994).  However, the research on Latinos and Asians are at best mixed when it 
comes to group consciousness and participation (Lien 1994, Jones-Correa & Leal 1996; 
Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Bobo and Johnson 2000; Stokes 2003; Chong & Rogers 
2004; Junn 2006).  
Group membership is not the only factor that mobilizes; how you ask people to 
participate can also have an impact.  There is a large body of research that compares the 
most effective contact methods (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2008). These “get out the 
vote” (GOTV) studies include canvassing (such as telephone, in-person, or flyers) and 
text messaging (Dale and Strauss 2009; Gerber and Green 2000, 2004; Green, Gerber, 
and Nicholson 2007). GOTV assumes that social pressure is an effective mobilization 
tool (Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008).  However, how exactly social pressure calculates 
into the mobilization equation is still ambiguous.  
Social pressure studies assume that “individuals do not make political decisions in 
a vacuum” (Siegel, 2009, 122).  There is ample evidence that social networks are 
associated with participation (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Kenny 1992; Leighley 1990; 
McClurg 2003, 2006; Mutz 2002) and social movements (Chong 1991; Kuran 1991; 
McAdams 1986; Petersen 2001).  For example, Chong (2000) argues that private 
incentives such as personal reputation mobilized support for the Civil Rights Movement.  
When people care about their reputation, they must take into account how they make 
others feel and how they feel about themselves.  For example, a person who at first may 
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not have given their support to the Civil Rights Movement, may end up eventually 
joining the movement due to social pressure.   
This pressure could be in the form of shame if they did not join their community 
members in protesting. In one field experiment, shame was effective at mobilizing high 
and low propensity voters (Costas 2010).  The GOTV field experiments highlight how 
basic emotions can mobilize but often fails to consider a variety of action-oriented 
emotions.  While the shame and guilt study is a great direction forward, it fails to 
consider the importance of anger, which should also fit well into social pressure theories.  
For example, when an individual observes members of her group being angry, she may 
then feel pressure to also become or express this emotion.  Studies on mobilization ignore 
how anger may impact the cost of participating and interact with social pressure.  
2.3. Emotions and Politics 
 There are many existing theories on how the role of the emotions affects 
political decision making.  Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) (Marcus and MacKuen 
1993; Marcus et al. 2000) is the leading paradigm in this research area.  The assumption 
is that threat (racial and political) leads to anxiety.  This anxiety then changes how 
individuals process information, support policies, and mobilization efforts.  It is derived 
from emotional appraisal theory and has been used to understand how emotions influence 
(1) political judgments, such as feelings towards candidates, presidents, and elections 
(Abelson et al.1982; Brader 2005; Ragsdale 1991; Dunn and Schweitzer 2005), (2) 
support for policies (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav 2005; Brader, Valentino, and 
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Suhay 2008; Suthammanont, Peterson, Owens, and Leighley 2010), and (3) information 
processing  (Marcus et al. 2000; Burden and Klofstad 2005; Dolan and Holbrook 2001).  
Collectively, these previous studies make affect a core tool for understanding political 
attitudes and behaviors.  Overall, AIT finds that anxiety pushes voters to diverge from 
habitual behavior and motivates them to gather more information (Marcus et al. 2000).   
AIT assumes that the emotional response to threat is anxiety, but new research 
suggests that this assumption is incomplete.  It is problematic because other researchers 
argue that anger is another response to threat, which leads to different outcomes than 
found in AIT (Lerner and Keltner 2000, Huddy 2009, Petersen 2010, Valentino et al. 
2011).  For example, discriminatory experiences (threat) have been shown to increase 
participation (Salamon and Van Evera 1973, Feldman and Stenner 1997, Marcus, 
Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Miller et al. 2000; Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens 2000; 
Cho, Gimpel, and Wu 2006, Valentino et al. 2009), but the causal mechanism behind this 
mobilization is more complicated than anxiety alone.  The hidden catalyst, in this 
example, is an emotion that leads to action: anger.   
Recent research across disciplines on threat also point to anger being the driver 
behind mobilization (Druckman and McDermott 2008; Lerner et al. 2003; Lerner and 
Keltner 2001; MacKuen et al. 2010; Nabi 2003; Valentino et al. 2006; Valentino et al. 
2008; Valentino et al. 2011).  One limitation of these studies is that they rely on 
analyzing how anger impacts mobilization at the individual level absent social 
interactions and group identity.  The missing link to understanding the interaction 
between anger, social interactions, and group identity is group-level anger directed at the 
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out-group.  A systematic gap then exists in the current state of affective research that 
overlooks how out-group anger calculates into the decision to take collective action.  
One way to address this gap is to consider how threat may manifest itself into 
creating out-group anger.  A recent review of the threat literature suggests two diverse 
and distinct reactions to threat: anxiety and anger (Huddy et al. 2007).  The empirical and 
theoretical findings across many studies find that these two emotional reactions to threat 
lead to different outcomes.  In a similar vein, Petersen (2010) further demonstrates that 
anger and anxiety are distinct emotions that consist of different behavioral domains with 
regards to perceptions.   
These findings echo the work of evolutionary psychologists on the logic of human 
anger (Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides 2009).  Evolutionary psychologists argue that humans 
use anger to bargain with and as a motivation mechanism to approach the target of their 
anger (Peterson, Sznycer, Cosmides, and Tobby 2010).  These findings provide evidence 
of how anger is an alternative response to threat.  Another important aspect of anger is 
that it is a social emotion, foundational to understanding how social and political animals 
behave (Alford and Hibbing 2004; Cosmides and Tooby 2006).  Unfortunately, political 
scientists have focused mainly on anger in a vacuum and ignored the social impact of 
anger.  
The political science literature on threat has already generated a plethora research 
on the impact of anger on mobilization.  This anger is assumed to get people to march in 
the streets but political scientists have yet to fully explore how anger actually does this 
within a social context.  Experiments that induce anger and measure political 
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participation absent social context and subject interactions fail to pinpoint the underlying 
mechanism.  Survey research that correlates reported levels of anger and political 
responses are also largely silent on how anger and what type of anger is most effective at 
getting people to act.  In order to address these limitations, this dissertation examines the 
social aspects of out-group anger.  I am interested in what happens when individuals are 
angry with the out-group and how individuals respond when they know other group 
members are also angry.  Current research on anger and mobilization fails to 
systematically tackle these two questions.   
2.4. Theory  
In the next section, I present Intergroup Emotional Theory (Mackie et al. 2000).  
IET addresses levels of analysis and relationships that Affective Intelligence Theory 
misses.  It provides a comprehensive understanding on emotions with regards to social 
pressure and group theories.  There are three important assumptions in IET with regards 
to anger and mobilization.  First, it assumes that emotions can be appraised in light of 
groups.  Second, groups feel negative affect towards one another.  Third, groups may feel 
specific discrete emotions towards out-groups.  These assumptions provide the leverage 
to think about out-group anger and mobilization.   
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Figure 2.1 – Roadmap of Intergroup Emotional Theory 
 
 IET involves three levels of analysis (1) individual level, (2) interpersonal level 
(interaction between individuals), and (3) group level (Figure 2.1).  At the individual 
level, Appraisal Action Tendency Theory is the dominant theory (Affective Intelligence 
Theory). At the interpersonal level, the dominant approach involves social referencing, 
which is the notion that emotions provide social information (social pressure theories).  
At the group level, the most common underlining theory is social identity theory and 
intergroup relations (group theories).  I argue that political affect research has thoroughly 
examined emotions at the individual level and interpersonal level.  However, the work on 
emotions at the group level is not as robust.   
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2.5. Intergroup Emotional Theory at the Individual Level 
At the individual level, social psychologists developed the two-dimensional 
valence model and appraisal theory to explain emotions and behavior.  These models 
establish that positive moods are associated with more pro-social behaviors (Berkowitz 
1987; Cunningham et al. 1990; Isen et al. 1978).  On the other hand, Hertel et al. (2000) 
find that moods affect the process of decision making but does not affect the level of 
cooperation.  Given these divergent findings, the relationship between specific moods 
and cooperation is unclear.   
In contrast to the two-model valence theory, appraisal theories assume that 
individuals anticipate and take into account how they feel about potential consequences 
of alternative courses of action (Fridja 1986; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Keltner et al. 
1993; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001).  Appraisal theory and 
the two-valence model of emotions indicate that positive emotions are associated with 
approach and negative emotions are associated with avoidance.  One exception is that 
anger is considered to have both approach and avoidance tendencies (Lerner and 
Tiendens 2006).  Appraisal Action Tendency theory provides a roadmap to understanding 
how an individual responds to specific emotions, but little on how individuals interacting 
with others while angry will respond.   
2.6. Intergroup Emotional Theory at the Social Level 
At the individual level, AIT research overlooks social psychological emotional 
theories that account for social interactions, such as social referencing and contagion.  In 
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social referencing, individuals draw on the emotional expressions of others to inform 
their own emotions and behaviors (Klinnert et al. 1983).  Emotional contagion theory 
argues that human beings have the “tendency to automatically mimic and 
synchronize...with those of another person” (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1994, p.5).   
Emotions As Social Information (EASI) theory serves as the interpersonal theory 
that incorporates how emotions serve as social cues.  EASI theory builds upon the work 
of social-functional approach scholars (Frijda 1986; Keltner and Haidt 1999, Keltner et 
al. 2001).  EASI is useful because (1) previous models studied the valence of 
emotions/moods but EASI focuses on discrete emotions and the information these 
specific emotions convey, (2) it considers emotions to have two processes (a) 
interpersonal influence (inferences and affective reactions) and (b) two classes of 
moderators (information processing and social-relational factors), and (3) it integrates 
inconsistent findings for the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions on behavior 
(van Kleef 2010). 
Behavioral economists have explored the impact of Emotions As Social 
Information and found a strong relationship between emotions and perceptions of risk 
(Druckman and McDermott 2008; Loewenstein 2008).  Empirical tests indicate that 
emotions play a key role in negotiations and bargaining (van Kleef, De Dreu, Manstead 
2008; Cyders and Smith 2008; van Dijk, van Kleef, Steinel, and van Beest 2008).  When 
bargaining, subjects who communicate anger are more likely to receive lower outcomes 
than subjects who did not communicate anger (van Dijk and van Kleef, Steinel, and van 
Beest 2008).  In negotiations, van Kleef, De Dreu, Manstead (2008) find that angry 
“opponent[s] elicits compliance in the focal negotiator, whereas happiness elicits 
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exploitation” (73).  The EASI model provides a bridge to understanding discrete 
emotions and their effects on individuals, but fails consider group behavior.  While EASI 
can inform group behavior, most social scientists only evaluate this theory with regard to 
risks and attitudes that overlooks groups.  
2.7. Intergroup Emotional Theory at the Group Level 
Emotion by itself is often not enough to mobilize individuals; there must be an 
examination of how emotion impact groups.  Group mobilization is a problem of 
collective action.  Political scientists offer rational choice and social norms explanations 
for solving problems of collective action.  Chong (1991) argues that individuals mobilize 
in order to work for private goods, such as reputation.  Javeline (2003) argues that the 
greater the blame attribution, the greater the probability an individual will mobilize.  
These two frameworks hint to how emotions such as shame, embarrassment, fear, and 
anger mobilizes.  Other explanations for group collective action are based on group 
deprivation theory (Runciman 1966; Crosby 1976; Folger 1987), social identity theory 
(Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979), resource mobilization theory (Klandermans 1989), and 
procedural fairness theory (Smith and Kessler 2004).  These theories also fail to account 
for the role that emotions may play in mobilization but provide a great springboard to 
bring emotions into the discussion. 
The existing literature is well represented in the areas of group research grounded 
in social identity and self-categorization theory (Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979) and 
theories of intergroup relations (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998).  Social identity theory is 
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based on the notion of in-groups and out-groups, where individuals identify and value 
their in-group and devalue out-groups (Brown and Brewer 1998).  The key theoretical 
argument is that individuals with high levels of social identity are more likely to take part 
in collective action on behalf of their group’s interests.  However, there is mixed 
empirical evidence for this argument (Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam 1990; Mackie, 
Devos, and Smith 2000).   
The literature on intergroup relations helps bridge the gap between group identity 
and emotions.  Intergroup relations theories deal with group affect towards one another 
and intergroup contact.  It is well established that groups feel negative affect towards out-
group members (Sherif and Sherif 1953; Tajfel 1974; Tajfel 1982; Brewer and Miller 
2003).  However, not many scholars have considered how in-groups can feel specific 
negative emotions towards out-groups.  Emotions may be most important when there is 
group threat – when groups are not given equal status and possess different interests.  
Group threat is based on groups fighting and competing, perceived or real, over symbolic 
and material resources (Kinder and Sears 1981; Bobo 1983).  Research indicates the 
dominant group feels threatened when (1) the size of the subordinate group increases 
(Keys 1949; Sears and Kinder 1981, 1985; Bobo 1983, 1988), and (2) social policies can 
potentially benefit subordinate groups (Bobo and Klugel 1993).  While the literature on 
group threat is extensive, the vast majority of it fails to mention emotions even though 
threat and emotions go hand in hand. 
One exception is Peterson (2002), who uses an emotions-based approach to 
understanding collective action.  He argues that resentment (a sense of unjust group 
status) explains ethnic violence because it “describes a process linking structure to 
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information, information to belief, belief to emotion, and emotion and belief to action” 
(259).  In this theory, structural changes such as modernization or rapid changes (collapse 
of empire, war/occupation, and collapse of state) influence how information, beliefs, and 
emotions lead to ethnic violence.  Peterson details how emotions related to fear, hatred, 
and resentment are associated with specific targets of violence.  However, Peterson does 
not argue that anger mobilizes.  Yet recent work indicates that that anger does mobilize 
(Valentino et al. 2011).  In Valentino et al’s (2011) experimental work, they find that 
“anger boosts participation” and in longitudinal survey data that “anger to be positively 
linked to participation” (168).    
Currently, the research on emotions and behavior talks past the research on 
groups and collective action.  I merge these research approaches using IET in order to test 
how emotions and group competition impact mobilization.  Under group threat, emotions 
conveyed by group members may serve as a commitment device and assist with 
mobilization.  In order to address this limitation, I borrow from existing theories of 
emotions and mobilization and develop empirical tests.  The purpose of this research is to 
examine and integrate how emotions (1) help with the interpretation and organization of 
information about oneself and one’s environment, (2) serve to mobilize and allocate 
resources, (3) facilitate arousal and motivation, and (4) provide a mechanism for social 
communication (Pieters and van Raaij 1987).  With these properties, an emotional 
mobilization explanation may broaden our understanding of collection action through 
what is known about group research. 
IET integrates the individual, interpersonal, and group level theories into 
emotions.  Emotion research at the individual level has been widely integrated into 
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political science.  The Affective Intelligence theory is a variant of Appraisal Action 
Tendency Theory.  At the individual level, appraisal theory argues that the situation or 
event leads to a specific emotion, depending on how it harms or helps individual 
concerns (Frijda 1986, Roseman 1984; Scherer 1988; Smith and Ellsworth 1985).   After 
appraising a situation, individuals experience a specific emotion and then this emotion is 
followed by a certain action tendency.   The biggest shortcoming with using just 
Appraisal Action Tendency theories is that it ignores social interactions that take part 
among individuals.  Therefore in order to capture a more complete model of emotions 
and mobilization, I must incorporate how emotions inform interpersonal and group 
behavior. 
 While EASI is a promising way to examine emotional research, political scientists 
have not embraced or examined it as closely as Appraisal Action Tendency.  A closer 
examination of EASI towards political mobilization will help explain whether emotions 
reduce the cost of participation. However, EASI is not enough to understand how group 
interactions respond to emotions.  Group theories based on group identity and group 
threat contribute to understanding how emotions impact mobilization.  Perhaps social 
identity and group threat induce emotional responses that call upon existing “social 
contracts that provide additional benefits” for participation.  In order to build the 
theoretical argument for how anger can mobilize, there must be an incorporation of the 
most relevant emotional theories to political questions – Intergroup Emotional Theory 
provides this exact framework that allows anger to mobilize.  
 In summary, IET provides a theoretical foundation to examine fully how emotions 
can inform an individual, individuals, and groups.  Previous studies in political science 
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mostly examine emotional theories at the individual level theories, ignoring social 
interactions among individuals and groups.  The main take away from IET is that (1) 
Appraisal Action Tendency provides the basis for when individuals become angry and 
what they do in response.  Social information theories say that it is important to not only 
consider an individual’s emotional state, but that the emotions of other individuals are 
also important to consider.  Social identity and intergroup theory provides the basis for 
how threat manifests into group anger.  
The value of IET lies in its ability to provide different expectations for emotions 
and mobilization for each level of analysis.  Equally important is that it examines how 
emotions mobilize by asking two important questions (1) do emotions reduce the cost of 
participation by providing important social information to those making decisions and (2) 
when emotions are elicited in response to group threat and identity does it provide 
additional benefits from participation?  If emotions reduce the cost and increase the 
benefits of participation, then it may be more rational for individuals to mobilize. 
2.8. Hypotheses 
I have two main hypotheses.  The first hypothesis tests the assumptions of 
Appraisal Action Tendency.  When an individual is angry, she blames someone or 
something for it (Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, and Pope 1993) and then is motivated to act in 
order to change the situation (move against or remove the barrier) (Fridja 1986; Fridja, 
Kupiers, and ter Schure 1989).  When an individual is angry, she is less likely to mobilize 
for events unrelated to her anger.   Many studies find that anger leads to action  (Devos, 
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Silver, Mackie, and Lickel 2002; Frijd, 1986; Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel 2007; Mackie et 
al. 2000), but in this chapter I want to explore how anger can lead to inaction.  
Hypothesis 1: Angry individuals are less likely to participate in a task unrelated 
 to the target of their anger. 
The existing empirical evidence on the role of anger and mobilization is at best 
mixed.  One side finds that at the group level, anger elicits a desire to confront, oppose, 
or argue against the agent (individual or group) who is responsible for the blameworthy 
action (Devos, Silver, Mackie, and Lickel 2002; Frijd, 1986; Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel 
2007; Mackie et al. 2000).  Echoing the idea that anger mobilizes is Leach, Snider, and 
Iyer (2002), who hypothesize that group-based anger might be a more powerful predictor 
of collective action than individual anger.  Rydell, Mackie, Maitner, Claypool, Ryan, and 
Smith (2008) also find that intergroup anger causes groups to take more risk.  For 
example, anger increased the willingness of faculty members to protest collective pay 
disadvantages (Smith, Cronin, and Kessler 2008).   
But other research finds that anger does not mobilize.  Mallet et al. (2008) found 
that group-based anger played a limited role in initiating collective action.  The nature by 
which anger mobilizes needs to be further clarified in order to make sense of these 
inconsistent findings.  
Hypothesis 2: Individuals angry with the out-group will mobilize in a task related 
 to the target of their anger. 
In hypothesis two, I examine the impact of out-group anger on mobilization.  
Here, I test the theoretical foundations of Intergroup Emotional Theory.  Previous 
research on anger at the group level does not actually measure out-group anger.  Instead, 
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angry individuals were aggregated to represent group level anger, not anger directed at 
the out-group.  In order to make the mobilization task related to the out-group, I place the 
groups into a competitive environment.   
Inserting competition into the mobilization task allows the angry group to rally 
against the out-group.  It is important to consider group competition because it increases 
the saliency of group identity.  Group competition arises when groups are working for a 
goal.  Empirical studies find that group competition increases in-group cooperation (Erev 
el al. 1993; Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport 2006; West et al. 2006; Tan and Bolle 2007; 
Purritinen and Mappes 2009).  Competition is shown to make group identity more salient 
between groups and increases cooperation among in-group members (Erev et al. 1993; 
Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoprt 2006; West et al. 2006; Tan and Bolle 2007).  Therefore 
within a competitive environment, anger at the out-group should also increase 
mobilization.  Competition alone increases mobilization, but when a group starts the 
mobilization task already angry with the out-group, there should be even higher levels of 
in-group cooperation.    
Hypothesis 2a: In competitive environments, individuals angry with the out-group 
 will mobilize.  
Competition increases the saliency of group identity within angry individuals.  
However, the increase in identity saliency is not enough to mobilize the angry 
individuals.  Angry individuals will be more likely to mobilize when they think their in-
group members are also angry.  When angry groups face competition (not the source of 
their anger) the untargeted anger will not increase group mobilization.  Competition will 
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not be sufficient to mobilize the angry group when the task is unrelated to the cause of 
anger.   
Hypothesis 2b: In threatening environments, individuals angry with the out-group 
 will mobilize.  
Group threat occurs when groups compete and keep each other from reaching 
their goals (zero-sum game).  Individuals in threatening environments targets their anger 
towards the out-group, and are more likely to mobilize because the action tendency is to 
attack the object that is hindering their goals.  Group threat creates a condition where two 
groups are not only competing, but losing is costly to each member of the losing group. 
Under group threat, the angry group now has a target to direct their anger against.   
Building upon the empirical evidence on group competition, between-group 
competition increases moral emotions (anger and guilt) when group members violate the 
cooperation norms (Puurtinen and Mappes 2009).  Therefore, when groups are in 
competition and group members fail to cooperate, this intensifies anger and guilt.  This 
makes it important to consider how emotions are affected by the interaction between 
group threat and out-group anger.   
IET posits that individuals who are angry and threatened by the out-group should 
then mobilize within their in-group against the out-group.  Group members would use 
this emotional information and direct their anger at the out-group and cooperate more 
within their in-group to obtain a goal.  In this situation, anger signals a commitment 
device to in-group members.  There needs to be both anger and group threat in order to 
unleash the mobilization power of group anger.  Group threat makes competition costly 
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to individuals and gives the angry group a target to mobilize against; therefore 
mobilization is the most likely response.   
2.9. Conclusion 
Overall, the role that out-group anger plays in an individual’s calculation in 
whether or not to mobilize with their group is unclear.  The research on anger 
demonstrates that it is an approach emotion, but the way in which out-group anger 
impacts an individual’s willingness to approach is not fully understood.  Scholars have 
hinted that out-group anger is important for specific group mobilization, but these 
conjectures have not been rigorously or empirically tested.  To fill this gap, my research 
empirically tests the role of out-group anger on mobilization within different contexts.  
These results will help shed light on the way in which out-group anger affects group 
decision making.  In the next chapter, I will examine the impact of anger on a 
mobilization task.   
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Chapter 3 
Anger and Mobilization 
In this chapter, I test how anger impacts mobilization. I examine Appraisal Action 
Tendency and how it impacts a subject’s behavior in a series of one-shot public goods 
games.  Subjects were assigned to three emotional treatments: (1) happy, (2) angry, and 
(3) neutral.  Subjects were asked to decide whether or not to mobilize in a series of 
decision tasks.  During these decision tasks, I controlled for their emotional type and the 
emotional cues of others in their group. I found that happy subjects contributed more than 
angry subjects and that subjects contributed differently based the emotional cues of others 
in their group.  These results indicate that anger impacts mobilization, but equally 
important are emotional cues of one’s group members. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine whether anger alone can mobilize 
people.  Experiments on anger usually rely on subjects to recall a task that made them 
angry and then look at how they respond.  Using this approach, I asked subjects to recall 
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a task that made them angry and then tested whether subjects were more willing to 
mobilize.  I provide an experimental test of an individual’s level of anger and whether it 
impacts behavior in a public goods game.  In the experiment, I tested (1) whether subjects 
become angry when asked to recall an angry event, (2) if and how angry individuals 
mobilize and (3) whether subjects use emotional cues of others in their group in the 
decision to mobilize.  
Mobilization is defined as “the process in which candidates, parties, activists, and 
groups induce other people to participate" (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003).  In this 
experiment, I am interested in how anger propels self-interested individuals to act for a 
collective goal (Olson, 2, 1965).  In short, will angry individuals engage in costly action 
that benefits their group and lead to mobilization?   
In this chapter, I find that the emotional treatment (anger) had an effect but it did 
not last very long.  Subjects contributed differently based on their emotional type.  As 
expected, the angry subjects did not contribute more than the happy subjects.  The 
subjects also contributed different amounts based on their emotional type as well as the 
emotional cues of others in their group.  This finding indicates that for emotions to 
mobilize, researchers should take into consideration the importance of emotions beyond 
an individual and examine how it operates within a group context. 
3.1. Theory 
 In this chapter, I test a hypothesis based upon two assumptions derived from 
Appraisal Action Tendency Theory.  The first assumption is that an individual is angry 
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when her goals are blocked and she can blame someone or something for it (Smith, 
Haynes, Lazarus, and Pope 1993).  This assumption frames how to create anger.  The 
second assumption from Appraisal Action Tendency Theory argues that anger motivates 
individuals to act in order to change the situation and to move against and remove the 
barrier (Fridja 1986; Fridja, Kupiers, and ter Schure 1989).  Consequently, angry subjects 
should take action against the target of their anger. 
 These two assumptions have a direct implication for mobilization.  The 
implication is that when an individual is angry, she will take action against what 
originally caused her to be angry but be less likely to help others in an unrelated task 
(Small and Lerner 2008).  Anger fails to prompt action when the task is unrelated to the 
target of the anger.  For example, a person is shopping and in line to check out but they 
are cut-off by a fellow shopper.  She becomes angry toward the person who cut in line in 
front of her.  She then pays for her groceries and at the exit is asked to sign a city petition 
to provide more green space.  The angry shopper is not likely to sign the petition because 
she is angry and signing the petition is unrelated to what made her angry.  However, she 
may be willing to sign a petition to ensure that shoppers cannot cut in line.   
In addition to anger, I also account for happiness.  Appraisal Action Tendency 
Theory assumes individuals are happy when they are making reasonable progress 
towards the realization of a goal (Lazarus 1992).  Appraisal Action Tendency Theory also 
argues that happy people exhibit more pro-social behavior because they have positive 
expectations (Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, and Pope 1993).  The implication from these two 
characteristics of happiness is that when an individual is happy, being happy makes her 
more willing to mobilize.   
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3.2. Hypothesis 
The hypothesis in this chapter was derived from Appraisal Action Tendency 
Theory.  The main hypothesis examines whether angry individuals are less likely to 
mobilize than happy individuals.  According to Appraisal Action Tendency Theory, 
anger causes individuals to take action against what made them angry and being happy 
causes an individual to be more willing to work with others.  Angry subjects should not 
mobilize in a task unrelated to their anger, but happy subjects should mobilize.  
Therefore, the hypothesis is angry subjects are less likely to mobilize than happy subjects 
in a task unrelated to their anger. 
3.3. Research Design 
The experiments were conducted at Rice University over a one-week period in the 
Behavioral Research Lab.  There were a total of nine sessions with twelve subjects in 
each session (N=108).  Subjects were recruited from residential dining halls at Rice 
University.  Each experiment session lasted about an hour, and all sessions were 
completed during the week of November 16-20, 2009.  The experiments were 
computerized using Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2006).  On average, each subject earned $12.50.  
Below, I present a timeline of the experiment.   
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Table 3.1 - Experiment Timeline 
Step Procedure: 
1 Subjects signed consent forms and were randomly assigned subject identification 
numbers and computer stations. 
2 With 12 subjects, the experimenter read over the general rules and procedures.  
Then the experimenter started Z-Tree and randomized the blocking order and 
emotional treatment. 
3 Subjects read over the public goods game instructions and worked through 
examples of how to earn money. Appendix materials. 
4 Subjects took part in a writing task where they were asked to write about an 
event that made them angry, happy, or were asked to describe the experiment 
room. 
5 Subjects took an emotional inventory. 
6 Subjects were reminded of their emotional type, based on their emotional writing 
task. 
7 Subjects made four decisions where they were presented with four icons.  One 
icon represented their emotional type, and three additional icons represented the 
emotional type of their group members.  There was no feedback between each 
decision round, but after the four periods, subjects were given a summary of 
earnings. 
8 After the decision task, subjects took another emotional inventory. 
9 Subjects answered questionnaires on trust, affect, mood, altruism, political 
orientations, and demographics. 
10 Subjects completed additional questionnaire on politics and demographics. 
11 Once every subject completed the questionnaire, the earnings were calculated 
and everyone was excused one by one. 
12 Once excused, subjects were paid and debriefed. 
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During step 1, subjects signed the consent forms and randomly picked their 
subject identification cards.  The subject identification card included each subject’s 
identification number and her computer terminal.  The subject identification numbers 
were used throughout the experiment to link the subject to her earnings. Subjects also 
immediately entered the lab in order reduce the communication and interaction between 
subjects.  
During step 2, the experiment called for twelve subjects in order to assign them to 
three emotional treatments.  With twelve subjects and three emotional groups, I was able 
to mix the composition of the groups between decisions in order to examine how the 
different combination of emotional types responded to being placed into different groups.  
In each session, I over recruited subjects and paid extra subjects a $5.00 show-up fee in 
order to fill each session.  Extra subjects are those who showed up after 16 subjects 
already entered the lab; all subjects who arrived at the lab within 5 minutes of the 
experiment start time are paid a show-up fee.   
Step 3 involved instructions for the public goods game and familiarizing the 
subject on how she would earn money.  The public goods game was used to create a 
collective action problem.  The collective action problem is often the foundation for 
studies on group mobilization (Olson 1965, 1994).  Mobilization involves costly 
individual action for group benefit.  Those who contribute to the public good risk the 
chance of having free riders profit off their contributions.  Public goods game is often 
used to examine collective action (Ostrom 2000; Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, and Van De 
Kragt 1986; Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003).   
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The public goods game was adapted from the protocol of Goeree, Holt, and Laury 
(1999).  Subjects worked through two public goods earning examples in order to ensure 
they understood how they would make money.  In the earning examples, subjects learned 
about group size (4) and how much each token was worth in the two different funds.  All 
subjects then had to answer two earning examples correctly before proceeding. In the 
event that a subject answered incorrectly, the subject was given a detailed explanation of 
the correct answer and ultimately had to pick the correct answer before proceeding.  
Subjects waited for all other subjects to finish before moving on to the next task.  
Step 4 involved the emotional treatment.  The three emotional treatments were (1) 
angry, (2) happy, or (3) neutral.  The subjects were randomly assigned their emotional 
treatment by the experimental program Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Each subject was 
asked to either recall a time when they were happy, angry, or to describe the experiment 
room (neutral).  The writing recall task is a standard way to induce emotions (Strack et al. 
1985; Keltner et al. 1993; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001; De drew et 
al. 2008; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Abramson, and Peterson 2009).  The neutral 
group was asked to describe the experiment room so that each subject, irrespective of 
emotional treatment, completed a writing task for five minutes.  This neutral task ensured 
that the experimental protocol was the same for all emotional types.   
At the end of five minutes, each subject placed her writing task into an envelope 
and then the envelope was collected.  Similar to other experiments, the writing task was 
collected and the experimenter looked over them and recorded whether the subject 
completed the assigned writing task (Strack et al. 1985).  In each experiment, subjects 
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completed the writing task as directed.  If the subject did not complete the writing task, I 
would have noted this in the experiment session (but there were no cases where a subject 
did not complete a writing task).   
In Step 5, subjects filled out an emotional inventory adapted from the Positive and 
Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS-X) (Watson and Anna Clark 1994).  Since the 
PANAS-X is commonly used to measure emotions, I based my question wording on their 
template.  The PANAS-X includes a set of emotions: anger, happiness, positive, negative, 
upset, hostile, alert, ashamed, inspired, nervous, and determined.  I chose to measure both 
positive and negative emotions because previous research indicated that positive and 
negative affect needs to be measured at the same time (Watson, Anna Clark, and Tellegen 
1998).   
With the question wording from PANAS-X, I used question responses that 
differed from the PANAS-X.  The PANAS-X usually measures affect with a five point 
LIKERT Scale with numbers between 1-5.  Instead of the LIKERT scale with radio 
buttons, I used an emotional slider scale to measure affect similar to Marcus, Neuman, 
and MacKuen 2011.  They found that the slider measure out performed the radio button 
measurement in reliability and external validity. One difference between the Marcus, 
Neuman, and MacKuen scale was that their scale was vertical, and the scale I used was 
horizontal.  All scale tickers started at the midpoint, similar to Marcus et al. (2009a. 
2010) who found it to be more reliable compared to other ticker placements.  
Figure 3.2 provides an example of the affective emotional scale. The question 
asked subjects to, “Think about how you feel right now: On the scale below, the far 
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LEFT side signifies STRONGLY DISAGREE, and the far RIGHT side signifies 
STRONGLY AGREE.  Please adjust the ticker to the LEFT or RIGHT as appropriate.”    
Figure 3.1 – Emotional Ticker Scale 
 
In Step 6, subjects entered the public goods game.  All subjects were assigned to a 
group with three others.  Within groups, each subject was given 25 tokens; 100 tokens 
per group.  Each subject then decided how many tokens she wanted to place in an 
individual or group fund. The group fund was doubled by the experimenter and then 
shared among all four subjects.  The marginal per capita return (MPCR) was .50.  Each 
subject made four decisions on how to allocate her tokens. 
In each decision, the subjects were presented a figure similar to Figure 3.3 
(depending on the treatment).  Each subject made four decisions under different group 
compositions.  These groups were either the same, mixed, or asymmetric.  Between each 
round, no feedback was given to subjects.  Figure 3.3 illustrates an angry subject in a 
group with two other angry subjects and one other happy subject; four members total in 
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this group.  At the end of fourth decision, the subject was given a summary screen of her 
total earnings.   
Figure 3.2 – Example of Group and Icons 
 
The purpose of block design was to control for how decision order impacted 
contributions.  A block design was used in order to compare groups of subjects between 
experiments.  This experiment design allowed the experimenter to examine whether the 
difference in behavior is due to changes in the procedural order or treatment variables. 
Table 3.2 - Block Design 
Block Decision Period 1 Decision Period 2 Decision Period 3 Decision Period 4 
1 Same  Equal Asymmetric 1 Asymmetric 2 
2 Equal Asymmetric 1 Same Asymmetric 2 
3 Asymmetric 1 Same Equal Asymmetric 2 
 
The block design above shows the group composition, which can be categorized 
as following: same – subject has same emotional type as the other three group members; 
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equal – subject has same emotional type as one other group member, while the other two 
group members share the same emotional type; asymmetric 1 – when the group 
composition is three happy and one angry, or vice versa (it also includes when everyone 
is neutral); asymmetric 2 – consists of a mixture of equal and asymmetric 1 with neutrals 
thrown in. See appendix for specific breakdowns of group composition by decision 
period. 
In order to convey different groups within the decision, I used facial icons to 
represent emotional types and reinforce emotional treatments.  The emotional icons were 
used to reaffirm the subject’s emotional type (assigned in the writing exercise) and the 
emotional types of others in her group.  These icons have been used in other studies to 
signal different subject types (Eckel and Wilson 1999).  In addition, these icons have 
been tested and used in other studies to convey very specific emotions (McKelvie 1973; 
MacDonald et al. 1996; Katsikitis 1997).   
These icons consisted of oval figures with eyebrows, eyes, and mouths.  These 
eyebrows, eyes, and mouths were made up of simple lines, and the combinations of facial 
features signaled different emotional types.  A happy icon consisted of upward eyebrows 
and a smiling mouth, while an angry icon featured downward eyebrows and a frowning 
mouth.  The neutral icon featured a flat mouth and flat eyebrows.  Eckel and Wilson 
(1999) tested different variations of eyebrows and mouths.  They found that the faces that 
have downward eyebrows and frowning mouths best represent angry types, while the 
faces with upward eyebrows and smiling mouths signaled happy types (12).   
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Figure 3.2 – Example of Decision Grouping for an Angry Subject 
 
Between each decision, subjects were given no feedback on how much they 
earned.  After the four decision screens, subjects were provided with a summary screen of 
how much they earned.  Subjects were told, “Your total earnings for today are” and had 
to press “ok” to continue.   
At this point, the subject completed the second emotional inventory.  In steps 9 
and 10, subjects answered questionnaires on trust, general affect, mood, altruism, 
political orientation, and demographics.  These questionnaires were included because 
they are often correlated with contributions (Cronson 2007). The questionnaire section 
then concluded with political questions on partisanship, ideology, and demographic 
indicators such as gender, age, college, major, and grade point average. These questions 
were included to control for other factors that may impact behavior in the decision task.   
In steps 10 and 11, subjects completed additional questionnaires, and their total 
earnings were calculated.  Once earnings were tallied up, the subjects were excused one 
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by one.  When each subject returned to the experiment lobby, they were told their 
earnings, signed the payment sheet, and were debriefed.  During the debriefing stage, 
subjects were asked to give feedback on the experiment.  
3.4. Emotional Treatment Effects 
In order to examine whether the emotional treatment took effect, I measured 
responses immediately after the treatment and after the public goods decisions.  Each 
subject was given an emotional inventory and indicated how strongly she agreed or 
disagreed with feeling specific emotions.  The emotional slider scale ran from 
(0=Strongly Disagree to 100=Strongly Agree).   
I did not have a pre and post treatment measure for each emotion.  Instead, I had 
two measures after the emotional treatment.  These measures conveyed the extent to 
which the emotional treatment initially took hold and then how long it lasted.  The 
assumption was that emotional baselines were randomly distributed in the subject pool 
before the experiment and that the main differences in emotional states were due to the 
treatment.   
3.5. Between Group Emotional Differences 
This section examines within group differences and demonstrates how much 
emotional manipulation persisted over the course of the experiment.  Within this section, 
I answer two questions: (1) did the emotional treatment take hold? (2) how long did the 
emotional treatment last?  I examined two measures of anger and happiness.  The 
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measures Happy 1 and Angry 1 were collected immediately after the emotional writing 
task.  Happy 2 and Angry 2 were measured after the public goods experiment.    
Table 3.3 - Emotional Mean by Group 
Type Happy 1 Happy 2 Angry 1 Angry 2 
Angry 48.25 (21.39) 66.61 (21.90) 41.80 (27.67) 25.13 (20.89) 
Happy 73.33 (17.45) 70.41 (21.41) 14.08 (21.08) 15.44 (20.77) 
Neutral 63.33 (20.97) 69.25 (20.86) 18.75 (18.91) 14.80 (16.18) 
N=36 in each cell 
 
Table 3.3 indicates the means and standard deviations for each measured emotion.  
At Happy 1, the happy group was the happiest (mean=73.3) followed by neutral 
(mean=63.3) and lowest was the angry group (mean=48.25).  In Happy 2, the angry 
group and neutral group increased in happiness but the happy group did not increase.  In 
Angry 1, the angry group was the angriest (mean=41.8), then the neutral group 
(mean=18.7), and the least angry was the happy group (mean=14.1).  In Angry 2, the 
angry group decreased in anger while the happy group slightly increased and the neutral 
group decreased in anger.  Overall, in the happy measures, the happy group was the 
happiest.  In the angry measures, the angry group was the angriest.    
Table 3.4 - Between Group T-test for First Emotion Measure 
 Difference T-value P-value N 
Happy 1     
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Angry vs Neutral -15.08 (2.49) -6.04 .00*** 36 
Angry vs Happy -25.08 (1.36) -10.90 .00*** 36 
Happy vs Neutral 10 (2.27) 4.39 .00*** 36 
Angry 1     
Angry vs Neutral 23.05 (2.79) 8.25 .00*** 36 
Angry vs Happy 27.94 (2.89) -9.56 .00*** 36 
Happy vs Neutral -4.66 (2.36) -1.97 .02* 36 
N=36 
Table 3.4 presents between group differences for the first measure of anger and 
happiness.  The top row indicates the emotion measured and the first column indicates 
group comparisons, the difference between the means, t-score, p-value, and numbers of 
cases.  In Happy 1, between group t-tests indicate statistically significant differences 
between the three emotional groups.  The angry and happy groups were significantly 
different from one another.  The happy group was happier than the angry group and this 
was statistically significant.   
In Angry 1, there were statistical significant differences between the angry group 
and the happy group, as well as between the angry group and the neutral group, but there 
was no significant difference between the happy and neutral groups.  I expected that the 
happy group would be less angry than the neutral group because they underwent the 
happy treatment.  T-tests indicated the largest difference between the angry and happy 
groups for Angry 1 and this difference was statistically significant.  These t-tests indicate 
that the angry group had a different mean score of anger compared to the neutral and 
happy groups.   
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The treatment group assigned to each emotion reported the highest level for that 
emotion.  The angry group was angrier, and their anger levels were different and in the 
expected direction from the neutral and happy groups.  A similar pattern was found 
among the happy group; subjects in this group reported being the happiest, and the level 
of happiness was higher and in the expected direction compared to the angry and neutral 
groups.  
In summary, the descriptive statistics indicate the happiest group right after the 
writing treatment was the happy treatment group and the angriest group was the group 
assigned to the angry writing task.  From here, I examine how long the emotion persisted.  
Table 3.5 - Between Group T-test for Second Emotion Measure 
 Difference T-value P-value N 
Happy 2     
Angry vs Neutral 10.33 (2.02) 4.69 .00 36 
Angry vs Happy 9.69 (2.45) 3.94 .00 36 
Happy vs Neutral .63 (2.19) .29 .38 36 
Angry 2     
Angry vs Neutral -2.63 (2.52) -1.04 -.14 36 
Angry vs Happy -3.80 (2.55) -1.49 .06 36 
Happy vs Neutral 1.16 (2.49) .32 .44 36 
N=36 
Table 3.5 presents t-tests for how each group compares to the other groups in the 
second emotional evaluation, Happy 2 and Angry 2.  In Happy 2, I expected the angry 
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group to have lower levels of happiness compared to the neutral and happy groups.  I also 
expected the happy group to have higher levels of happiness than the neutral group.  In 
the between group differences, I found no statistical differences in the three emotional 
treatment groups from one another.  Overall, there were no meaningful differences 
between how the three different emotional groups reported happiness.  
In Angry 2, I expected for the angry group to have higher levels of reported anger 
than both the happy and neutral groups.  I also expected the happy group to have lower 
levels of anger than the neutral group.  I found no statistically significant differences in 
the reported levels of anger in the second evaluation between any of the groups.  By 
Angry 2, the angry group’s anger had dissipated.   
These results indicate that at Angry 1, the angry group was the angriest and their 
anger levels were higher than the control and happy groups.  By Angry 2, the groups all 
rated the same levels of anger.  Even though there are no significant differences in the 
levels of anger at Angry 2, I can be confident that the angry group was the angriest after 
the initial writing task.   
3.6. Between Subject Differences Over Time 
I expected the happy group to be the happiest over both emotional evaluations.  
Over the course the experiment, the angry group’s anger should decrease and the neutral 
group may become happier in response to the game.  The within group t-tests indicate 
this exact pattern.  I found that the happy group was the happiest throughout the 
experiment at both evaluations.  The angry group had the lowest level of happiness at the 
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first evaluation but by the second evaluation, the angry group had increased in happiness 
and this difference was statistically significant.   
Table 3.6 ­ Between T­test for Happy Measures 
Type First Evaluation Second Evaluation T-test N 
Angry 48.25 66.61 T=-5.05, 
p=.00*** 
36 
Happy 73.33 70.41 T=1.09, 
p=.27 
36 
Neutral 63.33 69.25 T=-2.09, 
p=.04* 
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A between subject analysis demonstrates that the happiest subjects are in the 
happy treatment group. The neutral and angry subjects had lower happy scores.  In Happy 
2, the happy subjects did not exhibit statistically significant differences while the neutral 
subjects did exhibit statistically significant increases.  Within subjects, the angry subjects 
increased in happiness (t=-5.05, p= .00).  The neutral subjects also demonstrated an 
increase in happiness between both evaluations (t=-2.09, p=04).  T-tests indicate no 
significant differences in the happy subjects and happiness mean scores between both 
evaluations.  The t-test for the measure of happiness indicates that the happy subjects 
were the happiest post-writing task but by the end of experiment they were not 
significantly happier relative to the other groups.  From these results, I conclude that the 
angry subjects became happier over time, but there were no change in neutral and happy 
subjects.   
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Now, I examine whether these emotions persisted by only looking at each group 
(emotional type) compared to itself over time.  I expect the angry group’s anger to 
decrease over time.  Below in Table 3.10, I find that the level of anger at Angry 1 is 
lower than Angry 2.  I expect the happy and neutral groups to show no significant change 
in the second evaluation of anger over time.  The t-tests below confirm this exact pattern.  
Table 3.7 -Between Subject T-test for Angry Measures 
Type Angry 1 Angry 2 T-test N 
Angry 41.80 25.13 T=5.54, p=.00*** 36 
Happy 14.08 15.44 T=-.058, p=.56 36 
Neutral 18.75 14.80 T=1.71, p=.09 36 
 
Overall, the analysis indicates that between subject differences occurred for the 
angry group when asked about anger and happiness.  The angry subjects became less 
angry over time and also became happier over time, which is significant for both 
emotions.  The neutrals also increased happiness levels over time and reduced anger (not 
significant).  The happy subjects did not increase in happiness levels over time, but 
remained the happiest group of the three in both measures. 
3.7. Data 
The dependent variable is contribution and the main independent variable is the 
emotional treatment.  There will be a discussion of the descriptive statistics and statistic 
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tests.  I am working with panel data – each subject made a total four decisions whether or 
not to contribute to the public good and there was no feedback between each decision 
period.  In addition, each subject was matched with a different group composition in each 
decision period.   
3.8. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable was the contribution to the public good, and values 
ranged between 0 – 25 tokens.  In the figure below, I treated each decision as independent 
of one another.  Below was the distribution of the dependent variable.  
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Figure 3.3 - Histogram of Percent of Contribution (0-25 tokens) 
 
 
Figure 3.3 represents a histogram of the dependent variable.  There were a total of 
432 observations.  Each subject made four contribution decisions.  The histogram above 
indicated there are large concentrations of contributions of 0 and 25.  The distribution of 
the dependent variable indicates that contributions were truncated at both the high and 
low end and not normally distributed.  The overall mean contribution was 14.03 tokens 
and the standard deviation was 8.94.  In the next section, I examine contributions by 
treatment type.   
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Table 3.8 - Sum Contribution by Type 
Emotion Mean Std. deviation Std. Error 
Angry 56.19 35.11 2.93 
Happy 63.25 29.11 2.43 
Neutral 50.88 35.03 2.91 
N=36 in each cell.  
I expected and found that on average, the happy group contributes the most.  The 
second highest contributors were among the angry group, and the neutral group 
contributed the least to the public good.  A series of t-tests between groups revealed that 
the happy group contributed more than the angry group, and the difference is statistically 
significant (t=1.65, p=.05).  This indicates that the happy subjects contribute more on 
average than the angry group, supporting my main hypothesis.   
In the second t-test, I examine whether the angry group contributed more than the 
neutral group.  I found some support for this, however, it was not statistically significant 
(t=-1.53, p=.06).  Then, I examined whether the happy group contributed more than the 
neutral group.  I found that the happy group does contribute more than the neutral group 
and these differences were statistically significant (t=-3.32, p=.00). 
Subjects assigned to the happy condition contributed more than individuals in the 
angry or neutral group.  The neutral group contributed the least.  T-tests further indicate 
that the average happy and angry group contributions were statistically different from one 
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another.  These findings support my main hypothesis that happy groups contribute more 
than angry groups when the angry group lacks a target.   
I now examine contributions period-by-period and control for the subject’s 
emotional type, block group, and decision period.  In order to examine the impact of 
different block groups and decision periods, I run a series of regressions that predict 
contributions in each period for each subject.  The block design was implemented in 
order to control for how the order of group context could impact the level of 
contributions.  In order to accomplish this, I ran regressions with clustering on the 
subject.  Regressions with clusters were used to examine whether decisions were 
correlated to one another for any given subject.  
3.9. Examining Blocking and Ordering 
In this section, I ran a series of regressions to examine the impact of blocking on 
contributions.  There were a total of three block designs.  I needed to run a series of 
models that determine whether there were differences between the block designs.  In 
order to test for the impact of the above independent variables, I created dummy variables 
for the (1) happy group, (2) neutral group, (3) block 2, and (4) block 3.  Block 2 and 
block 3 were dummy variables in order to compare whether contributions in these blocks 
differ from Block 1.  Having these dummy variables allowed me to compare the 
difference between emotional type and decision period.  For example, in the first 
decision, seeing three other happy subjects may then impact the happy subject's 
contribution in the second decision when she is paired with three angry subjects.  The 
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order of decisions and the groups within those decisions may impact contributions.  
These control variables allow me to compare the models to the baseline angry subject in 
block 1.  
I ran OLS regressions with clusters of standard errors on subject identification 
number.  OLS regression assumes that the residuals are independent between 
observations (http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/chapter4/statareg4.htm).  
My data may violate this assumption because the contributions by each subject may not 
be independent, and this would lead to residuals that are dependent between decisions.  I 
utilize the OLS cluster option in order to examine whether observations are clustered by 
subject id and may be correlated by subject id, but independent between decisions.  Even 
though each decision was designed to be independent, the subject’s behavior may not be 
independent.  I developed the experiment in order to control for how contributions may 
vary due to the order in which subjects made decisions.  The blocking design included 
varying group composition.   
The dependent variable in this model is contribution.  The independent variables 
include block group, neutral dummy, happy dummy, and the decision period.  These 
models compare the difference between the angry group from the happy and neutral 
groups.  The first model examines contributions by block group.  In the second model, I 
examine the contributions while controlling for block group and dummies for emotions 
(happy and neutral).  The third model then examines the independent impact of decision 
period on contribution. The fourth model accounts for decision period and block group.  
The fifth model includes variables from all previous models.   
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Table 3.9 - Regression Estimates for Contributions with Clusters by Subject  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Block 2 -1.49 
(2.02) 
-1.49 
(2.02) 
 -1.49 
(2.02) 
-1.49 
(2.02) 
Block 3 -3.25  
(1.91) 
-3.25  
(1.89) 
 -3.25  
(1.91) 
-3.25  
(1.89) 
Happy (0,1)  -1.70 
(1.94) 
  -1.70 
(1.95) 
Neutral (0,1)  -2.89 
(1.93) 
  -2.89 
(1.94) 
Decision 
Period 
(1, 2, 3,4) 
  -.12 
(.17) 
-.12 
(.17) 
-.12 
(.17) 
Constant 15.88*** 
(1.40) 
17.42*** 
(1.78) 
14.61*** 
(.88) 
16.19*** 
(1.45) 
17.73*** 
(1.82) 
N=432      
R-squared .02 .04 .00 .02 .04 
***p<.00, **p<.01, p>.05* (Standard Errors in Parenthesis) N= 432.  
 
Below, I analyze the different OLS clustered models.  In model 1, I examine the 
impact of the different blocks on contributions.  This model shows no difference between 
contributions when comparing block 2 to block 1.  There is some evidence that block 3 is 
different from block 1.  The coefficient on block 2 is -1.4, but the t-value is not 
statistically significant. The coefficient on block 3 is twice as block 2.  The coefficient for 
block 3 was also negative, but not statistically significant.  The constant in the model was 
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15.88 and the standard error is 1.40 with a p-value of .00.  Model 1 indicates that block 3 
was different from the comparison baseline (block 1).  
In model 2, I build upon model 1 and include the two emotional dummy variables.  
In model 2, the comparison baseline is the angry subjects in block 1.  Model 2 expands 
on model 1 and provides the same baseline result when dummy variables for the happy 
and neutral group are included.  The main comparison group now is angry types and 
includes subjects who were in block 1.  In this model, coefficients for block 2 and block 3 
are unchanged, and the only difference is the p-value of block 3, which is lower at 1.89.  
The coefficient for the happy dummy variable is -1.70 and not statistically significant.  
The coefficient for the neutral dummy variable is also negative at -2.89 and not 
statistically significant.   
Model 1 and model 2 demonstrate that none of the variables in the models were 
statistically significant.  At this point, I need to consider whether the decision period 
impacted contributions.  Model 3 demonstrated that decision period did not make a 
significant impact on contributions. The coefficient was negative and not significant.  The 
explanatory power of the decision period does not improve when it was added to model 4 
along with block number.  The largest coefficient was still attributed to block 3 but it was 
not statistically significant.  In model 5, the decision period was added to a fully specified 
model with dummy variables for the neutral group, happy group, block 2, and block 3.  
The main result was that decision period is not statistically significant along with the 
other variables.   
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Overall, these clustered regression models indicate that there were no effect of 
decision period, happy, neutral, block 3, or block 2 on contributions.  This indicates that 
the differences in contributions are not attributed to emotional type.  The angry subjects 
did contribute differently from the neutral and happy subjects, but the differences were 
not statistically significant.  While these results are worrisome, the decision to contribute 
may have also been influenced by the emotional cues the subjects received about their 
group members.  Perhaps being placed in a group with three happy icons would lead to 
differences in contribution compared to being placed in a group with three angry subjects.   
This pushes me to examine how, irrespective of decision period, subjects 
contributed according to who they are paired with.  Angry subjects failed to contribute 
more than the happy or neutral groups.  These models indicate little support for the idea 
that angry subjects would contribute more than happy or neutral subjects.  I now compare 
each subject type and how much they contributed in each decision, controlling for the 
group composition in each decision.  In the next section, I examine how specific decision 
groupings impact contributions.   
3.10. Distribution of Contributions by Emotional Treatment Types 
The decision-making task involved four decisions with group composition 
changing between decisions.  Earlier discussion suggested how emotional type and 
different group pairings impact contributions.  The decision making process may be 
influenced more by group emotional icons than the subject’s own emotional treatment.  
For example, a subject is told that a happy face icon best represents their writing task and 
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then is placed into a group with three angry face icons.  The happy subject (happy face 
icon) may have contributed differently to the group fund as a consequence of being 
paired with three angry face icons.  I examine how being in different group compositions, 
including majority group, equal group, minority group, and mixed group impacts 
contributions by emotional type.  Accounting for different group combinations, I am able 
to tease out how group composition impacts contributions.   
The figure below provides a summary of how contributions change for each given 
emotional treatment as a subject’s group composition changed.  The first column 
provides information on the emotional type and what group a subject was paired with.  
The second column provides the mean contributions for a subject who was paired with 
the same emotional type.  Moving across the column, there is a slow decrease in the 
number of group members of the same emotional type.  There is preliminary evidence 
that suggests as the number of subjects of a different emotional type increases, angry 
subjects contribute more.  
A subject’s emotional type and the others she is grouped with affected 
contribution amounts.  Angry subjects contributed the most in the following groups: (1) 
minority, (2) mixed, (3) majority, (4) equal, and (5) same.  In contrast, happy subjects 
contributed the most in the following order: (1) same, (2) majority, (3) equal, (4) 
minority, and (5) mixed.  For neutral subjects, contributions varied very little between 
groups except when a neutral was in a mixed group.  Neutral contributions were 
relatively stable with different group configurations.  These patterns indicate that a 
subject’s type and a subject’s group members was important to consider for 
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contributions.  In the next section, I discuss specific changes in group composition and 
the impact on a subject’s contributions.  
Table 3.10 - Mean Contributions by Emotional Type and Group Pairing 
Type & Pairing Same Majority Equal Minority 
Angry w/Happy 14.22, n=27 14.88, n=18 16.33, n=9 
Angry w/Neutral  
13.86, 
n=36 13.07, n=27 14.38, n=18 No obs 
Happy w/Angry 15.66, n=27 14.77, n=18 14.55, n=9 
Happy w/Neutral 
17.33, 
n=36 17.85, n=27 14.61, n=18 No obs 
Neutral w/Angry No obs 13.11, n=18 11.77, n=9 
Neutral w/Happy 
13.27, 
n=72 No obs 12.94, n=18 14.55, n=9 
 
The table above indicates that angry subjects contribute less when they are paired 
with three other angry subjects.  Angry subjects increased their contributions as the 
number of happy subjects in their group increased.  For an angry subject in a group with 
three other angry subjects, her mean contributions was 13.86 tokens and increased to 
16.33 tokens when she is paired with three happy subjects.  While there is an increase in 
contributions, it is not a statistically significant change (t=-0.75, p=.23).   
Contributions for happy subjects also changed in response to group composition.  
Happy subjects contributed less on average as the number of happy subjects in their 
group decreased.  When a happy subject was in a group with three other happy subjects, 
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she contributed on average 17.33 tokens, but as her group changed to three angry 
subjects, her contributions decreased to 14.55 tokens.  While there is a decrease, it is not 
statistically significant different (t=.95, p=.17).   
Neutral subjects also indicated a change in contributions as the number of happy 
and angry subjects in their group changed.  When a neutral subject was in a group with 
three other neutral subjects, the neutral subject contributed 13.27 tokens.  As the neutral 
subject became the minority with three angry subjects, she reduced her contribution to 
11.27 tokens.  In contrast, when the neutral subject was paired with three happy subjects, 
she increased her contribution to 14.55 tokens.  Again, these changes were not 
statistically significant. 
Overall, the results hint at a pattern of contributions based on the number of 
happy or angry subjects in a group.  As the number of angry subjects in a group 
increased, subjects contributed less.  As the number of happy subjects in a group 
increased, subjects contributed more.  However, this pattern was not linear, exact, or 
statistically significant.  There was not a direct decrease or increase in contributions as 
the number of happy or anger subjects in a group changed.   
These results show preliminary evidence of emotions and social referencing in 
which subjects use information about the emotional cues given by group members.  
When a subject is induced with an emotion, it may not have a singular impact on how she 
behaves in the aggregate.  A subject’s individual action is not only influenced by how she 
feels but how she thinks others may feel as well.  This makes the case that it is important 
to consider the social context of emotions.  The data indicated that subjects were 
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responding to the emotional types they are paired with.  This is in line with predictions 
found in Intergroup Emotional Theory, which posit that individuals appraise the situation 
in light of their group.  Individuals also take emotional cues into consideration.   
3.11. Limitations 
 My data is noisy, and results are inconclusive due to several factors: small 
samples, the nature of one-shot game, and the lack of emotional targets.  Subjects 
mobilized differently based on their emotional type and group members they were 
making decisions with.  However, the exact pattern in which emotions and group 
composition impacted contributions is not clear.  On the surface, there were some 
differences but upon closer examination, the differences are not robust.  My sample sizes 
are small, and it makes it difficult to tease out how precisely group context impacted 
contributions.  The second limitation is that a one-shot public goods game is problematic 
because even though subjects were told that their decisions were independent, subjects 
may treat them as series of dependent decisions.  Further feedback provided in the public 
goods game may have had an impact on the emotional treatment.  Lastly, subjects were 
induced with an emotional treatment and given cues about the emotional state of others in 
their group, but the experiment fails to fully account for Intergroup Emotional Theory 
where anger is directed at an out-group.  In my experiment, anger is induced only at the 
individual members and has no group saliency.  In the next chapter, I will induce anger 
that emerges from intergroup interactions and accounts for social contexts.   
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Subjects in this experiment did not have the opportunity to react to the target of 
their anger.  The angry and happy subjects were asked to mobilize in a task unrelated to 
why they were angry or happy.  My next experiment must induce anger with a target.  I 
also need to induce anger that has a target and control the different levels of anger.  
Anger must be measured when it directed at the individual themselves, the individuals’ 
group, and then at the group that made them angry.  
3.12. Discussion & Conclusion 
Overall, the results from this study are inclusive regarding exactly how anger and 
happiness impact mobilization.  The data indicated the emotional treatment took hold for 
the angry treatment group but the emotional treatment’s effect decreased over time.  
Nevertheless, the emotional cues provided to the subjects about their own type and their 
group members types did in some cases change levels of contribution.  The exact way in 
which subjects responded to these two factors is unclear.  However, we do see somewhat 
of a pattern.  These are preliminary results that indicate subjects do take into account 
emotional cues about their counterparts.   
In order to clarify how anger impacts mobilization, I need to design another series 
of experiments that provides a stronger elicitation of anger and measure actual anger 
towards the out-group directly.  The level of anger also needs to be relevant to groups. 
The next experiment must actually induce a strong level of anger at the out-group.  Only 
with this type of angry treatment will I be able to examine the true impact of out-group 
anger and mobilization. 
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Along the same vein, the fact that angry subjects responded to the emotional cues 
of their group members calls for additional studies and designs that help clarify how and 
why subjects used the emotional cues.  More importantly, the next set of studies needs to 
not only induce strong emotions but also measure affective measures at the individual 
and group levels.  Intergroup Emotional Theory argues that emotions occur at the 
individual, group, and out-group levels.  As a result, it is important to include these 
measures to demonstrate the level of emotions at each juncture.   
These results highlight the need to induce out-group anger and how that impacts 
decision-making.  This experiment induced emotions but the emotions were elicited at 
the individual level and did not include group interactions or group saliency.  In order to 
examine the true impact of anger, I must induce anger with a target and then give angry 
subjects the opportunity to mobilize against that target.  The next chapter, I will create 
these conditions and test these conjectures.  
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Chapter 4 
Experimental Test of Out-Group Anger  
In this chapter, I elicited out-group anger through intergroup interactions. 
Previous experimental work on anger only elicits anger at the individual level.  Because I 
am interested in anger towards the out-group, I designed two novel treatments to simulate 
this.  I then compared how well both these treatments increased the levels of out-group 
anger.  In Treatment 1, I elicited out-group anger, but surprisingly I also increased the 
subjects’ anger towards their own group.  Consequently, in Treatment 2, I was still able 
to elicit out-group anger, but then was able to limit the subjects’ anger towards their own 
group. 
Political scientists are interested in the role of emotions in politics.  This research 
spans from information processing (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000), to policy 
preferences (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav 2005; Lerner and Keltner 2001), to 
ethnic violence (Peterson 2000).  The research on emotions is extensive but the research 
on discrete emotions, such as anger and its impact on mobilization, are limited.  In 
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Chapter 3, I employed a traditional procedure to induce anger through a recall writing 
task (Strack et al. 1985; Keltner et al. 1993; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Tiedens and Linton 
2001; De drew et al. 2008; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Abramson, and Peterson 
2009).  Although I was able to elevate the subjects’ anger levels, anger was only relevant 
to the individual and it was ineffective in mobilizing group behavior. 
In this chapter, I introduce two anger-inducing treatments that are based off of 
Intergroup Group Emotional Theory.  In the previous chapter, I induced anger through a 
writing task that was relevant to a subject at the individual level, but failed to create anger 
with a target (aligned with appraisal action tendency) or relevant to group interactions (a 
main concept in Intergroup Emotional Theory).  Inducing group anger salient to group 
identity, I argue, is key to an emotionally charged mobilization story.   
Intergroup Emotional Theory operates on three levels the: individual, 
interpersonal, and group.  According to Appraisal Action Tendency Theory, anger 
emerges when a subject indentifies and blames an object or individual for keeping her 
from a goal (Keltner and Lerner 2001).  At the social referencing level, individuals 
interact with others and use emotions as social information.  When an individual feels 
angry, she uses emotions as information to help her determine how to respond.  
Combining the individual and interpersonal level interaction theories of emotions, I then 
include the group theory of social identity and the idea that anger can be targeted at 
groups.  For example, research on intergroup relations finds that groups can feel negative 
affect towards the out-group.  I take this one step further and argue that beyond negative 
affect, individuals in groups feel discrete emotions such as anger towards the out-group.  
In my treatments, I designed intergroup interactions where Group A blocks Group B from 
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a goal in order to elicit anger directed towards the out-group (as outlined in the theory 
above).  
4.1. Differences in Treatments 
Before diving into each treatment and their results, I need to explain at a general 
level the differences between the treatments and how I elicited out-group anger in each 
treatment.  Using performance tasks, I give individuals in Treatment 1 the ability to 
choose between two earning tasks for their group.  The two tasks are: 1) easier and worth 
more or 2) harder and worth less.  The assumption is that subjects would want to be paid 
to perform task 1, and not task 2.  In Treatment 1, subjects complete both tasks, but are 
only paid for one of them.  One group is allowed to vote on which task they would like to 
be paid, while the other group must be paid based on the remaining task.  The voting 
group will choose to be paid for task 1, thereby eliciting anger from the other group.  The 
assumption was that by allowing the non-voting group to see how much more payment 
they would have received, they would become angry at the voting-group (out-group). 
In Treatment 2, the same two tasks are used. The difference is that one of the 
groups vote on which task they wish to complete.  Once again, one group gets to choose 
the easy-worth-more task, while the other group is assigned the harder-worth-less task.  
Anger is elicited in this treatment by telling subjects the non-voting group that by the 
other group assigned them the harder, worth-less task.  The difference in effect of 
Treatment 2 is limiting anger towards one’s own group (attribution bias that perhaps your 
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own group members performed poorly).  The blame should be clearly placed on the 
voting-group.  
These two treatments follow the specific conditions laid out in Intergroup 
Emotional Theory that create anger directed at the out-group.  The key in the theory is 
that individuals placed in groups may become angry toward the out-group when they feel 
that the out-group is blocking them group from a goal.  In both games, one group blocks 
another group from receiving more payout.   
Above I spoke generally about the differences between the treatments.  Here I 
discuss in detail the set up of the performance task.  Both treatments use the same 
performance task but the procedures within each treatment vary.  I adapt the “real effort 
task” from Abeler et al. (2009, 2011) and use it in my treatment to examine group anger.  
Abeler et al. 2009 describe the effort task as “tedious and repetitive”, and requires 
subjects to count the number of zeros in tables consisting of 150 randomly ordered zeros 
and ones.  I chose this task because it “does not require prior knowledge, performance is 
easily measurable, and there is little learning possibility.”   
Figure 4.1 provides a screenshot of Abeler et al. 2009 effort task; each subject is 
given five minutes to count the number of zeros in as many tables as possible. Subjects 
entered the number of zeros appearing in the table and then pressed “OK” to advance to 
the next table.  Abeler et al. 2009 used the real effort task in order to examine the impact 
on reference points; I am using the real effort task for a different purpose.  In my study, I 
am using the real effort task to generate out-group anger.  The set up of the real effort 
task in Abeler et al. 2009 provided the foundational tool to create out-group anger. 
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Figure 4.1 – Screenshot from Appendix of Abeler, Falk, Gotte and Huffman (2009).  
 
I randomly assign subjects to be a member of Group A or Group B.  After group 
assignment, subjects complete an emotional inventory.  This emotional inventory 
measures a battery of negative and positive emotions. It asks subjects how much they feel 
specific emotions at the individual level, towards their in-group, and towards the out-
group.  After the emotional inventory is compete, subjects are given examples of the 
performance task and are asked to calculate how much money they would make in each 
performance task.  In addition, subjects take part in two one-minute practice rounds of the 
easy and hard performance tasks.  I created random number charts with the integers 1-9 
and asked subjects to identify the number of times a random number appears in the 
number table.  For the easy task, subjects see a 3x3 table; for the hard task, subjects see a 
6x6 table.  Each subject has five seconds to enter an answer, and every five seconds a 
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new number table appears.  Subjects continue to complete these tasks for five minutes.  
There are a total of 60 number tables.   
My performance task differs from Abeler et al. 2009 and 2011 in several ways: I 
have two types of number tables, the number tables includes values 1-9 and not just 0 and 
1; subjects are given five seconds to answer not four seconds; and the task lasts for five 
minutes not four minutes.  I made these changes in order to make the task more difficult; 
adding more integers made the task more cognitively taxing for subjects and therefore I 
wanted to give subjects one more second to complete each table.  Below are two screen 
shots that illustrate the two performance tasks.  The easy task is worth 10 cents per 
correct answer while the hard task is worth 5 cents per correct answer.  The left hand 
figure is the easy task (3x3 table) and the right hand figure is the hard task (6x6 table).  
Subjects are given feedback between each number table on how much time is remaining, 
how many tables are left unsolved, and how much money they have earned in this task.   
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Figure 4.2 – Easy versus Hard Performance Task 
 
*Treatment Coded on Z-Tree. (Ferhbacher 2007). 
In the first treatment, subjects complete five minutes of both the hard and easy 
tasks and receive feedback on how much they would earn in each task.  Each subject first 
completes the easy task for 5 minutes.  In five minutes, the subject has 5 seconds each to 
answer a total of 60 easy tables.  If a subject enters the correct answer within 5 seconds, 
she earns 10 cents.  If a subject fails to enter the correct answer within 5 seconds, the next 
number table appears.  There are a maximum of 60 tables.  At the end of the easy task, 
each subject completes the hard task for 5 minutes.  The setup is the same as in the easy 
task.  
Upon completing the two tasks, the emotional treatment takes place.  The subjects 
are told, “Now decide which task do you wish your group to be paid for. The easy task is 
worth 10 cents per correct answer and the hard task is worth 5 cents per correct answer.”  
On the same screen, the control group is told, “Your group has been assigned to decide 
the task your group gets paid for” and “Please make your decision. What task do you 
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want for your group to be paid for?”  The angry group is told, “The other group is 
deciding whether your group gets paid for the easy or hard task” and “What task would 
you like your group to be paid for? Please make your decision, but keep in mind your 
decision will not be shown to the other group.  And it will not affect the choice made by 
the other group.”  The next screen is the payment selection feedback screen; the control 
group is told, “Your group choose to be paid with the EASY task.”  The angry group is 
told, “Your group preferred to be paid with the EASY task.  The other group assigned 
you to be paid with the HARD task.  The HARD task is more difficult and worth less and 
you earned less money as a result.”   
In my second treatment, the tasks are assigned in a different manner.  The 
emotional treatment happens when the tasks are assigned.  Both groups take part in two 
one-minute practice rounds, but vote for which task they want to complete for five 
minutes.  Both groups vote for which task they prefer, but only one group’s votes 
counted.  The other group is told the first group decides which tasks they are assigned.  In 
both treatments, one group prevents the other group from a higher payout and easier task.  
In the first treatment, anger is elicited through the selection of task payment.  In the 
second treatment, anger is elicited through the selection of task assignment.  
The next section will involve a detailed discussion of Treatment 1 procedures.   
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Table 4.1 - Treatment 1 Timeline 
Treatment 1: Performance Task (full information) 
1. Subjects sign consent forms. 
2. Subjects are randomly assigned to a computer station and subject identification 
number. 
3. Subjects are given information the two performance tasks and complete two (two 
minute) practice rounds.   
4. Subjects perform the easy task for five minutes. 
5. Subjects perform the hard task for five minutes. 
6. Subjects are given feedback on how much they earned in each type of task. 
7. Subjects are asked to pick which task they want to be paid for.   
8. One group votes and picks the easy task and the other group then gets assigned the 
hard task payment. 
9. Subjects being paid for the hard task are told that the first group choose the easy task 
payment for their own group and chose the hard task payment for their group.  
10. Subjects are given information on their total earnings relative to the other group.   
11. Subjects fill out the emotional inventory. 
12. Each subject is dismissed one by one, paid in private, and sign the earnings sheet.   
13. Lastly, subjects are debriefed.   
 
4.2. Treatment 1: Performance Task (Payment task) 
Subjects: There were a total of two treatment sessions.  Subjects were recruited 
from Rice University during lunch and dinner in the residential dining halls.  The first 
session consisted of 12 subjects, with one group consisting of three subjects as the neutral 
group and the nine other subjects as the angry group.  In a second session, there were four 
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neutral subjects in one group and twelve angry subjects in the other group.  There is an 
imbalance between the control and treatment groups because I am most interested in the 
subjects in the treatment group.  The objective of these treatments is to test for the impact 
of the increase in anger between these two groups.  In order to get more statistical 
leverage out of the treatments, I designed the treatments to maximize the number of 
angry subjects, but wanted at the same time to make sure I had a control group to 
compare against.   
In each session, subjects stayed in the same groups for the entire treatment.  The 
treatments were conducted using Z-Tree (Ferhbacher 2007) and lasted about an hour.  
There were a total of 28 subjects.  There were a total of seven subjects in the control 
category and 21 in the angry category.  Each subject earned a $5.00 show up fee and on 
average $3.33 extra for the task.  
Procedures: Subjects were assigned into two groups, Group A or Group B.  Next, 
subjects rated how they felt in an emotional inventory. Then each subject took part in two 
practice performance tasks.  There were two types of performance tasks: (1) easy task 
worth 10 cents for each correct answer and (2) a difficult task worth 5 cents for each 
correct answer.  The purpose of the task was to evoke frustration and anger in those 
assigned to the difficult task.  After the practice rounds, subjects received feedback on 
how well they performed in the easy and hard practice rounds.  Then both groups 
performed the hard and easy task for five minutes.  Upon completing these tasks, the 
subjects were given feedback on how much they would have earned in the easy and hard 
tasks.  However, they were then told they would only be paid for one of the tasks.  
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Emotional Treatment: Payment assignment was used to create anger towards the 
out-group.  Group A chose which task they wished to be paid for (either the easy task 
worth more or the difficult task worth less), and Group B was told that Group A had 
decided which task Group B would be paid for.  Group A voted (the voting rule was such 
that if one person in group A chose the easy task payment, then Group A as a whole 
would be paid the easy task).  Group B also voted, but their votes did not count.  In order 
to induce the anger mechanism, Group B was told that Group A had blocked their group 
from being paid the easy and more profitable task. As a preference check on payment 
assignment, I recorded which task the subjects preferred.  In both sessions, every subject 
chose the easy performance task payment.   
Emotional Inventory: In order to check for emotional treatment effects, after the 
payment assignment, all subjects rated how they felt again. Immediately after the 
inventory, subjects were given questions on treatment procedures and demographics.  
I used three types of questions to compare the difference in anger levels.  I 
examined three anger levels because Intergroup Emotional Theory operates on three 
levels.  Anger at the out-group involves accounting for an individual’s reported level of 
anger and their anger towards the out-group.  I also include how much anger a subject 
feels towards their own-group.  Measuring these three specific anger levels will then 
allow me to examine whether I successfully elicited anger in line with Intergroup Group 
Emotional Theory. 
In the emotional inventory, subjects were asked “Think about yourself right now, 
your group, and the other group and do you feel angry?”  Subjects were then told to 
move the slider left or right to indicate the location that shows how they felt. The slider is 
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anchored in the middle with the far left labeled “Strongly Disagree” and the far right 
labeled “Strongly Agree.”  There are no numbers on the slider and all sliders start at the 
midway point. Below is an example of the measurement tool.   
Figure 4.3 - Emotional Measurement and Ticker 
 
 
The use of the slider scale follows the measurement protocol of Markus, 
MacKuen, and Neuman 2010.  They find that the slider scale is a more reliable measure 
of affect than the LIKERT Scale.  I utilized Markus, MacKuen, and Neuman’s ticker 
scale placement but I place mine horizontally instead of vertically due to programming 
limitations in Z-Tree.  Additionally, I followed their placement of the ticker in the middle 
of the scale.   
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4.3. Within Subject Differences 
In this section, I present within subject tests and examine the differences within 
groups across three levels of measured anger: Individual, In-Group, and Out-Group.  T-
test within group determines if there are differences between pre-performance and post-
performance.  I need to examine the extent to which the emotional treatment took hold; 
therefore I compare the pre and post levels of anger within the angry group and control 
groups.  The most important thing is that the angry group should become angrier at the 
out-group post treatment.  The control group should not become angrier with the out-
group.  I expect to find no difference within the control group for the three measures of 
anger.  I expect there to be differences within the angry group between two measures of 
anger.  The angry group should have a higher level of anger after the performance task is 
completed than before the performance task has begun.  The angry group should not 
become angrier with their in-group, but the angry group should become angrier with the 
out-group.   
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Figure 4.4 - Treatment 1: Individual Level of Anger 
 
N=24, control=6 and angry=18. 
 
Figure 4.4 plots the pre and post-performance means for individual anger for the 
angry and control groups.  The mean for the control group pre performance task is 14.28 
and the mean for the angry group pre treatment is 23.04.  Post treatment, the angry group 
reported higher levels of anger than the control group.  The mean for the angry group 
post performance task is 49.15 and the mean for the control post performance task is 
12.51.   
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Table 4.2 - Wilcox Test for Individual Anger  
Individual Anger N Rank Sum Expected 
Pre    
Control  6 84.5 75 
Angry 18 215.5 225 
Z-Score, P-value .64,.51   
Post    
Control  6 63 75 
Angry 18 237 225 
Z-Score, P-value -.80, .42   
 
In order to test between group differences, I run a series of Wilcox tests.  Given 
my small sample, these tests indicate if the means for each group is different from one 
another.  The Wilcox test for pre and post individual anger measures are in Figure 4.6.  I 
find that there are no differences in the means between the groups pre and post treatment.  
This indicates that the two groups had similar levels of individual anger post treatment.  
This implies that the anger manipulation did not work at the individual level.  Next, I 
check to see what the treatment did for in-group and out-group anger.  
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Figure 4.5 - Treatment 1: Anger directed at the In-Group. 
 
N=24, control=6 and angry=18.   
 
In figure 4.5, I compare changes in in-group anger.  The squares line represent the 
angry group and diamonds line represents the control group.  Before the performance 
task, the angry group had a mean anger level of 17.95, and the control group had a mean 
anger level of 13.28.  After the performance task, the angry group increased to 37.42, and 
the control group mean decreased slightly to 11.71.  This figure suggests that the anger 
treatment made the angry group angry at their own-group, but Wilcox test will examine if 
the means are different between the angry and control group post treatment.   
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Table 4.3 - Wilcox Test for Anger at In-Group 
 
 
In Table 4.3, I present the Wilcox test for in-group anger.  I find that there are no 
statistically significant differences in the reported levels of in-group anger between the 
groups in both the pre and post treatment measures.  This indicates that the performance 
task failed to create difference in reported in-group anger.  I will now discuss out-group 
anger during Treatment 1.   
In-Group Anger N Rank Sum Expected 
Pre    
Control  6 88.5 75 
Angry 18 211.5 225 
Z-score, P-value .96, .33   
Post    
Control  6 79.5 75 
Angry 18 220.5 225 
Z-score, P-value. .30, .76   
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Figure 4.6 - Treatment 1: Anger directed at Out-Group. 
 
N=24, control=6 and angry=18.  
 
Figure 4.6 indicates the change in anger towards the out-group pre and post 
performance task.  The angry group begins with a mean anger level of 29.61 at the out-
group while the control group begins with a mean anger level 19.42 at the out-group. 
After the performance task, the angry group becomes angrier towards the out-group, 
evidenced by a mean anger level of 55.76, and the control group becomes less angry at 
the out-group, evidenced by a decrease in mean anger to 6.42.  Next, I will discuss the 
Wilcox test.   
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Table 4.4 - Wilcox Test for Out-Group Anger  
 N Rank Sum Expected 
Pre    
Control  6 99 75 
Angry 18 201 225 
Z-score, P-value 1.66, .09   
Post    
Control  6 52.5 75 
Angry 18 247.5 225 
Z-score, P-value 1.51, .13   
 
In Table 4.4, I find in both Wilcox tests that the control and angry group means 
are not statistically different from one another in reported levels of out-group anger.  The 
angry and control groups do not have different means for anger towards the out-group 
post or pre treatment.  The Wilcox tests for Treatment 1 indicates that the anger treatment 
did not take hold.   
These comparisons of individual levels of anger, anger towards the in-group, and 
anger towards the out-group demonstrate that the performance task did not make the 
angry group angrier than the control group. I will now discuss Treatment 2.   
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4.4. Treatment 2 
A major concern in Treatment 1 was that I increased in-group anger within the 
angry group.  I set out originally to only create anger towards the out-group.  As a 
consequence, I created a second protocol that attempts to limit in-group anger.  The main 
limitation in Treatment 1 is that the increase in in-group anger makes it difficult to 
disentangle between anger towards the out-group. 
I created a second method of creating intergroup anger.  In this experiment, I 
changed the task selection and payment task.  The objective of Treatment 2 is to induce 
targeted anger and simultaneously reduce the amount of in-group anger in the angry 
group.  Treatment 2 is similar to Treatment 1; the key difference is that Treatment 2 
creates anger through task assignment not payment selection.  Unlike Treatment 1, both 
groups do not complete the easy and hard tasks for five minutes.  Instead, Treatment 2 
begins with both groups voting on which task they wish to complete for payment; 
however, only one group is assigned the easy task with a higher payout.  In Treatment 2, 
the angry group should be become angrier and more likely to blame the control group for 
blocking the angry group from completing their preferred task.   
Anger towards a subject’s in-group may hinder their ability to become angry with 
the out-group.  The angry group may have blamed their in-group for the payment task 
assignment in Treatment 1; therefore, I attempt to limit the amount of anger the angry 
group has towards their in-group by reducing the amount of information given to the 
angry group about their own group’s performance.  I want to make it clear that the other 
group blocked them from the easy performance task and caused them to earn less.  
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Treatment 2 will decrease the amount information given in the task assignment in an 
attempt to increase the amount of anger the angry group feels towards the out-group.   
Table 4.5 - Treatment 2 Timeline 
1. Subjects sign consent forms. 
2. Subjects are randomly assigned to a subject identification number and computer 
station. 
3. Subjects read over and work through examples of earnings that will be calculated in 
this Treatment. 
4. Subjects are assigned to two practice rounds with the easy and hard performance task.  
These performance tasks involve correctly identifying the number of times a randomly 
assigned number appears in a number table.  The number tables are a 3x3 (with correct 
answers worth five cents) or 6x6 (with correct answers worth ten cents).  The subjects 
have five seconds to correctly id the number of times a number appears.   
5. One group gets to choose which task they will complete for money.  As a result, one 
group is assigned the easy task and the other is assigned the hard task.  
6. Subjects are given information about their earnings in the performance task and how 
well and what others subjects also did in the performance task.  Then subjects are 
assigned into groups (based on performance) and told about how one group choose the 
task for the other group.  Then subjects are asked how they feel about their performance, 
earnings, and group assignment. 
7. Subjects are given information on their total earnings.   
8. Subject fill out a questionnaire on emotional status. 
9. Then each subject is dismissed one by one, paid in private, and sign the earnings sheet.   
10. Lastly, subjects are debriefed.   
Subjects: There were a total of two treatment sessions.  Subjects were recruited 
from Rice University.  Each session consisted of twelve subjects, placed into groups of 
four.  In each session, subjects were assigned to the same group.  The treatments were 
conducted using Z-Tree and lasted about an hour. There were a total of two treatment 
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sessions with a total of 24 subjects.  There were a total of eight subjects in the control 
group and sixteen in the angry group.  Each subject earned a $5.00 show up fee and on 
average $3.33 for task completion.  
Procedures: First, subjects were assigned into two groups, Group A and Group B.  
Each group consisted of four subjects, and these groups remained constant throughout the 
treatment.  Second, subjects rated how they felt in series of emotional batteries.  Then 
each subject took part in two one-minute practice rounds.  There were two types of 
performance tasks: an easy task worth 10 cents each correct answer, and a hard task 
worth 5 cents for each correct answer.  The performance task was adapted from the 
protocol of Abeler, Falk, Gotte and Huffman (2009) in which subjects earned money for 
correctly identifying the frequency in which a number appeared in a series of tables (as 
described previously in Treatment 1).  Treatment 2 is nearly identical to Treatment 1; the 
key difference is in the task assignment.  
Emotional Treatment: After the practice rounds, subjects received feedback on 
well they performed in the easy and hard practice rounds.  Then both groups decided 
which task they wished to complete for money.  This is where I create out-group anger.  
The key difference is that in Treatment 1 both groups completed the hard and easy tasks 
but only one group gets to be paid the easy task worth more.  In contrast, Treatment 2 
creates out-group anger through how the easy and hard task is assigned.  Both groups do 
not complete both task.  Instead, groups vote on which task they wish to complete. 
Group A was told, “Your group has been assigned to decide which task your 
group gets,” and “Please make your decision. What tasks do you want for your group?”  
Group B is told, “The other group is deciding whether your group gets the easy or hard 
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task” and “What task would you like your group to get? Please make your decision, but 
keep in mind that no one in the other group will know your choice.”  Immediately after, 
each group is assigned their task.  Group A is told, “Your Group choose the Easy task,” 
and Group B is told, “Your group preferred the EASY task.  The other group voted to 
assign you the HARD task.”  
The anger treatment is created through the task assignment.  Intergroup Emotional 
Theory argues that out-group anger emerges when one group blocks another group from 
a goal.  In Treatment 2, I follow this pattern and had Group A blocking Group B from 
completing the easy-worth-more task.  Group B becomes angry toward Group A for 
keeping them from the easy task and forcing them to complete the harder task, which is 
worth less.  
In order to control for performance task preference, I recorded whether each 
subject preferred the easy or hard task.  In these two sessions, there were three subjects 
that preferred the hard task to the easy task.  One subject out of eight subjects in the 
control group preferred the hard task.  Within the angry group of sixteen subjects, only 
two subjects preferred the hard task to the easy task.  These results indicate that overall, 
subjects preferred to complete the easy task to the more difficult one.  
Performance task assignment was critical in eliciting anger in line with Intergroup 
Emotional Theory.  It assumes that emotional responses must account for the individual, 
dyadic interactions, and group interactions.  Subjects in the angry group became angry 
with the other group for blocking them from a goal they wanted.  Appraisal Action 
Tendency Theory then predicts that individuals become angry when they appraise 
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something or feel as though someone is blocking them from a goal, and in response they 
have the tendency to take actions against this barrier. 
4.5. Main Treatment Effects 
Here, I present the main treatment effects.  Again, there are two groups, an angry 
and control group.  I present the pre and post performance task levels of anger for each 
group. These figures are created from three sets of questions.  First, rate how angry you 
feel right now.  Second, rate how angry you feel towards your in-group.  Last, rate how 
angry you feel towards the out-group.  Throughout the treatments, Group A’s out-group 
is Group B and Group B’s out-group is Group A.  Note that everything is the same as in 
Treatment 1.   
I utilize a within subject design in order to test if there are pre and post 
performance task differences.  I have a small number of cases, but these t-tests within 
groups allow me to examine the differences in different levels of anger.  These t-test 
results allowed me to determine whether the emotional treatment took hold and how it 
impacted the control and angry groups.  
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Figure 4.7 - Treatment 2: Individual Level of Anger 
 
N=28, control=7 and angry=21 
I expect the angry group to increase their level of anger at the individual level, 
and I expect no difference for the control group.  I find that the angry group increases 
their level of anger pre to post performance task.  As expected among the control group, 
the figure indicates no difference in the anger level pre to post performance task.  The 
Wilcox test in the Figure 4.7 will indicate if the levels of anger were different between 
the control and angry group.   
28.5 
49.83 
22.3 
58.27 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
angry_1_I (pre)  angry_2 _I (post) 
Control 
Angry 
 83 
 
 
Table 4.6 - Wilcox Test for Treatment 2 for Individual Anger  
 N Rank Sum Expected 
Pre    
Control  7 84.5 101.5 
Angry 21 321.5 304.5 
Z-score, P-value -.91, .35   
Post    
Control  7 51 101.5 
Angry 21 355 304.5 
Z-score, P-value -2.70, .00   
 
Table 4.6 presents the Wilcox tests for individual level anger between the control 
and angry groups.  The Wilcox test for pre performance task indicates no difference 
between the angry and control groups.  Differences emerge post performance task, where 
the angry group reports higher levels anger than the control group (Z=-2.70, p=.00).  
These differences in the control and angry group in individual indicate that Treatment 2 
may have successfully induced anger.   
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Figure 4.8 - Treatment 2: Anger towards the In-Group  
 
N=28, control=7 and angry=21 
I expected to find no change in anger directed toward a subject’s in-group for the 
control and angry group.  However, I found in Figure 4.8 that the angry group increased 
anger towards their in-group.  I also found the control group increased anger toward their 
in-group as well. Between group t-test pre and post performance task indicate there are 
differences. 
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Table 4.7 - Wilcox Test for Treatment 2 for In-Group Anger  
 N Rank Sum Expected 
Pre    
Control  7 91.5 101.5 
Angry 21 314.5 304.5 
Z-score, P-value -.56, .57   
Post    
Control  7 64.5 101.5 
Angry 21 341.5 304.5 
Z-score, P-value -1.99, .04   
 
Table 4.7 indicates that there were no differences between the angry group and 
control group pre treatment for the measure in-group anger.  However, post performance 
task, the control group had higher levels of anger towards their in-group than the angry 
group did towards theirs (z=-1.99, p=.04).  This indicates that the post performance task 
the control group was anger towards their in-group than the angry group towards their in-
group.  These post performance task results indicate that the treatment failed to elevate 
anger level of the angry group above the control group and help make the case that 
Treatment 2 is performing well.   
 
 
 
 
 86 
 
Figure 4.9 - Treatment 2 and Anger towards the Out-Group 
 
 
 N=28, control=7 and angry=21 
I expect for the angry group to increase anger toward the out-group and for the 
control group to exhibit no change in anger toward the out-group.  The angry group does 
increase anger toward the out-group.  The control group does not increase their level of 
anger toward the out-group.  Figure 4.9 illustrates that the angry group increased in anger 
towards the out-group while the control group exhibits no change in anger towards the 
out-group.   
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Table 4.8 - Wilcox Test for Treatment 2 for Out-Group Anger  
Out-Group Anger N Rank Sum Expected 
Pre    
Control  7 81.5 101.5 
Angry 21 324.5 304.5 
Z-score, P-value -1.08, .27   
Post    
Control  7 39 101.5 
Angry 21 367 304.5 
Z-score, P-value -3.34, .00   
 
The Wilcox tests for the pre and post measures of out-group anger confirm that 
the performance task is working in the expected way.  The angry group and control group 
means were not different pre performance task.  However, the differences in means 
appear post performance task, as the angry group became angrier at the out-group (=-
3.34, p=.00).  These test post performance task in Treatment 2 indicate that it successfully 
made the angry group angry towards the out-group.   
4.6. Discussion 
Overall, Treatment 2 out performs Treatment 1.  Treatment 1 failed to increase 
anger within the angry group at a statistically significant difference from the control 
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group.  In Treatment 1, I created out-group anger by having Group A block Group B 
from being paid a task that was worth more.  Group A voted to be paid the higher 
yielding and easier task and Group B was then paid with the lower yielding but more 
difficult task.  This anger treatment was not successful in creating out-group anger.   
In Treatment 2, anger was created through the selection of the tasks.  Group A 
voted to complete the higher yielding and easier task and Group B was told that Group A 
assigned them the lower yielding and harder task.  Once again, Group A blocks Group B 
from the desired goal.  I found that Treatment 2’s performance task increased anger at the 
out-group.  As a consequence, I decided to move forward with Treatment 2. 
4.7. Conclusion 
Treatment 2 successfully elicited anger towards the out-group.  Anger is no longer 
only salient to the individual.  I designed these anger treatments to create anger directed 
at the out-group through carefully planned intergroup interactions that make anger 
relevant at the group level.  The saliency of anger at the group level will then create the 
conditions ripe for group anger to mobilize individuals against the target of their group 
anger (the out-group).   
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Chapter 5 
The Impact of Out-Group Anger under 
Competition and Threat 
In this chapter, I examine how out-group anger mobilizes.  Using two 
experiments, I examine how out-group anger impact mobilization in a competitive and 
threatening environment.  Intergroup Emotional Theory posits that anger directed 
towards the out-group will foster in-group cooperation.  I expect that anger at the out-
group to provide a catalyst for group action, when groups face competitive and 
threatening environments.  The experiments indicate that out-group anger in the 
competitive environment mobilizes subjects more than out-group anger in the threatening 
environment.   
In the previous chapter, I created anger toward the out-group aligned with 
Intergroup Emotional Theory.  The objective of this chapter is to examine how this 
specific type of anger impacts a subject’s behavior in a mobilization task when she faces 
group competition and threat.  I attempt to bridge the research on group mobilization and 
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group solidarity through the mechanism anger.  Research on intergroup relations (Sherif 
and Sherif 1969; Brewer 1998; Taijel 1982, 2010; Messick 1989) indicates that groups 
often are in conflict with one another.  These conflicts range between competition over 
perceptions and actual resources, and these conflicts may present the best conditions for 
anger to mobilize.   
I examine the impact of out-group anger under two distinct contexts, competition 
and threat.  I define competition to involve a contest between individuals for limited 
resources and it often results in costly within-group cooperation among non-related 
individuals (Wilson 1975; Aviles 2002; Boyd et al. 2003; West et al. 2007).  Group threat 
also involves competition, but is defined as when a member of one group perceives that 
another group is in a position to cause them harm (Stephan, Renfro, and Davis 2008), this 
should also result in within group cooperation.  As a result, I empirically test how anger 
impacts mobilization when groups are both in competition and threatening one another.   
Intergroup Emotional Theory predicts that out-group anger increases mobilization 
within groups.  Anger toward the out-group should increase the likelihood of 
mobilization.  Intergroup Emotional Theory argues that intergroup interactions and 
contexts play a pivotal role in understanding group emotions.  In these experiments, I 
made one group angry with the out-group.  Then I placed each group into a competitive 
or threatening environment.  The competitive environment should increase the 
mobilization within the angry group, but the subjects in the angry group may not care 
about or react to being placed in competition.  In contrast, I expect the threatening 
environment to push the angry group to mobilize in order to protect their individual and 
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group wellbeing.  Losing in the threatening environment is more costly and if a subject is 
already angry with the out-group, she should be willing to mobilize. 
In the next section, I will provide a general overview of the two experiments.  In 
order to measure mobilization, I rely on a public goods game.  I expand on the public 
goods game used in Chapter 3 and examine how subjects behave under the condition of 
competition and threat. I use a variant of the public goods game—a competitive public 
good (CPG) (Tan and Bolle 2007; Puurtinen and Mappes 2009; Burton-Chellew, 
Gillespie, and West 2010) where groups have an additional incentive to contribute to the 
public good in order win a prize.   
The setup of the competitive public goods game is identical to the public goods 
game, but after each contribution decision, group comparisons are made in order to 
allocate the prize, bonus tokens.  In CPG, the bonus tokens increase cooperation because 
groups can win bonus tokens from the experimenter.  In the threatening public good 
(TPG), the prize or bonus tokens are taken from the losing group and redistributed among 
the winning group. The threatening condition should increase the cooperation because 
bonus tokens are taken from each member of the losing group.  The threat of losing of 
tokens should increase the willingness of the angry group to mobilize not only to win 
bonus tokens but also to protect their individual earnings.   
These experiments have two main treatment variables.  The first treatment was 
whether or not the subject is assigned to the angry or control group.  The second 
treatment was the type of public goods game; subjects were assigned to either the 
competitive public goods game or the threatening public goods game.  Angry groups 
should mobilize more than the control groups in both games.  Additionally, the angry 
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groups in the threatening public goods game should also mobilize more than the angry 
group in competitive public goods game.   
5.1. Literature on Competition and Threat 
Social scientists have a long history of making conjectures about the role of 
competition and threat on inter-group relations (Allport 1954; V.O. Keys 1949).  It is 
well established that groups often feel that they are in competition and threatened by one 
another, and posses negative evaluations towards one another (discrimination, racism, 
and negative affect) (Bobo 1983, 1988, 1996; Quillian 1995; Kinder 1981; Brewer 1998; 
Messick 1989).  Competition can be present without threat but threat cannot exist without 
competition.  These theories collectively argue that groups hold negative affect towards 
one another (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000), but are largely absent empirically on how 
specific anger toward the out-group impacts intergroup relations and interactions.  
 A popular explanation for political mobilization is that competition and threat 
push individuals to respond.  These individuals may respond by increasing their sense of 
group identity and group solidarity which then in turns increases their willingness to 
mobilize.  Group solidarity is the concept that involves psychological identification and 
group consciousness (Taijel et al. 1971).  Researchers have traditionally relied on survey 
questions that ask about (1) self identification with one’s group, (2) a feeling of closeness 
to one’s group, (3) a belief that one’s fate is linked to that of the group in order to 
measure group solidarity. These measures independently or in combination are used to 
predict political behavior  (Chong and Rogers 2005).   
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The empirical evidence on how group solidarity encourages political mobilization 
on behalf their group is empirically mixed.  Among African Americans, group solidarity 
is a powerful indicator for political participation (Olsen 1970; Shingles 1981; Verba and 
Nie 1972).  Other studies have shown the relationship between group solidarity and 
political participation is missing (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Marschall 2001; Tate 1991, 
1995; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995).  Despite the mixed finding on how group 
solidarity works, scholars agree that the concept is important to explain why individuals 
mobilize on behalf of their group (Kai-Stokes 2003; Masuoka 2006; Sanchez 2006).  
These studies imply that group solidarity is important but when it is important is unclear.  
A person who feels connected to their group may be willing to work for causes that 
benefit their group, but I argue a person who has a sense of group solidarity and angry at 
the out-group is the most likely to mobilize.  
The mechanism in which group solidarity increases political mobilization and 
participation is missing.  I argue that an emotional mechanism such as anger is at play 
here.  Emotions provide the catalyst for a group member to work on behalf of their group.  
Emotions that encourage approach tendencies such as anger then push group members to 
feel a stronger sense of group solidarity and increase the need to mobilize.  For example, 
if a person is angry with the out-group because she feels discriminated against (the out-
group is keeping her in-group from a goal), this may increase her level of group solidarity 
and willingness to mobilize.   
I designed experiments where group solidarity exists and examine whether out-
group anger then increases mobilization under competition and threat. Research in 
experimental economics indicates that group competition increases in-group cooperation 
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(Erev et al. 1993; Gunnthorsdottir and Rapport 2006; West et al. 2006; Tan and Bolle 
2007).  Overall, the economic literature indicates that competition between groups will 
increase in-group cooperation but these studies failed to examine how being angry 
impacts cooperation.  It is empirically unclear how anger toward the out-group impacts 
cooperation within groups.  I expected an interactive effect of out-group anger and 
competition on mobilization.  
The political science literature indicates that group consciousness, competition, 
and threat are important to consider for intergroup relations.  The literature on anger 
bridges how group consciousness may emerge out of intergroup interaction.  Negative 
interactions with the out-group may cause a person to become angry with the out-group 
and then motivate him or her to work within his or her own group members to mobilize.   
Intergroup Emotional Theory provides a pathway for how and why individuals 
can become angry toward the out-group (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000).  Anger 
towards the out-group emerges when the out-group is seen as blocking a subject’s own 
group from a goal (Lerner and Keltner 2000).  Out-group anger may then allow 
competition and threat to increase mobilization.  As an overview, in the competitive 
experiment there is a contest between groups for a limited resource.  In the threatening 
experiment, subjects perceive the out-group to cause harm to her group.  In both 
experiment, anger at the out-group will increase mobilization.  The specific hypotheses 
are outlined in the next section.   
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5.2. Hypotheses 
I expect in each game for the angry group to contribute more than the control 
group.  Intergroup Emotional Theory shows that anger towards the out-group may cause 
angry groups to mobilize.  Under competition, out-group anger should push the angry 
group to mobilize.  Angry subjects under threat should contribute more than angry 
subjects under competition. Introducing threat implies direct harm to the individual and 
the group’s well being, and I expect the potential harm to push the angry group to 
mobilize.  
In Experiment 1, I predict the angry group will contribute more than the control 
group when competition is introduced.  Competition is created through comparing group 
performance; the group who performs the best receives bonus tokens.  Competition is 
expected to increase the saliency of each group’s identity and anger and provide the 
angry subjects with a target to direct their anger against.  This helps demonstrate how 
anger and competition elicits group mobilization.   
Experiment 2 will then examine a more costly form of competition that involves 
group threat and analysis how threat affects mobilization.  Experiment 2 is almost 
identical to Experiment 1 – the key difference is in who pays the bonus tokens.  In 
Experiment 2, the experimenter allocates the bonus tokens through threat where the 
bonus tokens are taken away from the losing group and given to the winning group. The 
bonus winner is calculated the same way as in Experiment 1, except the losing group has 
to pay the bonus tokens to the winning group.   
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Experiment 2 links group threat to mobilization.  Group threat is competition that 
results in the winning group taking away resources from the losing group.  When faced 
with group threat, angry individuals will mobilize against the target of their anger.  When 
a group loses the bonus tokens under group threat, the cost of losing is shared amongst all 
group members.  In the event that the losing group loses their entire group fund, each 
member is forced to pay the bonus tokens from his/her own individual private 
endowment fund.  The purpose of threatening the private endowment is to create more 
group threat.  It is important to have groups compete and for the consequences of 
competition to be costly.  Group threat provides a target for the losing group.  Once there 
is a target for the anger, then the losing group should mobilize to remove or harm the 
cause of their anger. 
Hypothesis 1. Angry individuals in TPG will contribute more than the angry 
 individuals in CPG.  
In hypothesis 1, I expect there to be higher contributions among the angry group 
in the threatening public goods game.  Losing is costly within the context of threat; it 
should push individuals already angry with the out-group to mobilize more.   
5.3. Experiments 
I expand on the performance task in the Chapter 4 that elicited out-group anger.  
In this chapter, I induce anger that is targeted and implemented an expanded version of 
the public goods game.  I utilize a CPG framework with a bonus round after each public 
good decision to create competition or threat.  In this section, I compare how anger and 
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competition mobilize compared to anger and threat.  Experiment 1 examines anger and 
competition while Experiment 2 examines anger and threat.   
Table 5.1 - Difference between the CPG versus the TPG 
 CPG TPG 
Source of Bonus Experimenter Losing Group 
 
Experiment 1 examines the impact of anger and competition on mobilization.  
The mobilization task is a CPG.  The competitive public goods game is adapted from 
Puurtienen and Mappes (2009), they found that competition between groups increased 
within group cooperation and increased the moral emotions anger associated with 
violations of cooperation norms.  More specifically, they found that subjects felt anger 
towards group members that free ride (357).  Burton-Chellew et al. (2009) also observe 
the same pattern when they measure period-by-period anger towards a subjects own 
group.  I build upon these findings and examine how anger towards a subject’s own 
group and the out-group impacts cooperation.   
A competitive public goods game is similar to a standard public goods game but 
there is an additional stage where there are group comparisons.  After each round, the 
group with the largest group fund, which includes contributions to the public good and 
individual endowments, wins the bonus, which is the difference in tokens between 
groups.  The experimenter then calculates the difference between the groups, doubles that 
amount, and distributes the bonus tokens evenly to the members of the winning group.  
Since the experimenter pays the bonus, this creates an environment with competition.  
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Competition should increase contributions within the group because between group-
competition aligns the individual’s interest with their groups interests (Puurtinen and 
Mappes 2009; West et al. 2007), and subjects are more likely to regard their group as 
collaborators and not competitors (Burton-Chellew, Ross-Gillespie, and West 2010).  
Subjects will then working towards a common goal of winning bonus tokens.  The 
competitive public goods game makes the conditions ripe for anger to further push 
individuals to mobilize against the group, that they are already angry at.   
 The purpose of Experiment 2 is to examine how group threat impacts the 
likelihood that an angry individual will mobilize.  Group threat captures a specific type of 
competition and it provides an angry group with a target to mobilize against.  This 
experiment makes group identity salient through group competition similar to Experiment 
1, but it also induces group threat where losing can be very costly.  The cost of losing the 
prize hurts each individual.  Group threat forces the group to compete in order to protect 
themselves. The winning group is able to take resources away from the losing group.  As 
a result, the wining group blocks the losing group from their goal (i.e. protecting 
individual and group earnings and winning bonus tokens).  The losing group may then 
become angrier and mobilize to remove this external threat. Threat increases the saliency 
of group identity and group anger, these components should increase mobilization efforts.  
Experiment 2 further clarifies how anger can mobilize individuals to cooperate within 
their group when facing threat.  The key assumption is that anger toward the out-group 
under the condition of threat will force angry individuals to mobilize against the target of 
their anger, the out-group.   
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Table 5.2 - Experiment Timeline 
Step 1. Subjects sign the consent forms. 
Step: 2. Subjects are randomly assigned to a computer station and assigned to groups.  
Step: 3. Subjects fill out questionnaires on emotional status. 
Step: 4. Subjects work through examples how to earn money in the performance task 
earnings. 
Step: 5. Subjects take part in two (1 minute) practice performance tasks (3x3) and (6x6).  
Step: 6. Task Assignment: Each group chooses which performance task they wish to 
complete for money.  Group A decides which they want to complete.  Group B is told 
that Group A is blocking them from their task of choice. 
Step: 7. Subjects are given information about their earnings in the performance task and 
how well the other group did in the performance task. 
Step: 8. Subjects take part in a competitive public goods game or threatening public 
goods game (10 periods) where at the end of each period, a group comparison is made to 
determine which group wins the bonus.  
In CPG, the experimenter pays the bonus tokens.  
In TPG, the losing group pays bonus tokens to the winning group.  
Step: 9. Subjects are then given information on their total earnings in the competitive 
public goods game or threatening public goods game. 
Step: 10. Subjects fill out questionnaire on emotional status. 
Step: 11. Subjects fill out questionnaire on demographics and political questions. 
Step: 12. Then each subject is dismissed one by one, paid in private, and sign the 
earnings sheet. 
Step: 13. Lastly, subjects are debriefed. 
 
Subjects: The subjects were recruited from Rice University residential dining 
halls during lunch and dinner.  Each experimental session required a minimum of 16 
subjects and between 20-25 subjects were recruited for each session.  The experimenter 
over recruited in order to make sure that at least 16 subjects came to the lab.  Without 16 
subjects, the experimental session would be cancelled.  All experimental sessions and 
subject recruitment were completed during a one-week period. 
  Procedures: In steps 1-2, the subjects entered the laboratory lobby and were 
randomly assigned a subject identification number.  Each subject were assigned a subject 
 100 
 
identification number in order to link her to her total experiment earnings and keep her 
behavior in the experiment anonymous to the other subjects.  At the time of subject 
identification assignment, the subjects were also randomly assigned to a computer.  Upon 
receiving a computer number, the subject entered the lab.  Once 16 subjects entered the 
lab, the experiment began. 
Each subject opened the Z-leaf program on her computer and entered her subject 
identification number.  The experimenter started the Z-tree server program (Fischbacher 
2007) and instructed the subjects to enter her subject identification number and close all 
other programs he or she may have opened on the desktop.  Upon starting the Z-tree 
server, the experimenter randomly assigned subjects to their group and emotional 
condition.   
After each subject entered her subject identification number, she was told which 
group she was assigned to.  Each subject was told she was either a member of Group A or 
Group B.  In addition, each subject was told she was in a group of 4.  Within the 
experiment, there were a total of four groups and two pairs of groups.  Each group pair 
was matched throughout the experiment.  Immediately after group assignments, each 
subject took part in Step 3, which involves a baseline emotional battery of emotions.  
Each subject was asked to indicate how much she felt a specific emotion towards 
themselves, their group, and the out-group.  The emotional inventory is identical to that 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
After the emotional battery, each subject began Step 4 and was introduced to an 
easy and difficult performance task (see previous chapter).  This performance task 
involved identifying the correct number of times a random number appeared in a number 
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table. The 3x3 were worth five cents per correct answer and the 6x6 were worth ten cents 
per correct answer. The subject had five seconds and a total of five minutes to correctly 
identify the number of times a number appeared in the table.  Each subject calculated 
how much money he/she would earn for answering x amount of correct tables within 
each task.  After solving these earning examples, each subject then took part in two one-
minute practice rounds for each performance task.  Upon completing the practice rounds, 
the subject were given information on how well she did and how much she would have 
earned in the easy and difficult performance task. 
Anger Treatment:  In Step 6, subjects entered the stage where the emotional 
treatment was assigned.  Group A was told, “Now decide which task you wish your 
group to perform. The easy task is worth 10 cents per correct answer and the hard task is 
worth 5 cents per correct answer.  Your group has been assigned to decide the task your 
group gets.  Please make your decision. Which task do you want for your group?”  Group 
B was told “The other group is deciding whether your groups gets the easy or hard task.  
The easy task is worth 10 cents per correct answer and the hard task is worth 5 cents per 
correct answer.  What task would you like your group to get? Please make your decision, 
but keep in mind that no one in the other group will know your choice.”  The messages 
each group received one of following messages in the figure below.  
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Table 5.3 - Messages on Task Assignment According to Group.   
 Message on Task Assignment 
Group A 1.1.1. Your Group Choose the Easy Task 1.1.2. Your Group Choose the Hard Task 
Group B (1) Your group preferred the EASY task.  The other group voted to assign you 
the HARD task. 
(2) Your group preferred the HARD task.  The other group voted to assign 
you the HARD task. 
(3) Your group preferred the HARD task.  The other group voted to assign 
you the EASY task. 
(4) Your group preferred the EASY task.  The other group voted to assign you 
the EASY task.   
 
In Step 9, the subjects read the instructions for the competitive goods game or 
threatening public goods game.  They also worked through earning examples for their 
respective game.  There were two versions of the CPG, one is referred to as CPG and the 
other is referred to as TPG.  Both competitive public goods were based on previous 
public good games (Holt and Laury 1990; Andreoni 1988;).  Subjects were told, 
“Everyone in your group has been given 20 tokens.  Please allocate token between the 
Green and Blue Fund.  Anything you put in the Blue fund will be doubled and divided 
between four group members.  Whatever your put in the Green fund is yours and will not 
be shared.  Remember that the amount you allocate must equal 20.”  In the competitive 
public goods game (Tan and Zizzo 2008; Tan and Bolle 2007), there was additional 
component to the public goods game; the potential to win bonus tokens.   
After each decision, there was a group comparison made between each group’s 
total group account that included individual funds and the group funds.  I adapted the 
bonus token allocation from Puurtinen and Mappes (2009).  After each period, bonus 
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tokens were allocated to the group with the largest total group fund.  The bonus token 
were allocated by a tally of the difference between the two total group funds and 
multiplying that by two and dividing it to each member of the group with the larger total 
group fund.  The bonus was awarded in each period to the group with the largest group 
fund and any group could win the bonus in each round.  This was the key difference 
between the competitive public goods game and threatening public goods game. In the 
competitive public goods game, the experimenter paid the bonus tokens.  In contrast, in 
the threatening public goods game bonus tokens were taken from the losing group and 
allocated to the winning group.   
Feedback: After each period, subjects were given feedback on their earnings 
without bonus and then earnings with the bonus.  The first feedback screen provided a 
summary of period earning without the bonus that included: what you allocated to the 
Green fund, Blue Fund, your share of the Blue Fund, and total earnings this period 
without the bonus.   
In the second feedback screen subjects were given their total earnings with the 
bonus.  This screen included information on their group’s earnings and the other group’s 
earnings, and the difference in total group earnings.  In the same screen, in CPG, subjects 
were given specific feedback on bonus tokens, if they win, they receive information on 
“your share of the bonus that the experimenter will pay.”  In TPG, the subjects were told 
if they win that “your share of the bonus that the other group must pay” and if they lose 
“your share of the bonus that you must pay the other group.” In the event of a tie, subjects 
were told “In this period, there was a tie and neither group will receive any bonus 
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tokens.”  At the bottom of this feedback screen, all subjects received information on 
“Your earnings for this period” and “Your total earning thus far.”  
After ten periods of the competitive public goods game or the threatening public 
goods game (Step 10), subjects received information on their total earnings in this task.  
In Step 11, subjects took another emotional inventory.  This emotional inventory was 
identical to the inventory in Step 3.  These emotional inventories measured pre and post 
performance changes in emotions.  Lastly, subjects answered questions on trust, politics, 
and demographics (Step 12).  The experiment then concluded with Step 13, where each 
subject’s earnings were calculated, paid in private, and subjects were debriefed.   
5.4. Emotional Treatment 
 In this section, I present the emotional treatment effect.  I present within 
treatment t-tests for each group in each game.  The measure for anger was created from 
three questions which subjects answered pre and post performance in CPG and TPG.  
These questions asked subjects to “Think about yourself right now, your group, and the 
other group and do you feel angry?”  The subjects were then told to move the slider left 
or right to indicate the location that showed how they felt.  The slider was anchored in the 
middle with the far left labeled “Strongly Agree” and the far right labeled “Strongly 
Disagree.”  There were no numbers on the slider and all the sliders started at the midway 
point.  This emotional inventory is identical to Chapter 4. 
The within group t-tests below examine the mean difference between the angry 
and control groups and their reported levels of anger at three different targets: Individual, 
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Group, and Out-Group.  I expected the angry group to be angry at the out-group post 
treatment.  Among the control group, I expected lower levels of anger at the out-group.  
These expectations are borne out in my findings and I find that the angry group is angry 
with the out-group, but the control group is not angry with the out-group. Below is a 
figure that contains within group t-tests.   
Table 5.4 - Experiment 1: CPG T-test.  
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Angry     
Individual 19.81 (4.81) 25.81 (8.20) -0.74 0.23 
In-Group 13.56 (3.66) 30 (7.70) -2.69 0.00*** 
Out-Group  26.68 (6.90) 48.5 (8.30) -2.33 0.01** 
Control      
Individual 20.62 (4.61) 39.43 (7.73) -1.98 0.03* 
In-Group 15.06  (3.87) 34.12 (8.65) -1.96 0.03* 
Out-Group  25.62 (5.24) 30.75  (7.08) -0.54 0.29 
N=32 16=control 16=angry   
 
In CPG, I find that the angry group increases in anger at the individual level but 
these increases are not statistically significant.  The angry group also increases in their 
level of anger toward their own-group, and the out-group and these differences are 
statistically significant.  In the control group, I also find increases in anger levels.  The 
control group is angrier at the individual level (t-1.98, p=.03) and angrier toward their 
own-group (-1.96, .03) and these differences are statistically significant.  A major 
difference between the angry and control group is that the control group increases in 
anger toward the out-group, but these changes are not statistically significant.   
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Table 5.5 - Experiment 2: TPG T-test 
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Anger     
Individual 17.68 (5.09) 30.37 (7.56)  -1.76  0.04* 
In-Group 9.75 (3.70) 34.31 (8.23) -2.97 0.00***  
Out-Group  19.5 (6.45) 46.81 (8.10) -3.42 0.00***  
Control      
Individual 4.87 (1.89) 18.12 (6.53) -1.99  0.03* 
In-Group  6.62 (3.11) 18.56 (6.80) -1.44  0.08  
Out-Group  17.62 (6.59) 21.125 (7.40) -0.37 0.35    
N=32 16=control 16=angry   
  
In the Table 5.5, I examine the within group t-tests for angry and control group in 
TPG.  I find a similar pattern.  The t-test indicates within group differences in the angry 
group.  I measure anger directed at the individual subject, their group, and the out-group.  
I find that there are increases in anger levels across all three measures among the angry 
group.  These increases within the angry group are in the expected direction and 
statistically significant.  I also find increase in anger among the control group.  The 
control group became angrier toward their own group, and this changes is not statistically 
significant.  Within the control group, there was an increase in anger toward the group 
and the out-group that was not statistically significant.   
These t-tests indicate that the angry groups in both games were significantly angry 
with the out-group.  However, the control group in both games was also angry with her 
in-group.  These t-tests in Table 5.5 indicate that the emotional treatment worked.  In the 
next section, I present between group t-test for each measure of anger.  I expect no 
differences between the angry and control group in the pre treatment measures of anger in 
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either experiment.  Post treatment, I expect the angry group to be angrier at the individual 
level and angrier with the out-group.  I do not have expectations for the change in anger 
towards a subject’s in-group.   
Table 5.6 - CPG: Between Group T-Test 
CPG  Control Angry T-score P-value 
Pre     
Angry 1 20.65 (4.61) 19.81 (4.81) .12 .45 
In-Group Angry 1 15.06 (3.87) 13.56 (3.66) .28 .39 
Out-Group Angry 1 25.62 (5.24) 26.68 (6.90) -0.12 .45 
Post     
Angry 2 39.43 (7.73) 25.13 (8.20) 1.20 .11 
In-Group Angry 2 34.12 (8.65) 30 (7.70) .35 .36 
Out-Group Angry 2 30.75 (7.08) 48.5 (8.36) -1.62 .05 
N=Angry 16, Control=16.     
 
In the pre treatment measures of anger, I find that the control group has a higher 
level of anger than the angry group for individual level anger and towards their in-group.  
But these differences are not statistically significant.  In the pre treatment measure of 
anger toward the out-group, the angry group reports a higher level but this difference is 
also not statistically significant.  Post treatment, I find that the control group is angrier at 
the individual level and angrier with their in-group than the angry group.  But these 
differences in anger at not statistically significant.  However, as expected, I find that the 
angry group is angrier with the out-group than the control group is at the out-group.  The 
between group t-test for post out-group anger is statistically significant (t=-1.62, p=.05).  
In CPG, the angry group was angrier than the control group post treatment with the out-
group.   
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Table 5.7 - TPG: Between Group T-Test 
TPG  Control Angry T-score P-value 
Pre     
Angry 1 4.87 (7.58) 17.68 (5.09) -2.35 .01** 
In-Group Angry 1 6.62 (3.11) 9.75 (3.70) -0.64 .26 
Out-Group Angry 1 17.65 (6.59) 19.5 (6.45) -0.20 .42 
Post     
Angry 2 18.84 (6.53) 30.37 (7.56) -1.22 .11 
In-Group Angry 2 18.56 (6.80) 34.31 (8.23) -1.47 .07 
Out-Group Angry 2 21.12 (7.40) 46.81 (8.10) -2.34 .01** 
N=Angry 16, Control=16. 
In TPG, I expect pre treatment both groups to have the same level of anger.  Post 
treatment, I expect the angry groups to have higher levels of anger.  Pre treatment, the 
angry group has higher levels of anger at the individual level, with their in-group, and 
with the out-group.  Even as the angry group reports higher levels at the start, the 
differences is only statistically significant from the pre treatment individual level of 
anger.  Post treatment, I expect the angry group to have higher levels of anger than the 
control group.  I find this exact pattern post treatment that the angry group has higher 
levels of anger.  The difference in anger at the individual level and directed at the 
subject’s in-group is not statistically between the control and angry group.  The 
difference is statistically significant for post treatment measure of anger towards the out-
group, the angry group is angrier than the control.   
5.5. Results 
The dependent variable is mobilization.  Mobilization is operationalized as the 
number of tokens contributed to the group fund.  The contributions range from 0 to 20 
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tokens and the dependent variable is collected for 10 periods.  I first present the mean 
aggregate contributions for each subject type in each game.  This means that each subject 
has 10 periods of contributions, and their total contributions are calculated.  I expect for 
the control group to contribute more than the angry group in the CPG.  In TPG, I expect 
the angry group to contribute more than the control group. In addition, I expect the angry 
group to contribute more in TPG than CPG.  
Table 5.8 - Sum Contribution Differences between Anger and Control Groups 
 Angry Control T-score P-value 
CPG 166.75 
(12.03) 
141.18 
(14.21) 
-1.13 .09, 
n=32 
TPG 153.81 
(9.53) 
172.56 
(7.78) 
1.52 .06, 
n=32 
     
N=16 cases in each cell.  
 
The between groups t-test above examines whether the angry group in each game 
contributed more than the angry group.  I have the same sum mean contribution across 10 
periods.  I find that the angry group contributed on average more than the control group 
only in CPG.  The between group t-test indicates that in CPG, the angry group 
cumulatively contributes more than the control group.  The angry group contributed a 
mean total of 166.75 tokens across 10 periods and the control group contributed 141.18 
tokens across 10 periods.  The differences are not statistically significant with a t=-1.13 
and p-value of .09, but the results are in the expected direction.   
In TPG, I expected to find that the angry group contributed more than the control 
group.  Instead, I find the control group contributed more than the angry group.  The 
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difference is not in the expected directions; the control group on average contributed 
172.56 tokens each period while the angry group contributed on average 153.81 tokens.  
The difference is not statistically significant (t=1.52, p=.06).  I now move on to discuss 
hypothesis 1.  
Table 5.9 - Sum Differences between Game.   
Experiment  CPG TPG T-score P-value 
Angry 166.75 (12.03) 153.81 (9.53) T=.84 p=.20 
Control  141.18 (14.21) 172.56 (7.78) T=1.92 p=.03 
N=16 cases in each cell.  
In hypothesis 1, I examine whether or not the angry group contributed more in 
TPG than the angry group in CPG.  Between game tests indicate that there is no support 
for hypothesis 1.  The empirical evidence indicates the opposite relationship; the angry 
group in CPG contributed more than the angry group in TPG.  These differences are not 
statistically significant.  In contrast, the control group in both these game behaved how I 
expect the angry group to behave.  The control group in TPG contributed more than the 
control group in CPG.  These differences in the control group are also statistically 
significant.  These between game comparisons within the same treatment types indicate 
no support for hypothesis 1.   
Overall, the angry group in TPG did not contribute more than the angry group in 
CPG.  These results indicate that my hypothesis about the nature of anger and group 
threat is not aligned with expectation of Intergroup Emotional Theory.   
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A third set of t-test examine if the angry and control treatment group get angrier 
with their out-group than the in-group?  I ran a series of t-test within the same group 
comparing the difference between the change in anger with the in-group versus the 
change in anger with the out-group.  I expect that both groups became angrier with the 
out-group than with their in-group.  In addition, I expect the angry group in TPG to have 
the biggest change in anger towards the out-group.   
Table 5.10 - T-test for between change in In-Group vs Out-Group Anger 
CPG In-Group Out-Group T-score P-value 
Angry 16.43 (6.10) 21.81 (9.35) -0.57 0.28 
Control  19.06 (9.71) 5.125 (9.48) 1.28 0.10 
TPG     
Angry 24.56 (8.25) 27.31 (7.97) -0.38 0.35 
Control  11.93 (8.25) 3.5 (9.22) 0.73 0.23 
 
Above, I find that the angry subjects in CPG have a higher level of anger towards 
the out-group then the in-group but these differences are not statistically significant. 
Among the control group in CPG, I find that the control group is angrier with their in-
group then the out-group but these differences are not statistically significant.  In TPG, 
the angry subjects are angrier towards the out-group than their in-group but again these 
differences are not statistically significant.  In TPG, the control group is angrier at with 
their in-group than the out-group and these differences are not statistically significant.  
These t-tests indicate that overall the change in anger within the angry and control in each 
game is not statistically different from one another.   
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5.6. Discussion 
Intergroup Emotional Theory assumes that anger directed toward the out-group 
will lead to within group mobilization.  If a group is angry with the out-group, the anger 
should drive one group to mobilize against the other. What I find is that under 
competition, anger toward the out-group leads to mobilization.   However, under the 
condition of threat, the angry group is angry with the out-group but this does not lead the 
angry group to mobilize against the out-group.  Even though there is anger toward the 
out-group in both games, the competition game increases the likelihood of mobilization 
while the threat game decreases the likelihood of mobilization.    
Is there something unique about the threatening public goods game that 
discourages the angry group from mobilizing?  I expected that threat would drive angry 
individuals to mobilize with one another to protect the individual and group from the out-
group.  The threatening public goods game allocates bonus tokens won from the losing 
group’s group fund, which then requires examination of period-by-period mean 
contributions.   
 113 
 
 
Figure 5.1 - CPG Contributions Across Periods. 
 
 
In Figure 5.1, I examine average contributions by period each group in both 
games.  The line graphs below represent the average contributions in each game.  Within 
each line graph, the red lines with the square boxes represent the angry group and the 
blue lines with the circles represents the control group.  The y-axis represents the mean 
contributions, which ranges from 0-20 tokens and the x-axis represents the periods across 
time (1-10).  Overall, I find that the angry group mobilized more in the competitive 
public goods.  However the angry group does not mobilize more when they are placed in 
the threatening public goods game.   
At first glance, I find that the angry group contributes on average more than the 
control group.  The angry groups mean contributions range from 18 to 15 tokens and the 
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control group’s mean contributions range from 16 to 10 tokens.  The angry group 
contributions are more stable than the control group, which decreases more quickly in 
contributions over time.  In addition, the figure indicates that over 10 periods the angry 
group contributed more than the control group.  A series of t-test period-by-period 
indicate that only in period 8 did the angry group contribute more than the control group 
and this difference were statistically significant (t=-1.71, p=.04).  In the other periods, the 
results were in the expected direction but not statistically robust. 
Figure 5.2 - TPG Contributions Across Periods 
 
 
In the figure 5.2, I have created a line graph with the average contributions across 
ten periods in TPG.   The contributions for the control group range from 20 to 15 tokens 
while the angry groups contributions range form 17 to 14 tokens.  I expected that the 
angry group would have higher contributions than the control group. The results indicate 
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that this is not true.  Instead the control group contributions on average more than the 
control group, except in the last period.  A closer examination period-by-period, I find in 
t-test that in periods 3 and 8, the control group not only contributed more but the 
differences was statistically significant.   
Overall, the data indicate that there is support for hypothesis 1, the angry subjects 
contributed more than the control group in CPG.  I find no support for hypothesis 2, the 
angry group did not contribute more than the control group in TPG.  Lastly, there is also 
no support for hypothesis 3.  The angry group in TPG did not contribute more than the 
angry group in CPG. These findings undermine the expectations in Intergroup Emotional 
Theory.  The theory expects that anger towards the out-group will lead to mobilization in 
a subject’s own group.  This experiments increased anger toward the out-group but I also 
found increases in anger towards a subject’s in-group.  The elevated levels in anger 
towards a subject’s in-group may be impacting contribution levels.  As a result, I will 
now examine the change in anger toward a subject’s in-group.  The first step is to 
examine how often does the angry group win in each period versus the control group.   
Table 5.11 - Frequency of Wins across Groups 
Mean Wins Control Angry T-value P-value N 
CPG 4.5 (1.7) 5.25 (1.22) -.45 .66 32 
TPG 7.75 (.46) 2 (.48) 8.16 .00 32 
 
The table 5.11 above indicates the mean times a group won or lost over 10 periods 
in each experiment.  In the competitive public goods game, the angry group won on 
average 5.25 times while the control group won 4.5 times.  Between group t-test indicate 
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in the competitive public goods game, that there are no differences between how many 
times the control or angry group won.  In the threatening public goods game, the control 
group wins on average 7.57 times while the angry group wins on average two times over 
10 periods.  The between group t-test in the threatening public goods game indicate that 
the control group won more than the angry group (t=8.16, p=.00). 
In this next section, I will examine the change in anger towards a subject’s in-
group.  The figure below indicates the amount of change in anger within each game and 
group type.  In addition, I have divided the sample into those groups that won or lost five 
or more periods.  I expect that winning five or more times will decrease the amount of 
anger towards a subject's in-group.  In contrast, losing five or more times will increase in-
group anger.  I created a change in-group anger measure by taking the difference between 
anger at in-group post treatment subtracted by in-group anger pre treatment.  A positive 
value for the change in-group anger indicates an increase.  A negative value for the 
change in-group anger indicates a decrease.   
Table 5.12 - Individual Change in Anger towards In-Group 
Change  
In-Group Anger 
Group Win 5x or + Group Loose 5x or + Within group T-test 
CPG    
Anger 4.12 (2.51), n=8 28.75 (10.49), n=8 T=2.28, p=.01, n=16 
Control -9.5 (4.84), n=8 47.85 (12.15), n=8 T=4.36, p=.00, n=16 
    
T-test 
Between Group  
T=-2.49, p=.01 T=1.17, p=.12  
TPG    
Anger 17 (14.86), n=4 27.08 (10.07), n=12 T=.51, p=.30, n=16 
Control 9.91 (9.80), n=12 18 (17.01), n=4 T=-.41, p=.34, n=16 
T-test Between T=-0.27, p=.39 T=-0.35, p=.36  
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Group  
 
In CPG, I expected groups that won five or more times to decrease anger towards 
their in-group, for both the control and angry group.  For those who lost five or more 
times, I expected an increase in in-group anger.  I expected the same pattern to emerge in 
TPG.  In CPG, the angry group increased in anger towards their in-group when they won 
five or more times while the control group that won five or more times decreased in in-
group anger.  These differences are statistically different, the angry group increased in 
anger while the control group decreased in anger at in-group (t=-2.49, p=.01).  In CPG, 
the angry and control group also behave as expected; they both increased in in-group 
anger when they lose five or more times.  Within group in CPG, I also find statistical 
differences among the groups when I compare how many times they won or lost.  In both 
the angry and control group, within t-tests indicate that losing five or more times 
increases anger at a subject’s in-group.   
In TPG, I expected that winning five or more times decreases anger at the in-
group and losing five or more times to increase anger at the in-group.  In TPG, I found 
that winning five or more times increased in-group anger.  Among the control and angry 
group, I expected that winning five or more times increased anger but the differences are 
not statistically significant.  When subjects lose five or more time, both groups’ increased 
in anger towards their in-group. In TPG, the angry group increased the most in anger 
towards their in-group, these differences are in the expected direction but not statistically 
significant.  Within group t-test in TPG, I found that the control group does not exhibit 
differences when they lose of win five or more times.   
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Table 5.13 - Individual Change in Anger towards Out-Group 
Change in Out-Group 
Anger 
Group Win 5x + Group Loose 5x  Within group T-test 
CPG    
Anger 11.25 (14.49), 
n=8 
32.37 (11.52), 
n=8 
T=1.14, p=.13, 
n=16 
Control -12.87 (9.55), 
n=8 
23.12 (14.21), 
n=8 
T=-2.10, 
p=.02,n=16 
T-test Between Group  T=-1.39, p=.09 T=-.50, p=.31  
TPG    
Anger 13 (14.42), n=4 32.08 (9.39), 
n=12 
T=1.03, p=.15, 
n=16 
Control 4.58 (12.42), 
n=12 
.25 (.25), n=4 T=-.19, p=.42, 
n=16 
T-test Between Group  T=-0.47, p=.31 T=-1.66, p=.05  
 
After examining the change in anger towards a subject’s own group, it is logical 
to now discuss how winning and losing then impact the change in anger towards a 
subject’s own-group.  I find in CPG, both winning and losing five or more times increase 
anger towards the out-group.  The control group in the CPG exhibit a different pattern, 
when they win five or more times they decrease in anger towards the out-group but when 
they lose five or more times they increase in anger towards the out-group, and these 
differences were statistically significant.  Between groups, winning five or more times 
there are differences between the angry and controls and these results are approaching 
statistical significant.  Winning five or more times, the angry group increases in anger 
towards the out-group while the control group decreases in anger towards the out-group.  
Losing five or more times in the CPG has the same impact on both groups; they increase 
in anger towards the out-group. 
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In TPG, the angry group increases in anger towards the out-group when they win 
five or more times and lose five or more times.  Losing five or more times increases 
anger towards the out-group among the angry subjects.  Within the control group, 
winning and losing increases anger towards the out-group, but the increase in anger is 
more when the control group wins than when they lose five or more time.  These 
differences in the control group when winning and losing are not statistically significant.  
Between groups, winning five or more times increase anger towards the out-group but 
these differences are not statistically significant.  The differences emerge between groups 
when comparing the change in out-group anger as a function of losing five or more times.  
When the angry group loses five or more times, they increase in anger more than the 
control group, and these differences are significant.  
In the next set of experiments, I explored how the angry group mobilized when 
faced with threat. Intergroup Emotional Theory suggests that out-group anger should be 
enough to increase the mobilization level.  However, I need to ensure that the angry 
group was angriest with their out-group. In the t-test for the main effects of anger, I found 
the angry group increased in their level of anger towards their own-group.  The increase 
in anger toward the angry group’s own-group may be impacting the willingness of the 
angry group to work with their in-group.   
In each period, the subject was given full information on how much her group 
members contributed to the public good and how well her group did compared to the out-
group.  I suspect that the angry group was responding to feedback about their group fund 
and bonus round payoffs.  In the next experiments, I reduce the information about bonus 
round tokens in order to reduce the amount of blame the angry group places on their 
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group for losing.  I suspect that anger with a subject’s group increased in response to 
losing the bonus tokens in the threatening public goods game. As a result, I will run 
another series of the threatening public goods game that will reduce the amount of 
feedback given between each period in order to reduce in-group blame and anger.   
5.7. Conclusion 
The experiments in this chapter examined the impact of anger toward the out-
group and its impact on mobilization under the condition of competition and threat.  
While I was successful at creating anger toward the out-group, the impact of competition 
and threat varied from theoretical expectation.  In CPG, the angry group out mobilized 
the control group.  In the TPG, the angry group did not out mobilize the control group.  
These results indicate that I need to further examine how threat impacts anger and 
mobilization.  In the next experiments, I reduce the amount of anger that an angry group 
subject directs at her own-group.  Perhaps the relationship between anger and threat is 
mitigated by how much anger a subject feels towards her own-group and the out-group.   
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Chapter 6 
Threat Prevents Mobilization 
The previous chapter demonstrated that threat did not increase mobilization 
compared to competition.  This finding was unexpected but the potential of threat to 
mobilize may be attributed to the surprising increase in in-group anger.  A subject’s 
increase in anger with her own group may have depressed her willingness to mobilize.  
To test this idea further, I reduced the feedback given to subjects in the two subsequent 
versions of the TGP experiment in order to mitigate anger towards their in-group. 
This chapter examines how out-group anger and threat when combined with anger 
impacts mobilization.  I use three versions of a threatening public goods game: one 
version with full feedback (TPG1); a second version with limited feedback (TPG2); and a 
third version where the angry group is discriminated against in combination with limited 
feedback (TPG3).  I find that as I reduce information and increase discrimination against 
the angry group, the angry group responds with decreasing mobilization.  In other words, 
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TPG1 yielded the most mobilization and TGP3 yielded the least mobilization.  However, 
within the three threat conditions, the angry groups do not mobilize more than the control 
groups.  These findings indicate that Intergroup Emotional Theory fails to explain how 
anger at the out-group is the catalyst for group mobilization.    
6.1. Between TPG Experiments 
In TPG1, subjects were given full information on the behavior of their group and 
the other group.  Receiving full feedback on group contributions may have caused 
subjects to increase anger towards free riders in their own group (Puurtinens and Mappes 
2009; Burton-Chellew et. al., 2010).  Limiting feedback should redirect anger towards the 
out-group and limit the amount of blame a subject places on her in-group for losing.  
Table 6.1 - Differences in TPG Versions 
 TPG1 TPG2 TPG3 
MPCR .50 .50 .33 (angry group) 
.50 (control group) 
Feedback 
Information 
Full  Win or Lose Win or Lose 
  
There are two main differences in these threatening public goods games: (1) in 
TPG2 there is less feedback on total group earnings, and (2) in TPG3 there is less 
feedback and additional discrimination against the angry group.  In TPG2, the 
experimental protocol was exactly the same as TPG1 except that there is a reduction in 
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the feedback provided to each subject between periods.  Subjects in TPG2 are told 
whether their group won, lost, or there was a tie in the allocation of bonus tokens and 
whether they would receive or have to pay the bonus tokens.  In TPG1, the subjects were 
given full feedback, which includes everything in TPG2 plus their group’s performance, 
the other group’s performance, and how many bonus tokens they won or lost.  To goal of 
limiting the feedback in TPG2 and TPG3 is to decrease the amount of blame and anger a 
subject directs towards their own in-group, and to see if this will result in mobilization 
towards the out-group. 
In TPG3, feedback is also limited exactly as it is in TPG2, and on top of that the 
angry group is discriminated against prior to starting the game.  I utilized discrimination 
in order to increase the angry group’s anger towards the out-group.  The angry group is 
told that their total group fund will be worth less because they earned less money in the 
performance task.  Under TPG3 with discrimination, the marginal per capital return 
(MPCR) was changed from .5 to .33 for the angry group.  Other studies have also 
examined the impact of heterogeneous payment MPCRs (Fisher, Schatzberg, Walker 
2005; Tan 2008; Chan, Mestelman, Moir, and Muller 19999.  The objective of lowering 
the MPCR is to remind the angry group that the out-group is the target of their anger.  I 
chose .33 because previous studies have shown that a MPCR at that rate is considered 
low (Issac and Walker 1998, 1994; Noussair and Soo 2008; Gunnthorsdottira, Houser, 
and McGabe 2007).  Threat coupled with discrimination should redirect anger from one’s 
own in-group towards the out-group and increase the incentive to mobilize.   
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In order to test these assumptions, I first need to look at the results from TPG1.  In 
TPG1, the angry subjects contributed less than the control group. The results of TPG1 
were taken from Chapter 5 and builds on the assumptions presented in IET that out-group 
anger increases mobilization.  In TPG1, having full information may have triggered the 
angry group to blame their own in-group for losing and feel that in-group members did 
not cooperate enough.  As consequence, in TPG2, I reduce the amount of feedback 
between periods so that the angry group will increase in anger towards the out-group and 
not their own in-group.   
6.2. Hypotheses 
The hypotheses in this chapter test Intergroup Emotional Theory under group 
threat.  I reexamine the findings in the previous chapter on why TPG failed to match the 
degree of mobilization in CPG.  I expect angry subjects to contribute differently across 
all the TPG experiments in response to changes in feedback (TPG2) and discrimination 
(TPG3).  These additional components should decrease the levels of anger a subject feels 
towards their own in-group and increase their willingness to cooperate against the 
threatening out-group.   
Hypothesis 1: Angry subjects will contribute more in TPG2 than TPG1.  
Angry subjects in TPG2 should hold less anger towards their in-group because the 
feedback provided to them makes it difficult to know the exact level of in-group 
cooperation.  Losing can be attributed to two different factors, the in-group and out-
group.  It is ambiguous how much subjects won or lost by, but more importantly subjects 
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may no longer fixate on blaming free riders in their in-group, and instead redirect their 
focus on the out-group.  The increase in uncertainty should increase the in-group 
favoritism and also increase blame attribution toward the out-group, which should 
translate to higher levels of mobilization.   
Hypothesis 2: Angry subjects will contribute more in TPG3 than TPG2. 
TPG3 incorporates discrimination with limited feedback and information (for the 
same reasons it was in TPG2) on mobilization.  Discrimination is included to reinforce 
anger at the out-group.  Before starting TPG3, the performance task assignment is 
strongly biased against the angry group so that they end up with a much lower MPCR.  
This reinforces to the angry group that the out-group is to blame for being disadvantaged 
and builds anger towards the out-group.  It also results in decreasing the value of every 
token in the angry group’s collective fund.  This group discrimination further makes 
group identity and anger at the out-group salient and should then prompt the angry group 
to mobilize against the out-group who has blocked them from a series of goals.   
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Table 6.2 - Experimental Protocol 
1.  Subjects signed consent forms. 
2.  Subjects were randomly assigned to a computer station and assigned to one of 
four groups. 
3. Subjects filled out an emotional inventory. 
4. Subjects worked through examples of how to earn money in the performance 
tasks. 
5. Subjects took part in two 1-minute practice performance tasks, one easy (3x3 
table) and one hard (6x6 table). 
6. Task Assignment and Anger Treatment: Each group chose which performance 
task they wish to complete for money.  Group A decided which one they want to 
complete.  Group B was told that Group A is blocking them from their task of 
choice.   
7. Subjects were given information on their performance task earnings and told how 
well the other group did in the performance task.     
8. Subjects took part in a threatening public goods game (10 periods). 
 In TPG1, subjects were given feedback on the collective group fund and how 
many tokens they won or lost in the bonus round. 
In TPG2, subjects were given no feedback on the collective group fund and only 
told in the bonus round whether they won or lost.   
In TPG3, information was limited similar to TPG2.  But before starting, the angry 
group was told that their group is assigned a MPCR of .33 because their group 
earned less in the performance task while the control group had a MPCR of .50. 
9. Subjects were given information on their total earnings. 
10. Subjects filled out an emotional inventory. 
11. Subjects evaluated positive mood inducing images. 
12. Subjects filled out questionnaire on demographics, political questions, and 
experimental procedures. 
 In TPG2 and TPG3, there were two new questions added pertaining to the 
MPCR: 
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a. How was the multiplier selected for the Blue Fund?  
b. What was the value of their Blue Fund multiplier? 
13. Subjects were dismissed one by one, paid in private, and debriefed. 
 
Sessions: There were a total of nine experimental sessions: two TPG1 sessions, 
three TPG2 sessions and four TPG3 sessions.  The subjects were recruited from Rice 
University dining halls during lunch and dinner.  The experiment lasted an hour and the 
subjects on average made $18.00.  Each experiment session required at least 16 subjects 
and in the event that 16 subjects did not show up, each subject was excused and paid a 
$5.00 show up fee.  Subjects were over recruited to ensure there were enough subjects for 
each session.  The experiments were conducted using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).   
Procedures: Refer to Table 6.2 for step by step procedures.  In TPG3, the angry 
group received the same information as TPG2 but the main difference is that the angry 
group is now assigned a lower MPCR for their Blue Fund (the collective group fund).  
The angry subjects were told, “There are two different multipliers assigned to the Blue 
Fund.  The multiplier of the Blue Fund is based on the earnings in the previous 
performance task.  Your group earned less in the performance task, so your group will get 
the smaller Blue Fund Multiplier. Your Blue Fund is multiplied by 1.667 while Group 
A’s Blue Fund is multiplied by 2.”  The control group was told nothing about two Blue 
Fund.  
Feedback: In TPG2 and TPG3, feedback was limited between the each period.  
Subjects received no feedback on how much they earned, with or without the bonus.  
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Subjects were told only if they won, lost, or if there was tie for the bonus tokens.  In the 
event that they won, subjects were told, “In this period, your group won and will receive 
the bonus tokens from the other group.”  When they lose, subjects are told, “In this 
period, your group lost and will have to the pay the bonus tokens to the other group.”  In 
the event of a tie, subjects were told, “In this period, there was a tie and neither group 
will receive any bonus tokens.”  With limited information, the groups would not respond 
to group contributions and bonus tokens, but instead mobilize in order to win the bonus 
tokens and protect their individual earnings.   
6.3. Emotional Treatment 
 In this section, I discuss the emotional treatment effect.  I present the results of a 
series of t-tests for the angry group and the control group in each version of the 
threatening public goods game.  I will first present within group differences for each 
version of the threatening public goods game.  I expect there to be differences for the 
angry group in pre and post measures of anger.  I do not expect changes in the control 
group.  I will then compare between group differences among the angry groups in each 
game. 
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Table 6.3 - TPG1 Within Group Anger Measures 
TPG1 Pre Post T-score P-value 
Angry Group     
Individual 17.68 (5.09) 30.37 (7.56) -1.76 0.04* 
Group 9.75 (3.70) 34.31 (8.23) -2.97 0.00*** 
Out-Group  19.5 (6.45) 46.81 (8.10) -3.42 0.00*** 
Control      
Individual 4.87 (1.89) 18.12 (6.53) -1.99 0.03* 
Group 6.62 (3.11) 18.56 (6.80) -1.44 0.08 
Out-Group  17.62 (6.59) 21.125 (7.40) -0.37 0.35 
N=32 16=control 16=angry   
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p = .00 
 
In TPG1, I find that the angry group became angrier overall.  These increases 
were statistically significant.  In the control group, I also found increases in reported 
levels of anger.  The only statistically significant difference was in how angry they were 
at the individual level.  The control group did not demonstrate statistical differences in 
the increase in anger towards their in-group or the out-group.  These t-tests indicate that 
the angry group was angry in TPG1.  
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Table 6.4 - TPG2 Within Group Anger Measures 
TPG2 Pre Post T-score P-value 
Angry Group     
Individual 22.54 (4.47)  43.66 (6.62)  -2.95  0.00*** 
In-Group 21.91 (5.29)  37 (6.91) -1.94 0.03*  
Out-Group  29.08 (4.36) 57.08 (7.01)  -4.22 0.00*** 
Control      
Individual 27.12 (5.14)  20.58 (5.25) 1.26 0.10 
In-Group 19.79 (4.13)  19.33 (4.69)   0.09 0.46 
Out-Group  25.29 (4.56)  18.54 (4.21)  1.38  0.08 
N=48 24=control 24=angry   
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p = .00 
In TPG2, I find that the angry group is angrier at all three levels.  They are angry 
toward themselves, their in-group, and the out-group.  Among the angry group, there is 
an increase in overall anger and these increases are statistically significant.  Within the 
control group, I find that anger decreased at all three levels, but these decreases in anger 
are not statistically significant.  Among the control group, there was no change in in-
group anger (t=.09, p.46).  Overall in TPG2, the angry group is angrier at all levels but 
the control group demonstrates no significant changes.  
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Table 6.5 - TPG3 (Limited Feedback & Discrimination) 
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Angry Group     
Individual 24.28 (4.03) 41.34 (4.90) -3.41 0.00*** 
In-Group 15.5 (3.01) 34.65 (4.13) -3.66 0.00*** 
Out-Group  24.78 (3.98) 54.34 (4.13) -6.21 0.00*** 
Control      
Individual 20.34 (3.83) 19.34 (3.72) 0.19 0.42 
In-Group 16.75 (3.39) 15.15 (3.12) 0.34 0.36 
Out-Group  25.40 (3.57) 27.34 (3.83) -0.44 0.32 
N=64 32=control 32=angry   
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p = .00 
In TPG3, as expected, I find that the angry group showed significant increases in 
anger toward the out-group (t=-6.21, p=.00).  The angry group also demonstrated an 
increase in anger at the individual level and towards their in-group. These increases were 
statistically significant.  Within the control group, there were decreases in anger at the 
individual level and towards their in-group, but these differences are not statistically 
significant.  Also within the control group, there was an increase in the level of anger 
towards the out-group, but this increase is not statistically significant.   
Overall, the within group t-test indicate that the angry group increased in their 
levels of anger in each threat experiment.  Within the control group, there was very little 
change in their reported levels of anger.  The only statistically significant change in anger 
was in TPG2, where the control group increased in general anger.  
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6.4. Between Group Differences in Anger 
I expect the angry and control groups to exhibit no differences across the three 
different measures of anger pre-treatment.  Post-treatment, I expect the angry group to 
exhibit higher levels of anger than the control group for each measure of anger.   
Table 6.6 - TPG1: Between Group T-Test 
TPG1 Control Angry T-score P-value 
Pre-Treatment     
Angry 1 4.87 (7.58) 17.68 (5.09) -2.35 .01** 
In-Group Angry 1 6.62 (3.11) 9.75 (3.70) -0.64 .26 
Out-Group Angry 1 17.65 (6.59) 19.5 (6.45) -0.20 .42 
Post-Treatment     
Angry 2 18.84 (6.53) 30.37 (7.56) -1.22 .11 
In-Group Angry 2 18.56 (6.80) 34.31 (8.23) -1.47 .07 
Out-Group Angry 2 21.12 (7.40) 46.81 (8.10) -2.34 .01** 
N=Angry 16, Control=16. 
In TPG1, the angry group starts off angrier than the control group pre-treatment.  
The angry group is angrier pre-treatment than the control group and this difference is 
statistically significant.  Post-treatment, the angry reports higher levels of general anger 
and in-group anger compared to the control group, but these differences were not 
statistically significant.  The only statistical significant difference post-treatment is found 
in the reported level of out-group anger.  The angry group is angrier with the out-group 
than control group, and this difference is statistically significant.   
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Table 6.7 - TPG2: Between Group T-Test 
 Control Angry T-score P-value 
Pre-Treatment     
Angry 1 27.12 (5.14) 22.54 (4.47) .67 .25 
In-Group Angry 1 19.79 (5.14) 21.91 (5.29) -.31 .37 
Out-Group Angry 1 25.29 (4.56) 29.08 (4.36) -.60 .27 
Post-Treatment     
Angry 2 20.57 (5.25) 43.66 (6.62) -2.73 .00*** 
In-Group Angry 2 19.33 (4.69) 37 (6.91) -2.11 .01** 
Out-Group Angry 2 18.54 (4.21) 57.08 (7.04) -4.70 .00*** 
 
Between each group, I expect for the angry and control groups to have no 
difference in anger pre-treatment.  I expect the differences to emerge post-treatment.  I 
find no differences between the angry and control group pre-treatment.  Both groups start 
off with no differences in how angry they rate being at the individual level, group level, 
or towards the out-group.  In the post-treatment, I find that the angry group is more angry 
at all three levels than the control group. These differences are in the expected direction 
and statistically significant.   
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Table 6.8 - TPG3: Within Group T-test 
 Control Angry T-score P-value 
Pre-Treatment     
Angry 1 20.34 (3.83) 24.28 (4.03) -0.70 .24 
In-Group Angry 1 16.75 (3.39) 15.5 (3.01) 0.25 .39 
Out-Group Angry 1 25.40 (3.57) 24.78 (3.98) .11 .54 
Post-Treatment     
Angry 2 19.34 (3.72) 41.34 (4.90) -3.57 .00*** 
In-Group Angry 2 15.15 (3.12) 34.65 (4.13) -3.76 .00*** 
Out-Group Angry 2 27.34 (3.83) 54.34 (4.13) -4.78 .00*** 
 
Again, I expect for both groups to start of with the same levels of anger pre-
treatment, but the angry group becomes angrier than the control group post-treatment.  
Between group t-tests indicate that in pre-treatment, there are no differences between the 
angry group and the control group.  The angry and control groups start off with the same 
levels of anger towards themselves, their in-group, and the out-group.  The differences 
emerge in post-treatment.  The angry group is angrier at the individual level than the 
control group. In addition, the angry group is also angrier towards their in-group than the 
control group.  Lastly, the angry group is more angry at the out-group; these differences 
are all statistically significant (-4.78, p=.00).  
Overall, in TPG3 the angry group is angry at all levels but the control group is not 
angry at all.  In TPG2, the angry group is also angry at all three levels, while the control 
group is not any angrier and in some cases less angry.  In addition, between group t-test 
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also indicate that the angry group is angrier than the control groups in post-treatment.  
The within group t-test indicated that the angry group was angrier than the control group.  
The between groups test further indicate that the anger group was angrier than the control 
group.  These t-tests indicate that the emotional treatment took hold for the angry group. 
In table 6.9, I examine whether there is a statistically significant difference in the 
change in anger towards one’s own in-group versus change in anger towards the out-
group for all three TPGs.  The change in anger variables was constructed from the 
difference in post and pre anger measures.  I expect that the angry group in all three 
threatening public goods games to have statistically significant differences in the change 
in anger.  The angry group should have a higher change in anger towards the out-group 
than towards their in-group.  I expect the control group to also have a higher of change in 
anger towards the out-group than their in-group, but I do not expect these differences to 
be statistically significant.   
Table 6.9 - Difference Between Change in In-Group and Out-Group Anger 
TPG1  In-group Anger  Out-Group Anger T-score P-Value 
Angry 24.56 (8.25) 27.31 (7.97) -0.38 0.35 
Control  11.93 (8.25) 3.5 (9.22) 0.73 0.23 
TPG2     
Angry 15.08 (7.74) 28 (6.63) -1.75 0.04* 
Control  -.45 (4.79) -6.75 (4.86) 1.33 0.09 
TPG3     
Angry 19.15 (5.23) 29.56 (4.75) -1.88 0.03* 
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Control  -1.59 (4.61) 1.93 (4.33) -0.76 0.22 
N for V1=16 in each cell, N for V2=24 in each cell, N for V3= 32 in each cell 
In TPG1, I find that the angry group reported higher increases in in-group and 
out-group anger than the control group.  These differences are not statistically significant.  
In addition, the t-test within group indicates the angry group reported higher increases in 
anger towards the out-group but these differences are also not statistically significant.   
In TPG2, I find that angry groups change in anger towards the out-group is higher 
than their change in anger towards their in-group.  The differences are statistically 
significant (t=-1.75, p=.04).  In contrast, the control group in TPG2 exhibits a decrease in 
anger towards their in-group and the out-group.  The control group’s decrease in anger 
were not statistically significant.   
In TPG3, the angry group has a larger increase in anger towards their out-group 
than towards their in-group.  These differences in the angry group are statistically 
significant (t=-1.88, p=.03).  The control group’s average change in anger towards their 
in-group decreases while average change in anger towards the out-group increases 
slightly, but these differences are not statistically significant.   
Overall, the angry groups in all three experiments are angrier towards the out-
group than they are towards their in-group.  The control group does not increase in their 
level of in-group anger and has very little change in anger towards the out-group.  These 
pre and post-treatment results provide strong evidence that the anger manipulation took 
effect for the TPG experiments. 
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6.5. Data & Results 
In this section, I will examine the sum of all contributions for each subject for 10 
periods.  The sum of all contributions ranges from 0 to 200 tokens.  I analyze the 
difference between the angry and control groups in each TPG game.  I expected in each 
experiment that the angry group contribute more than the control group.  Between 
experiments, I expect the angry group in TPG3 to contribute more than the angry group 
in TPG2, and for the angry group in TPG2 to contribute more than the angry group in 
TPG1.  The between group t-tests below indicate that the empirical evidence fails to 
support my expectations.  
Table 6.10 - Sum Differences in Contributions between Groups  
 Angry Control T-score P-value N 
TPG1 140 (33.73) 153.81 (27.54) 1.54 .06 16, 16 
TPG2 122.62 (55.95) 141.45 (57.08) 1.15 .12 24, 24 
TPG3 96.43 (52.1) 117.34 (62.58) 1.45 .07 36, 36 
Between Games      
TPG1 vs TPG2 T=-1.11, p=.13 T=-.09, p=.16   24, 36 
TPG2 vs TPG3 T=1.80, p=.03* T=1.80, p=.03*   24, 36 
 N=v2=24 in each cell, N=v3=32 in each cell.  
 
 
In TPG1, the angry group contributed less than the control group.  The angry 
group contributed on average 140 tokens while the control group contributed 153.81 
tokens.  These differences are not statistically significant but they are approaching 
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significance in the opposite expected direction.  In TPG2, I also find that the control 
group contributed more to the public good than the angry group.  The control group’s 
sum contributions are 141.45 tokens while the angry group’s sum contribution are 122.62 
tokens.  These differences indicate that the control group contributed more but the 
difference is not statistically significant (t=1.15 p=.12).  I fail to accept the hypotheses 
that the angry group contributes more than the control group in TPG2.   
In TPG3, I find that the angry group’s sum contributions are 96.43 tokens and the 
control group’s sum contributions are 117.34 tokens.  The angry group’s sum 
contributions are higher than the control but these differences are not statistically 
significant (t=1.45, p=.07).  The hypothesis was that the angry group in TPG3 would 
contribute more than the angry group in TPG2.  The between game t-test indicate little 
support for this hypothesis. In fact, the angry group in TPG2 contributes more than the 
angry group in TPG3.  These differences among the angry group within each game 
further indicate that these differences are statistically significant in the opposite direction 
as expected. As a result, I fail to accept hypothesis 3.  
These t-tests indicate that the angry group is unable to mobilize more than the 
control group.  Even when I reduce the amount of feedback between each period, the 
angry subjects are still not mobilizing.  I need to consider the nature of the feedback in 
each period and understand how it impacts the subjects’ willingness to contribute.  In 
addition, I was very surprised that in TPG3, the angry group did not contribute more than 
the control group.  Despite being angry towards the out-group and being systematically 
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discriminated against, the angry group was unable to out-mobilize the control group.  I 
will now examine period-by-period contributions.   
In the next set of figures, the x-axis indicates the period number. There were a 
total of 10 periods.  The y-axis represents the mean tokens contributed to the group fund, 
ranging from 0 to 20.  The red square line indicates the angry group and the blue diamond 
line indicates the control group.  These line graphs will provide overall trend for mean 
contributions across all ten periods for the angry and control groups.  These means are 
aggregated for all three experimental sessions for each emotional type. 
Figure 6.1 - TPG1 Mean Contributions Across Periods 
 
In the figure 6.1, I have created a line graph with the average contributions across 
ten periods in TPG1.  The contributions for the control group range from 20 to 15 tokens 
while the angry groups contributions range form 17 to 14 tokens.  I expected that the 
angry group would have higher contributions than the control group. The results indicate 
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that this is not true.  Instead the control group contributions on average more than the 
angry group, except in the last period.  A closer examination period-by-period, I find in t-
test that in periods 3 and 8, the control group not only contributed more but the 
differences was statistically significant.   
Figure 6.2 - TPG2 Mean Contributions Across Periods 
 
In figure 6.2, the blue diamond line represents the control group and the red 
square line represents the angry group.  In TPG2, the mean contributions range from 
11.35 tokens to 16.25 tokens.  The angry group contributed more than the control group 
in the first two periods but then contributed less in every period after.  Overall, the 
control group contributed more than the angry group.  The angry group’s contributions 
range from 11.23 tokens to 15.33 tokens.  The control group’s contributions were higher 
and ranged from 14.2 tokens to 16.25 tokens.   
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Figure 6.3 - TPG3 Mean Contributions Across Periods 
 
In TPG3, the mean contributions range from 8 tokens to 14 tokens.  The control 
group contributed more on average in each period.  The control group’s mean 
contributions ranges from 11.68 to 14.09 tokens.  In contrast, the angry group’s mean 
contributions are lower with a range from 8.68 tokens to 13.59 tokens.  The control 
group’s contributions are relatively stable but an eyeball test on the angry group’s 
contributions demonstrate that contributions started off on the higher end between 12-14 
tokens but by period 4, the contributions dropped and stayed lower between 8 and 11 
tokens.  The angry group has two dips in contributions at period 4 and period 8.   
The three figures clearly indicate that the control group in each threat condition 
contributed more than the angry group.  I will now run a series of models that will predict 
each subject’s contribution in each game.  These models will then allow me to compare 
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within and across threat treatments to understand which variables best predict 
contributions.   
6.6. Regression with Fixed Effects Models 
In the regression model with fixed effects, I assume each subject’s contribution is 
not independent. Fixed effects allow me to examine the differences between each subject 
when I model contributions.  I also control for variables that impact how a subject 
contributes period by period.  These explanatory variables include information that 
subjects received between decision periods which may impact their contributions, such as 
period, winning or losing bonus tokens, and how much they contributed in the previous 
round.  
The dependent variable is contribution by period, which ranges from 0 to 20 
tokens.  The independent variables include a subject’s previous period contribution, 
lagged losses (whether the subject lost in the previous period), period (the period 
number), and treatment (TPG1, TPG2, or TPG3).  A subject’s previous period 
contribution ranges from 0 to 20 tokens.  The lagged losses takes on a value of 1 or 0 and 
indicates whether not the subject lost in the previous period.  The period variable ranges 
from 1 to 9.  Treatment then controls for the TPG version.  The coefficients for treatment 
will then directly test the two hypotheses.   
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Table 6.11 - Regression with Fixed Effects for all TPG 
  
Model 1: 
TPG2 vs 
TPG1 
Model 2: 
TPG3 vs 
TPG2 
Model 3: 
TPG2 vs 
TPG1 & 
Angry=1 
Model 4: 
TPG3 vs 
TPG2  & 
Angry=1 
Previous Period 
Contribution 
.51 
(.06) **** 
.59 
(.05) **** 
.41 
(.07)*** 
.43 
(.06) **** 
Lagged Losses 
(1=Lost in prior 
Period, 0=no 
loss) 
-2.62 
(.69)**** 
-2.61 
(.59) **** 
-3.73 
(.97) *** 
-3.50 
(.93) **** 
Period  
(1-9) 
-.05 
(.05) 
-.09 
(.04) * 
-.03 
(.09) 
-.08 
(.09) 
Treatment 
(TPG Version) 
-1.03 
(.47) * 
-1.41 
(.42) *** 
-2.17 
(.82) *** 
-1.17 
(.82) 
Constant 
9.64 
(1.26) 
7.64 
(1.07) 
11.97 
(1.71) 
10.16 
(1.55) 
N 720 1008 360 504 
Wald Chi Square 108.83 *** 622.06 *** 75.87 *** 180.74*** 
 
In Table 6.11, the models indicate consistent predictors across different model 
specifications.  Previous period contribution has a positive impact on contributions and is 
statistically significant.  Lagged losses and period both have a negative impact on 
contributions and was also statistically significant.  Treatment was also statistically 
significant across models and indicates that treatment decreased contributions.    
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In models 1 and 3, I compare TPG2 to TPG1 and test hypothesis 1.  I find that 
treatment reduced contributions and find little support for the hypothesis that angry 
subjects in TPG2 contribute more than angry subjects in TPG1.   
Models 2 and 4 compare TPG3 to TPG2 and also indicate little support for 
hypothesis 2 – where angry subjects in TPG3 will contribute more than angry subjects in 
TPG2.  These regressions indicate that the relationship is opposite of expectations; the 
angry group contributed less in TP3 compared to TPG2, and in TPG2 compared to TPG1.   
6.7. Ordered Logistic Regression Models 
The second sets of models were ordered logistic regressions with clusters on each 
subject.  Ordered logistic regressions predict the difference between different categories 
of the dependent variable, contributions. I cluster on each subject because each subject’s 
contribution category in each period is not independent of one another.  In an ordered 
logistic regression, I assume that the relationship underlying each pair of outcome group 
is the same.  The coefficients that describe the relationship between the different 
categories of the dependent variable are the same.  This is called the proportion odds 
assumption or parallel regression assumption.   
The dependent variable is a recoded version of contribution.  In this alternative 
version of contribution, I reduce the amount of variance by pooling pairs of contributions.  
Contributions were modal and largest at 0 and 20, but there were also contributions 
bunched at 10 and 15 tokens.  There are now three categories and the value of each 
category is meaningful but arbitrary.  I then recoded the contribution variable to take on 
three values: 1, 2, or 3.  A 1 value represents subjects who contributed 0 tokens, 2 
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represents subjects who contributed between 1 to 10 tokens, and a 3 represents those who 
contributed 11 or more tokens.  The independent variables in this model are the same as 
they were in the regression with fixed effect model and include lagged losses, period, 
previous period contribution, and treatment.   
In the ordered logistic model, the comparison group is category 3 – those who 
contributed 11 or more tokens.  Cut 1 represents subjects who contributed 0 tokens and 
Cut 2 represents those who contributed 1 to 10 tokens.  I pooled the data to compare and 
test the hypotheses.  In order to test the hypothesis that the angry group in TPG2 would 
contribute more than the angry group in TPG1, I pooled the data for TPG1 and TPG2 
together.  To test the second hypothesis that angry subjects in TPG3 would contribute 
more than angry subjects in TPG2, I also pooled these data.  Then I ran ordered logistic 
regressions in order to check the robustness of these models.   
Table 6.12 - Ordered Logistic Models Comparing TPGs & Angry Subjects 
  
Model 5:       
TPG2 vs TPG1 
Model 6:     
TPG3 vs TPG2  
Model 7:    
TPG2 vs TPG1 
& Angry=1 
Model 8:    
TPG3 vs TPG2  
& Angry=1 
Previous Period 
Contribution (1-
20 tokens) 
.14  
(.02) **** 
.16  
(.01) 
**** 
.10  
(.02)*** 
.10  
(.01) 
**** 
Lagged Losses 
(1=Lost in prior 
Period, 0=no 
loss) 
-1.35  
(.48)**** 
-1.00  
(.23) 
**** 
-2.19  
(.71) 
*** 
-1.28  
(.31) 
**** 
Period 
-.03  
(.02) 
-.04 
 (.01) ** 
-.00  
(.03) 
-.03  
(.02) 
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Treatment 
-.79  
(.26) *** 
-.50  
(.21) ** 
-1.20  
(.36) 
*** 
-.31  
(.26) 
Cut 1 
-2.32  
(.26) 
-1.17  
(.39) 
-3.29  
(.94) 
1.42  
(.46) 
Cut 2 
-.81  
(.73) 
.46  
(.43) 
-2.10  
(1.04) 
-.24  
(.47) 
Wald 
105.67 
*** 
184.08 
*** 
48.26 
*** 80.46*** 
R squared 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.17 
N= 720 1008 48.26 80.46 
 
 
In Table 6.12, the coefficients in each model are similar to the results in the 
regression models.  The coefficients are in the same direction and are statistically 
significance.  Once again, previous period contribution is positive and statistically 
significant.  Lagged losses had a negative impact on contributions and are also 
statistically significant.  Period also had a negative impact on contributions but it is only 
significant in the model that compares TPG3 to TPG2.  The treatment variable is 
statistically significant across all the models.  In model 6 and 8, I failed to find support 
that TPG3 subjects were more likely to mobilize than TPG2 subjects.  Models 5 and 7 
provide similar results; I also find no support for the hypothesis that angry subjects 
contributed more in TPG2 than in TPG1. 
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6.8. Discussion  
 These experiments created anger towards the out-group, however it is unclear 
that anger towards the out-group will then result in mobilization against the out-group.  
These experiments indicate no support for the hypotheses stated earlier in this chapter.  
While discouraging, these results indicate an unexpected relationship that requires further 
analysis.  The ability of anger at the out-group to mobilize may also be contingent on 
how much anger group holds towards their in-group.  In-group anger may undermine any 
catalyst effect that anger provides towards the out-group.   
The nature of mobilization in these experiments involves two groups, a subject’s 
in-group and the out-group.  Individuals must calculate the willingness that their in-group 
will mobilize as well as the willingness of the other group to mobilize.  The cost of 
mobilization is high if no other in-group members show up.  The cost is also high if a 
subject contributes but their in-group does not contribute enough to win the bonus.  As a 
consequence, the subject should only contribute if significant portion of their in-group 
membership contributes and if their group contributed more than the out-group (i.e., 
confidence in their in-group to win).  Perhaps when a subject contributed to their group 
but then their group loses, the subject may reduce their level of contribution in the next 
period and become angry with other in-group members for free riding or not contributing 
enough.  With little support for my two hypotheses, I explore why anger directed towards 
the out-group may not be enough to mobilize groups.   
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6.9. Winning and Losing Bonus Tokens 
My sense is that losing the bonus may increase a subject’s anger towards their in-
group.  IET expects groups to become angry at the target of their anger, but the theory 
fails to mention or discuss the condition where a group becomes angry with their own in-
group.  In order to tease out the potential relationship between losing and increases in in-
group anger, I examine the average number of wins in each game in each group.  The 
number of times a group wins or loses can impact the levels of anger and the willingness 
of a subject to contribute.  There are total of 10 periods and the sum of the wins range 
from 0 to 10.   
Table 6.13 - Mean Wins in Each Experiment 
 
In TPG1, the angry group won on average 2 times while the control group won on 
average 7.75 times over ten periods.  These differences were statistically different from 
each other.  I find that in TPG2, the control group also wins on average more than the 
angry group.  The control group wins on average 5.83 times while the angry group wins 
3.5 times over 10 periods.  These differences in the number of wins are statistically 
different from one another.  In TPG3, I find a similar pattern where the control group 
Sum of Wins Control Angry T-score P-value N 
TPG1 7.75 (.46) 2 (.48) 8.16 .00*** 16 in each cell 
TPG2 5.83 (.93) 3.5 (.96) 1.73 .04* 24 in each cell 
TPG3 7.37 (.57) 2.62 (.57) 5.84 .00*** 36 in each cell 
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wins more than the angry group.  Not only does the control group win more they win on 
average 7.37 times over 10 periods while the angry group only wins 2.62 times.  These 
differences in wins are also statistically significant.  In these experiments, the angry 
group often loses and this may factor into their increase in anger at their in-group.  I now 
examine the level change in anger with a subject’s in-group and control for how many 
times they won or lost.   
I examine the average change in anger towards a subject’s own in-group.  I create 
this variable by calculating the difference between post and pre-treatment anger towards 
in-group.  This calculation will provide the change in anger towards the subjects’ in-
group.  In addition, I will examine the mean difference in change in anger.  For example, 
if a subject rated 100 in anger towards their in-group post-treatment and rated 50 in anger 
towards their in-group pre-treatment, then that subject would have a change in anger 
value of +50.  Positive changes in anger indicate an increase in anger and negative 
change in anger values indicates a decrease in anger.  I divide the sample within each 
control and angry group by those subjects who lost 5 or more times and those who won 5 
or more times.   
Table 6.14 - Change in In-Group Anger  
 Group Losing 5x + Group Winning 5x + Within Group T-test 
TPG1    
Anger 27.08 (10.01), n=12 17 (14.86) ,n=4 .51, p=.30, n=16 
Control 18 (17.01), n=4 9.91 (9.80), n=12 T=-.41, p=.34, n=16 
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T-test Between Group  T=-.35, p=.36 T=-0.27. p=.39  
TPG2    
Anger 25 (42.93), n=16 -4.75 (10.03), n=8 1.97, .03*, n=24 
Control 11.25 (26.32), n=8 -6.25 (20.36), n=16  1.78, .04*, n=24 
T-test Between Group  T=-0.83, p=.20 T=-0.19, p=.42  
TPG3    
Anger 25.28 (24.02), n=28 -23.75 (32.56), n=4 3.66, .00***, n=32 
Control 18 (30.29), n=4 -4.39 (24.81, n=28 1.64, .05*, n=32 
T-test Between Group  T=-.55, p=.29 T=1.40, p=.08  
 
I expect that among subjects who win five or more times will decrease their levels 
of anger towards their in-group. I expect the opposite for subjects who lose five or more 
times; these subjects should increase in their level of anger towards their in-group.  I 
expect these changes in anger towards a subject’s in-group to have the same directional 
change for the angry and control group.   
In TPG1, the angry group lost on average five or more times in each experiment 
session.  I am unable to compare the difference in in-group anger within the angry group 
as a function of losing five or more times.  I find no differences within or between 
subjects in their change in anger as a function of winning or losing five times or more.  
The increases in anger towards a subject’s in-group is not statistically significant, but 
those who lost five or more times have a higher increase in anger than those who won 
five or more times.  These t-tests indicate that the change in anger towards a subject’s 
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own in-group is not related to the number of wins or losses.  This may be due to the fact 
that subjects in TPG1 were given full information. 
In TPG2, I find that among groups who lost five or more times will increase in 
anger toward their in-group.  The angry groups who lost five or more times increased 25 
points in anger towards their in-group, while the control group who lost five or more 
times also increased in anger by 11.25 points.  I find the same pattern in TPG3 game: 
each subject who lost five or more times increased in anger towards their in-group.  The 
angry group who lost five or more times increased in anger by 25.28 points and the 
control increased in anger by 18 points.  These means indicate losing five or more times 
increases the level of anger a subject has towards her own in-group.   
In TPG3, I find that winning five more times decreases the level of anger a 
subject has towards their in-group. In each game and among each group, if a subject wins 
five or more times they decrease their level of anger towards their in-group.  In TPG2, the 
angry group decreased their anger by 4.75 points and the control group decreased by 6.25 
points.  In TPG3, the decrease in anger towards a subject’s group is more drastic for the 
angry group.  When the angry group wins five or more times, they decrease their level of 
anger on average by 23.75 points.  In the same TPG3, the control group demonstrates a 
similar less drastic pattern when they win five or more times they decrease their anger 
towards their in-group by 4.39 points.   
The general pattern is that in-group anger increases when groups lose five or more 
times.  At the same time, in-group anger decreases when a subject’s group wins five or 
more times.  The between group t-tests within in each group and comparisons are not 
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statistically significant but they are in the right direction.  The lack of statistical 
significance may be a function of the small number of cases that are in each comparison 
block.   
Before moving on, I want to also explore within groups and compare those who 
won five or more times or lost five or more times. I expect that there are differences in 
the change in anger towards the in-group based on whether the group won or lost.  The 
empirical evidence matches these expectations.  Irrespective of game and group, there are 
differences within a group based on whether or not they won or lost five or more times.  
In TPG2, within the angry group, winning or losing correlated with differences in the 
change in anger at a subject’s in-group (t=1.97, p=.03). In the same game, the control 
group also demonstrates differences in the change in anger when controlling for wins and 
losses (t=1.78, p=.04).  TPG3 exhibits the same patterns: there are significant difference 
among the angry group (t=3.66, p=.00) and the control group (t=1.64, p=.05).   
In the next section, I will examine how out-group anger changed as a function of 
winning or losing five or more times.  Table 6.18 explores the change in anger out-group 
anger, I find that in TPG1 that the angry group increases in anger as a function of 
winning and losing five or more times, but the increase in anger towards the out-group is 
much higher when losing five more times.  Among the control group in TPG1, the group 
increases in anger towards the out-group when they win and lose but these differences are 
not statistically significant.  The main difference when losing five or more times is that 
the angry group increase in anger towards the out-group much more than the control 
 153 
 
group (t=-1.55,p=.05).  There are no differences in change in anger towards the out-group 
when the group wins five or more times.  
Table 6.15 - Change in Anger towards Out-Group 
 Group Losing 5x + Group Winning 5x + Within Group T-test 
TPG1    
Anger 32.08 (9.39), n=12 13 (14.42), n=4 T=1.03, p=.15 
Control .25 (.25), n=4 4.58 (12.42), n=12 T=.19, p=.42, n=16 
T-test Between Group  T=-1.66, p=.05 T=-.47, p=.31  
TPG2 Group Losing 5x + Group Winning 5x +  
Anger 28.62 (9.07), n=16 26.75 (8.95), n=8 .13, .44, n=24 
Control -5.87 (8.65), n=8 -7.18 (6.06), n=16 -.12, .45, n=24 
T-test Between Group  T=-2.41, p=.01** T=-3.18, p=.00***  
TPG3 Group Losing 5x + Group Winning 5x +  
Anger 33.71 (4.88), n=28 .5 (6.84), n=4 2.49, .00***, n=32 
Control 26.75 (12.24), n=4 -1.60 (4.30), n=28 -2.31, .01**, n=32 
T-test Between Group  T=-.05, p=.69 T=-.17, p=.57  
 
In TPG2, there are no differences in change in anger towards the out-group for 
both groups when losing or winning five or more times.  Instead, the differences emerge 
between groups.  In TPG2, losing five or more times increases anger towards the out-
group for the angry group but decreases anger towards the out-group for the control 
group.  These differences are statistically significant.  The same relationship exists when 
controlling for winning five or more times; the angry group increases in anger towards 
 154 
 
the out-group but the control group decreases in anger.  These differences are also 
statistically significant.  The increase in change in anger towards the out-group may be 
related to winning and when the control group wins more, they do not increase in anger 
towards the out-group, as seen in the angry group. 
In TPG3, a different pattern emerges in change in anger towards the out-group.  
There are no differences between groups based on winning and losing.  The differences 
are within groups.  The angry group increases in anger towards the out-group the most 
when the angry group loses five or more times compared to when they win five or more 
times.  These differences are statistically significant. Losing increases anger towards the 
out-group among the angry group.  In the control group, losing five or more times also 
increases anger towards the out-group compared to winning fiver or more times.  These 
differences in the control group are also statistically significant.  In TPG3, losing five or 
more times increase anger towards the out-group for both groups.   
These within group and game t-tests demonstrate that the change in in-group 
anger is highly correlated with winning or losing five or more periods.  There is 
something about losing five or more times that increases the level of anger and how a 
subject feels towards their in-group.  Losing five or more times increases anger towards 
the out-group for the angry groups in TPG1, TPG2, and TPG3.  The control group did not 
increase in anger towards the out-group when they lost five or more times in TPG1 and 
TPG2; the increase in anger towards the out-group only occurred in TPG3.  
Unfortunately, I did not expect that winning and losing in each period would impact my 
main treatment variable.  I manipulated anger, but in the process of giving feedback and 
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facilitating group interactions, I also inadvertently elevated the levels of not only out-
group anger but also in-group anger.   
6.10. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I find that angry groups failed to mobilize more than the control 
groups under threat. The highest contributions among the angry groups were those who 
were placed in TPG1, and contributions decreased as the angry group received less 
feedback and faced discrimination.  TPG2 reduced the amount of feedback between 
periods but failed to increase the angry groups’ level of mobilization.  In TPG3, there was 
the same limited feedback as in TPG2, with an additional component of discrimination 
against the angry group.  Reducing feedback and introducing discrimination seemed to 
serve not as a catalyst for mobilization as expected, but instead as an obstruction to 
mobilization.  These results indicate problems with Intergroup Emotional Theory in 
explaining how emotions motivate groups to mobilize.  The theory predicts that angry 
groups will mobilize, but the empirical evidence suggests otherwise.   
Intergroup Emotional Theory predicts that anger towards the out-group results in 
angry groups mobilizing against the out-group.  In these experiments, I successfully 
created anger directed at the out-group but it was not enough to create mobilization.  
Instead, anger at the out-group increased but so did anger towards a subjects own in-
group.  The results indicate that the change in anger towards a subject’s in-group is a 
function of the number of times a subject won or lost.  These results hint at the idea that it 
is important to consider anger at multiple levels and targets.  Making a subject angry and 
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measuring his or her anger at the individual level is not sufficient; the ability of anger to 
mobilize a subject also involves understanding if they are angry towards an out-group 
and/or their own in-group.   
IET posits that when anger is targeted at the out-group, individuals are more 
willing to mobilize with their own-group against the out-group.  However, in TPG2 and 
TPG3, the target of the anger in response to losing in the previous periods is ambiguous.  
It is easy to blame a subject’s own in-group members and/or the out-group for losing 
when the feedback does not provide information on what caused the loss.  Losing makes 
subjects angry but it is uncertain whether it elevates anger at the out-group more than at a 
subject’s own in-group, and it’s unclear how this mixture of out-group and in-group 
anger impacts mobilization.  With this uncertainty, contributions fail to change much by 
period and subjects were unable to signal period by period to group members their 
willingness to cooperate against the out-group.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Anger is thought of as a powerful motivator for action.  In this dissertation, I set 
out to test this conjecture.  Previous research on anger and mobilization failed to consider 
how anger directed towards the out-group can manifest as a catalyst for group action.  
The objective of this dissertation was to examine the nature of this relationship.  In order 
to test the causal relationship between these two, I developed a series of experimental 
tests based upon Intergroup Emotional Theory.  IET provided the mechanism in which 
out-group anger could mobilize, but it failed to account how anger directed towards an 
individual’s own in-group might limit mobilization.   
7.1. Research Objective and Summary of Findings 
In order to tease out when and how anger impacts mobilization, I designed, 
implemented, and analyzed a series of experiments that systematically teased out the 
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variables that impact how groups mobilize.  I find that anger alone is not enough to push 
subjects to rally.  Out-group anger provides angry individuals with a target and the 
potential to move against that target.  Once anger is induced towards the out-group, I find 
that under competition, angry individuals take action against the target of their anger.  
But under the context of threat, individuals angry with the out-group fail to rally against 
the out-group.  Instead, when threatened, the impact of out-group anger is interfered and 
interrupted by increases in in-group anger.   
Future studies must account for and fine-tune the changes in both out-group and 
in-group anger; out-group anger may indeed facilitate action, but in-group anger may 
dampen its effects.  The decision to mobilize then involves a complex dance between 
expectations about the in-group and out-group.  Accounting for these two different 
expectations will then illuminate why some angry groups protest while others take no 
action.   
7.2. Contribution 
My dissertation contributes three ways to the study of anger and mobilization.  
First, I provided an empirical test of Intergroup Emotional Theory and find that the 
theory provides a pathway to understanding out-group anger.  But the theory fails to 
account for the reality that out-group anger may be limited by simultaneous increases in 
in-group anger.  Being angry with one’s own group may halt any mobilizing power of 
out-group anger.  The decision to mobilize for a given individual involves calculations 
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about both their in-group and the out-group.  If anger increases towards a subject’s own 
in-group it may interfere or interact with anger directed towards the out-group.   
The second contribution is within the experimental work on anger.  I created an 
innovative out-group anger elicitation treatment.  The dominant approach in experimental 
work on anger involves subjects recalling a time that made them angry or priming with 
angry faces.  These approaches to creating anger at the individual level are very 
important to the study of how anger impacts decision making.  However these elicitations 
often ignore the social aspect of anger and how anger must be directed towards 
something or some group.  Therefore, I needed to create out-group anger and I 
accomplished this through crafting intergroup interactions.  My out-group elicitations 
offer an alternative elicitation of anger and may be useful for other scholars interested in 
teasing out how out-group anger may impact decision making.   
The third contribution is empirical.  I find that out-group angry can both mobilize 
and demobilize.  Equipped with out-group anger, I find that under competition out-group 
anger is a powerful motivator of action, but under threat out-group anger does not have 
the same motivating effect.  The story of anger and mobilization emerges as being more 
complex than expected.  Out-group anger is necessary, but not sufficient by itself to 
explain group mobilization.  It turns out the role of in-group anger is equally important.  
Anger towards the in-group in effect may increase the cost of taking action even when 
anger towards the out-group decreases the cost. 
These three contributions reframe the questions about the role of anger as a more 
complex and interactive process.  The process involves how best to create out-group 
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anger while at the same time mitigating increases in in-group anger.  The action of 
mobilizing is costly in of itself.  In order to understand how in-group anger impacts 
mobilization, there needs to be an examination into how in-group anger increases the cost 
of participation and changes the dynamics of social obligations to mobilize on behalf of 
the group. 
7.3. Limitations 
While the dissertation makes important contributions, there are three main 
limitations.  The first limitation revolves around the small number of cases.  I employed 
experiments that involved mobilization and utilized a series of public goods games.  
These public goods games are ideal for measuring the dependent variable but are 
resource intensive experiments to run.  Public goods games involve group contributions 
that were doubled by the experimenter that can create expensive sessions very quickly.   
A second limitation is that out-group anger is conflated with in-group anger.  I did 
not expect in-group anger to increase within the angry group and this mixture made it 
difficult to tease out the independent impact of out-group anger.  The feedback within the 
competitive and threatening public goods games about winning and losing conflate my 
treatment out-group anger with feedback in the game.  In future studies, I must ensure 
that procedures within the experiment do not interfere with the main treatment variable. 
The third limitation is with external validity.  I ran these experiments on an 
undergraduate population and some may argue that this population is not an appropriate 
reflection of “real out-group anger.”  I agree that I am unable to make direct inferences 
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from the Rice student population to groups outside of Rice.  Instead, my dissertation 
focuses on the causal mechanism of out-group anger and explores under which conditions 
out-group anger may provoke subjects to cooperate with their own in-group.  Causal 
mechanism testing of out-group anger provides a conservative examination of how 
groups become angry towards the out-group and if and when that out-group anger may 
manifest into action.  In the future, I will utilize observational survey data to examine 
how out-group anger affects “real groups”.   
7.4. Future Research 
Even though there is ample ad and post hoc inferences that angry individuals and 
groups to take to the streets, the findings in my dissertation illustrate how this inference, 
though convenient, can be lead to over simplification.  The precise relationship and 
effects are far more nuanced.  Why do some angry people take to the streets while others 
never mobilize?  I offered out-group anger as the key explanation and found that under 
certain contexts, out-group anger is a powerful catalyst for mobilization.  Under 
competition, out-group anger motivates individuals to work on behalf of their group.  
Under threat, anger at the out-group also prompts action, but simultaneous in-group anger 
mutes mobilization.  Consequently, in-group anger becomes a liability for the group.  The 
social obligation to take action against the out-group decreases when an individual feels 
as if her own in-group members are not cooperating.   
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The interplay between in-group and out-group anger needs more theoretical work 
and empirical testing, but future work needs to consider out-group anger and in-group 
anger simultaneously.  
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Appendix A 
Chapter 3 Materials 
Table 3.14 – Blocking Order and Subject Number  
Decision 1 [Same] Same Subject 
A AAA Same 1, 2, 3, 4 
H HHH Same 5, 6, 7, 8 
N NNN Same 9, 10, 11, 12 
Decision 2 [Equal]   
A AHH Equal 1, 2 
A  ANN Equal 3, 4 
H  HAA Equal 5, 6 
H HNN Equal 7, 8 
N NHH Equal 9, 10 
N NAA Equal 11, 12 
Decision 3 [Asymmetric 1]   
A  HHH Minority 1 
A  AAH Majority 2, 3, 4 
H HHA Majority 5, 6, 7 
H  AAA Minority 8 
N NNN Same 9, 10, 11, 12 
Decision 4 [Asymmetric 2]   
A AAN Majority 1, 2, 3 
A  HNN Mixed 4 
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H HHN Majority 5, 6, 7 
H ANN Mixed 8 
N AAA Minority 9 
N HHH Minority 10 
N AHN Mixed 11, 12 
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Table 3.15 – Other Measured Emotional Variables 
Type Emotion 1 Emotion 2 T-test N 
 Positive 1 Positive 2   
Angry 49.08 64.69 T=-5.27, p=.00 36 
Happy 71.11 66.77 T=1.66, p=.10 36 
Neutral 64.5 66.58 T=-0.74, p=.46 36 
 Negative 1 Negative 2   
Angry 49.08 31.52 T=5.35, p=.00 36 
Happy 25.02 29.33 T=-1.54,p=.13 36 
Neutral 30.08 28.5 T=.61,p=.54 36 
 Upset 1 Upset 2   
Angry 40.27 23.22 T=4.17, p=.0002 36 
Happy 16.25 16.22 T=.0085, p=.99 36 
Neutral 16.72 13.44 T=1.28, p=.20 36 
 Hostile 1 Hostile 2   
Angry 33.08 22.88 T=3.26, p=.00 36 
Happy 13.05 13.88 T=-0.2293, p=.81 36 
Neutral 17.88 13.02 T=1.75, p=.08 36 
 Inspire 1 Inspire 2   
Angry 38.97 48.11 T=-2.47, p=.01 36 
Happy 51.55 46.19 T=1.53, p=.13 36 
Neutral 45.22 53.30 T=-2.11, p=.04 36 
 Nervous 1 Nervous 2   
Angry 39.08 40.66 T=-0.30, p=.76 36 
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Happy 30.75 33.72 T=-.45, p=.64 36 
Neutral 33.5 34.63 T=-0.29, p=.77 36 
 Determined 1 Determined 2   
Angry 55.80 61.52 T=-1.70, p=.09 36 
Happy 62.44 57.19 T=1.70, p=.09 36 
Neutral 60.72 65.27 T=-1.48, p=.14 36 
 Alert 1 Alert 2   
Angry 61.83 55.52 T=1.89, p=.06 36 
Happy 52.61 54.66 T=-0.64, p=.52 36 
Neutral 57.97 61.83 T=-1.13, p=.26 36 
 Ashamed 1 Ashamed 2   
Angry 24.41 21.69 T=0.44, p=.66 36 
Happy 13.16 9.88 T=0.95, p=.34 36 
Neutral 14.58 16.52 T=-0.60, t=.55 36 
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Appendix B 
Chapter 5 and Measures of Other Emotions 
Table 5.14 – CPG: Individual Level Negative Emotions  
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Angry     
Fear 17.62 (6.59) 21.12    (7.40) -0.37 0.35 
Afraid 24.93 (6.17) 20.62    (5.63) 0.68 0.25 
Scared 28.06 (5.77) 18.93    (5.65) 2.07 0.02 
Bitter 29 (6.66) 32.37   (7.78) -0.39 0.34 
Resentful 30.18    (5.64) 30.5    (8.09) -0.03 0.48 
Control     
Fear 27.87 (6.22) 14.56   (4.43) 2.15 0.02 
Afraid 26.31  (6.072) 14.62    (4.30) 1.93 0.03 
Scared 27.31    (6.86) 10.2    (2.80) 2.71 0.00 
Bitter 21.62    (5.31) 33.5    (8.23) -1.21 0.12 
Resentful 20    (5.12) 35.31    (8.11) -1.46 0.08 
N= 64, 32 angry and 32 Control 
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Table 5.15 – CPG: Negative Emotions Directed at In-Group 
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Anger     
Fear 28 (6.43) 17.75 (4.55) 2.01 0.03 
Afraid 28.62 (5.99) 20.25 (4.65) 1.36 0.09 
Scared 22.87 (5.37) 19.62 (5.37) 0.66 0.25 
Bitter 14.81 (3.58) 27.93 (8.18) -1.87 0.04 
Resentful 25.37 (5.01) 26.87 (7.69) -0.25 0.39 
Control     
Fear 25.06 (4.96 ) 10.87 (3.55) 2.77 0.00 
Afraid 30.06 (5.84) 11.87 (3.68) 3.47 0.00 
Scared 25.93 (5.08) 13.75 (3.76) 2.62 0.00 
Bitter 17.5 (4.95) 35.87 (9.01) -1.75 0.04 
Resentful 17 (3.70) 37.12 (8.64) -2.08 0.02 
N= 64, 32 angry and 32 Control 
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Table 5.16 – CPG Negative Emotions Directed at Out-Group  
Emotion Pre Post t-score p-value 
Anger     
Fear 27.81 (6.93) 23.5 (6.00) 0.58 0.28 
Afraid 31.43 (7.08) 21.62 (4.61) 1.55 0.06 
Scared 32.43 (6.60) 19.81 (5.31) 2.10 0.02 
Bitter 21.37 (6.19) 48.56 (9.22) -2.81 0.00 
Resentful 22 (6.20) 50.25 (9.46) -3.24 0.00 
Control     
Fear 31.31 (5.11) 15.37 (4.85) 2.72 0.00 
Afraid 27.75 (4.41) 16.31 (4.35) 2.29 0.01 
Scared 30.62 (5.24) 14.68 (3.84) 1.77 0.01 
Bitter 34.75 (6.03) 36.93 (8.47) 2.41 0.37 
Resentful 29.37 (5.87) 36.62 (8.87) -1.24 0.11 
N= 64, 32 angry and 32 neutral 
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Table 5.17 – TPG Individual Level Negative Emotions 
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Angry     
Fear 23.93 (7.40) 18.87 (5.59) 0.61 0.27 
Afraid 20.43 (6.13) 18 (5.72) 0.31 0.37 
Scared 21.93 (6.65) 17.5  (5.72) 0.56 0.29 
Bitter 24.5 (6.32) 33.75 (6.97) -1.49 0.07 
Resentful 17 (5.24) 25.87 (6.09) -1.39 0.09 
Control     
Fear 14.5 (5.60) 10.125 (5.22) 0.68 0.74 
Afraid 18.37 (7.36) 12.56 (5.20) 0.80 0.21 
Scared 15.93 (6.82) 10.06 (4.46) 0.97 0.17 
Bitter 14.31 (5.90) 29.25 (7.84) -1.77 0.04 
Resentful 10.5 (6.25) 24.87 (7.14) -1.41 0.08 
N= 64, 32 angry and 32 neutral 
 191 
 
Table 5.18 – TPG Negative Emotions Directed at Out-Group  
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Angry     
Fear 29.25 (6.50) 19.31 (5.40) 1.48 0.07 
Afraid 31.93 (7.35) 18.25 (6.31) 2.08 0.02 
Scared 30.87 (6.90) 21.43 (6.07) 1.22 0.12 
Bitter 22.18 (6.42) 44.06 (8.50) -3.36 0.00 
Resentful 22.43 (6.68) 42.5 (8.25) -2.56 0.01 
Control     
Fear 22.25 (5.84) 11.5 (4.73) 1.32 0.10 
Afraid 15 (4.40) 10.18 (4.29) 0.76 0.22 
Scared 21.75 (5.78) 10.31 (4.39) 1.45 0.08 
Bitter 25.81 (7.72) 27.81 (6.98) -0.23 0.59 
Resentful 20.68 (5.91) 25.5 (7.65) -0.55 0.29 
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Appendix C 
Chapter 6 and Other Emotion Measures 
Table 6.16 – Individual Level Negative Emotions Directed at Oneself  
Emotion Pre Post T-Score P-Value 
Anger     
Fear 24.25 (5.34)  25.04 (5.16) -0.10 0.45   
Afraid 22.20 (4.62)   19 (4.20)  0.59 0.27 
Scared 24.45(5.13) 21.04 (4.00)  0.54 0.29 
Bitter 28.41 (4.67)   35.87 (6.32) -0.98 0.16      
Resentful 29.45 (4.50) 51.87 (6.95) -2.88 0.00   
Control     
Fear 20.62 (4.43) 13.62 (3.61) 1.80  0.04 
Afraid 23.75 (5.07)   14.75 (4.52)   2.09  0.02 
Scared  25.16 (5.31)  13 (4.09)  2.47 0.01 
Bitter 25.12 (4.80)   24.08 (6.42)  0.16  0.43 
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Resentful 30.16 (5.48) 23.54 (5.91) 1.31  0.10 
 
Table 6.17 – Negative Emotions Directed at In-Group  
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Anger     
Fear 26.37 (5.38) 21.91 (5.60)  0.64 0.26 
Afraid 28.16 (4.96) 23.95 (5.41)  0.60 0.27 
Scared  32.33 (5.71) 23.5 (5.57)  1.24 0.11 
Bitter 19.66 (5.09) 39.54 (6.57)  -2.47 0.01    
Resentful 20.29 (4.13)  45.45 (7.01) -3.33 0.00 
Control     
Fear 32.91 (5.15)  16.04 (5.08) 2.31 0.01 
Afraid 36.87 (4.26)  11.87 (3.79)  5.04 0.00 
Scared 28.45 (4.07) 12.12 (3.59) 3.34 0.00 
Bitter 21.16 (4.50) 21.41 (5.31)  -0.04 0.48 
Resentful 20.29 (4.10) 23.25 (5.52) -0.48  0.31  
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Table 6.18 – Negative Emotions Directed at Out-Group  
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Angry     
Fear 32.41 (5.23)   32.29 (6.15)  0.01 0.49 
Afraid 29.79 (5.02)   25 (6.07) 0.66 0.25 
Scared 29.37 (5.65) 24.91 (6.25) 0.62 0.27 
Bitter 32.83 (4.94) 63.95 (6.98)  -4.46 0.00   
Resentful 30.25 (4.84) 64.58 (5.88)   -4.50 0.00  
Control     
Fear   27.37 (4.39)  15.58 (3.50 2.37 0.01 
Afraid 25.83 (5.18) 16.25 (4.14) 1.74 0.04 
Scared 26.41 (4.82) 14.45 (4.18) 2.15 0.02 
Bitter 25.66 (5.04) 16.33 (4.40)  1.83 0.03 
Resentful 27.66 (5.34) 19.54 (5.14) 1.56 0.06 
 
 
Change In Other Emotions: TPG3 
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Table 6.19 – Individual Level Negative Emotions Directed at Oneself  
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Anger     
Fear 30.18 (4.56)  18.37 (3.99) 2.52 0.00 
Afraid 25.84 (4.70) 18.31 (3.78)  1.89 0.03 
Scared 31.09 (4.48) 20.43 (4.08) 2.65 0.00 
Bitter 31.5 (4.76)   49.15 (5.36) -2.95  0.00    
Resentful 24.71 (3.85)  47.12 (4.84)  -3.98 0.00    
Control     
Fear 26.28 (4.64)  17.84 (3.66)  1.91 0.03 
Afraid 23.84 (4.31)  17.46 (3.35)  1.57 0.06 
Scared 23.90 (4.19) 18.15 (3.53)   1.29 0.10 
Bitter 21.62 (4.05) 22.03 (3.50)  -0.09 0.46 
Resentful 19.96 (3.58)   20 (3.77)  -0.00 0.49 
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Table 6.20– Negative Emotions Directed at In-Group  
Emotion Pre  Post T-score P-value 
Anger     
Fear 19.18 (3.09)    18.81 (3.22)   0.11 0.45 
Afraid 25.21 (3.61) 17.71 (2.95)    1.91 0.03 
Scared 21.78 (3.40)  17.56 (3.36) 0.98 0.16 
Bitter 16.21 (3.37)    46.21 (4.90)  -4.83 0.00  
Resentful 17.12 (3.14)  40.62 (4.82) -4.24  0.00 
Control     
Fear 22 (4.19) 12.65 (2.51) 2.59  0.00 
Afraid  25.53 (4.04) 14.34 (2.75) 2.79 0.00 
Scared 25.40 (3.79)  25.40 (3.79)  3.14 0.00 
Bitter  14.37 (3.35) 17.28 (3.35)   -0.63  0.26   
Resentful 16.15 (3.59) 16.15 (3.59)  0.44  0.33 
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Table 6.21 – Negative Emotions Directed at Out-Group  
Emotion Pre Post T-score P-value 
Angry     
Fear 36 (4.40)  18.78 (3.19)   3.67 0.00 
Afraid  34.06 (3.93)  18.43 (3.38)   3.96 0.00 
Scared  36 (4.39) 15.34 (2.79)   4.87 0.00 
Bitter 25.96 (4.31)    56.5 (4.93)   -5.05 0.00  
Resentful 28.37 (4.60) 58.43 (4.63)     -5.63 0.00   
Control     
Fear  32 (3.82)  21.78 (3.74) 2.68 0.00 
Afraid 29.12 (3.86) 18.43 (3.47)  2.91 0.00 
Scared 27.46 (3.90)   18.25 (3.62)  2.18 0.01 
Bitter 27.25 (4.04) 26.90 (4.065)  0.07 0.47 
Resentful 26.81 (3.86)  25.81 (4.19)  0.20 0.41 
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Table 6.22 – Mean Contributions by Type, Period, and Game 
TPG2 Control Angry TPG3 Control Angry 
1 14.2 15.33 1 12.65 12.68 
2 14.37 14.62 2 14 13.59 
3 15.45 13.75 3 13.71 12.96 
4 16.5 14.12 4 12.71 9.18 
5 16.25 14.5 5 14.09 10.81 
6 15.87 13.25 6 13.75 11.06 
7 15.37 11.25 7 12.31 9.81 
8 15.95 13.75 8 11.68 8.68 
9 16.25 13.29 9 12.68 10.81 
10 15.41 14.08 10 12.37 9.43 
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Table 6.23 – TPG2: Period-by-Period T-Test 
Period Angry Control T-score P value 
1 15.33 (1.02) 14.20 (1.49) -0.61 0.26 
2 14.62 (1.62) 14.37 (1.49) -0.11 0.45 
3 13.75 (1.66) 15.45 (1.43) 0.77 0.22 
4 14.12 (1.68) 16.5 (1.20) 1.14 0.12 
5 14.5 (1.67) 16.25 (1.36) 0.80 0.21 
6 13.25 (1.75) 15.87 (1.44) 1.15 0.12 
7 11.25 (1.95) 15.37 (1.54) 1.65 0.05* 
8 13.75 (1.66) 15.95 (1.41) 1.01 0.15 
9 13.29 (1.80) 16.25 (1.33) 1.31 0.09 
10 14.08 (1.67) 15.41 (1.46) 0.59 0.27 
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Table 6.24 – TPG3: Period-by-Period T-Test 
Period Angry Control T-Score P-Value 
1 12.68 (1.26) 12.65 (1.21) -0.01 0.49 
2 13.59 (1.39) 14 (1.19) 0.22 0.41 
3 12.96 (1.19) 13.71 (1.32) 0.41 0.33 
4 9.18 (1.42) 12.71 (1.40) 1.76 0.04* 
5 10.87 (1.30) 14.09 (1.24) 1.78 0.03* 
6 11.06 (1.40) 13.75    (1.31) 1.39 0.08 
7 9.81 (1.41) 12.31    (1.43) 1.23 0.11 
8 8.68 (1.57) 11.68    (1.47) 1.39 0.08 
9 10.81 (1.49) 12.68    (1.35) 0.92 0.17 
10 9.43 (1.56) 12.37    (1.39) 1.40 0.08 
 
 
